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DISSERTATION ABSTRACT 
 
Jordan L. Green 
 
Doctor of Philosophy 
 
Department of English 
 
June 2017 
 
Title: Musing Sadly on the Dead: Erotic Epistemology in the Nineteenth-Century English 
Elegy 
 
This project is about what I am calling an “erotic epistemology” in nineteenth-
century English elegiac poetry, a condition or event in a poetic text in which the discourses 
of love and knowledge are, to use a term Shelley liked to describe the experience of love, 
“intermixed.” The persistence of this inter-discourse suggests some fundamental 
connection between the desire for love and the desire for knowledge. Curiously, these 
performances of erotic longing insist urgently in the rhetorical, formal, and somatic 
registers of elegiac poetry in the nineteenth century. 
The confrontation with death that elegy stages is ideal for thinking about the 
relationship between erotic desire and poetic knowledge. As the limit case of a mind 
confronting an ultimately unknowable condition, the furthest expression of an impossible 
desire—the desire for the dead—elegies are love poems as well as death poems. This 
dissertation argues that Percy Bysshe Shelley’s Adonais for John Keats (1821), Alfred 
Tennyson’s In Memoriam for Arthur Hallam (1850), Algernon Charles Swinburne’s Ave 
Atque Vale for Charles Baudelaire (1867), and Thomas Tod Stoddart’s The Death-Wake 
(1831), perform the poetics of mourning as an erotic discourse, and allow an intimate 
understanding of a dead other that is an experience of pleasure. 
Much scholarship on the concept of eros considers it nearly synonymous with 
  v 
sexual desire and bodily pleasure. This project establishes a mode of reading elegy through 
its figures and forms that conceptualizes eros in these poems beyond sexuality, and without 
the burdens of biography and history. By stepping outside the critical confines of generic 
convention, literary influence, and eros-as-sexual want, this dissertation reevaluates the 
interpretive possibilities of erotic desire and language in a genre that is not commonly read 
as an amorous mode of speech. For these elegists, knowledge itself is an object of amorous 
desire, and epistemological want is a motive force of poetic mourning. These poems arrive 
at the pleasure of this knowledge through verse forms and figures of speech that perform an 
intimate textual relationship between the living and the dead, and when these linguistic 
events occur, the elegies reveal themselves as love poems. 
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CHAPTER I 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 I begin this dissertation with the following proposition: elegies are love poems. As 
they speak of or to an absent other who is a figure or object of intense desire and 
pleasure, represented as in possession of some privileged knowledge available only to the 
poetic speaker, and the attainment of which is ever just beyond their grasp, mourning 
poems think like love poems. My study of elegy stems from this observation that the 
language of poetic mourning in the nineteenth century has powerful echoes in the 
language of love. This project explores the elegiac relationship between the speaker and 
the lost object in canonical and non-canonical elegiac texts that range across the middle 
of the nineteenth century, from Adonais in 1821, The Death-Wake in 1831, In Memoriam 
in 1850, and through Ave Atque Vale in 1867. These poems perform what I am calling a 
“textually erotic” relationship, or a textual intimacy, in which pleasure is a somatic and 
intellectual experience that inheres in the language of epistemological want and in certain 
rhetorical figures and formal structures of desire. In the poetry of mourning, I will argue, 
language is the elegiac subject’s erotic potential.  
 Elegy speaks in the absence of an other who can respond. A central aim of this 
project is to think about other possibilities for this “other,” interpretive opportunities that 
are raised in the language and form of these elegies. The lost object in elegy does not 
need to be a person, or even an object at all, but can be an experience or event, a 
sensation, an affect, or a concept that gives the elegiac speaker knowledge and pleasure 
of some kind.1 What I mean is that elegiac love, like Platonic love, is ultimately for 
                                                
1 This is a variation of what John Rosenberg writes in Elegy for an Age, in which he defines elegy as any 
poem about a personal loss. I expand on Rosenberg later in the introduction. 
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something other than an other (a human other)—it is a love of knowledge, of wisdom, of 
the Good, mediated by the pleasure of the poetic text. I raise this possibility to introduce a 
way of thinking about eros that does not circumscribe it within the sexual body, and an 
understanding of knowledge and knowing that does not limit them to cognition, intuition, 
and mental experience, but pursues them as erotic events that course through the multiple 
speaking and silent bodies in the elegies, and through the bodies of the elegiac texts 
themselves, and even as they cross over to the position of the reading body.  
 The following chapters seek to discover what erotic knowledge sounds and looks 
like, what it tastes like and how it feels; and further, how these figures and objects that 
exist only in language allow the living speaker to touch the dead. I propose that, for Percy 
Bysshe Shelley, Alfred Tennyson, Algernon Charles Swinburne, and Thomas Tod 
Stoddart, poetic mourning is grounded in a desire to know and love the dead. In these 
poems, figuration and form are the means by which the mourning poet seeks to gain an 
intimate knowledge of the lost object, and it is this desire for intimate knowledge of the 
other that makes these elegies erotic. Put differently, the linguistic encounter between the 
living speaker and the dead love-object in these poems reveals that knowledge itself (in 
various forms which I detail below) can be an object, and knowing an experience, of 
pleasure, something that can be pursued “like a lover.”2 
 The argument I pursue throughout this project seeks to orient discussions of elegy 
and eroticism around their textuality—around figuration, versification, and form—as the 
means of writing desire for the lost love-object. The textual dimension of elegiac eros 
happens rhetorically through particular figures of speech, and formally through meter, 
                                                
2 This simile, “like a lover,” is from Swinburne’s Ave Atque Vale; I return to it in Chapter 2. 
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grammar, and even punctuation, which are the mechanisms of poetic pleasure. Yet the 
difficulty of determining what pleasure is and means in elegy is already apparent, and I 
aim to show how these elegies thematize the nature and particular qualities of pleasure as 
a continual problem of language that seeks the dead. Following this elusive pleasure 
through the body and bodies of the elegiac text is another main goal of this project. 
 This dissertation also seeks to address the delightfully playful and cheeky question 
posed by Roland Barthes in The Pleasure of the Text: “[W]hat if knowledge itself were 
delicious?” (23).3 Barthes, of course, ever the punster, always has in mind the multiplicity 
of language, and here, “delicious” has a double meaning: the first is metaphorical and 
signifies knowledge as an immaterial, conceptual object of desire; the second, and more 
interesting, implies that knowledge is a somatic pleasure—in this instance, delicious 
knowledge delights the sense of taste. I introduce Barthes as a model to show how 
Adonais, Ave Atque Vale, The Death-Wake, and In Memoriam each raise the possibility 
that knowledge and knowing can be experienced as a delectation. 
Elegiac Tremblings 
 A study of eros in nineteenth-century British poetry—perhaps in any field of 
Western humanistic thought—should probably begin with Plato, and I take my concept of 
eros from the Symposium. The fundamental question of this dialogue is over the nature of 
E/eros, or love. The guests at the banquet for Agathon—Phaedrus, Pausanias, 
Eryximachus, Aristophanes, Socrates, Alcibiades—each take turns trying to explain what 
eros is. My interest, though, lies in the character who is not there: Diotima (as spoken by 
                                                
3 Barthes asks this question in the immediate context of the political implications of pleasure as being right 
or left, clerisy or radicalism; I aim to place it into conversation with the erotic and epistemological 
conditions of the elegy. 
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Socrates). She poses to Socrates a variation of the fundamental question of this 
dissertation: how are we to understand what love and lovers are, what they seek and 
desire?4 “Why do we call some people lovers and not others?”, she asks (205b). Her 
answer is characteristically elliptical: “‘In essence, every type of desire for good things or 
happiness is what constitutes, in all cases, ‘powerful and treacherous love’. But this can 
be approached by many routes, and those who do so by other means, such as making 
money or athletics or philosophy, aren’t described as ‘loving’ or ‘lovers’. It’s only those 
whose enthusiasm is directed at one specific type who are described by terminology that 
belongs to the whole class, that of love, loving and lovers’” (205d).5 In the following 
chapters, I put pressure on the “type[s]” and “terminology” of love and lovers in the 
elegies to think about how the elegiac relation can be written as an erotic relation 
between the living and the dead.  
 Another aspect of Platonic thought that resonates in the elegies and informs my 
readings is the double register of touch and touching. When thinking about the language 
of Platonic eros, it caught my attention that, despite the insistence that transcendence of 
the body is ultimately necessary for attaining spiritual immortality and possessing “the 
Good,” the rhetoric of touch, though problematic and unstable, seems crucial for 
elaborating the conditions of eros. Two brief quotations and a close reading should 
demonstrate how touch can be an epistemological act, a mode of understanding: “[A]ll 
                                                
4 I should note here that the definition of eros, which is the fundamental question of the Symposium, 
changes reference and meaning throughout the dialogue. Sometimes eros and love are used 
interchangeably, sometimes in contrast—alighting on a stable definition will continue to be a problem for 
the dialogue and this dissertation. 
 
5 The comparison Diotima makes is to writing/poeisis itself: “When anything comes into being which did 
not exist before,” she says, “the cause of this is always composition” (206a, 43). 
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who rightly touch philosophy, study nothing else than to die, and to be dead,” Plato says.6 
In positing philosophy as something touchable, and touching as a mode of studying (of 
knowledge), the body that touches and is touched by philosophy is the necessary 
intermediary that translates sense perception into knowledge. In my readings, I examine 
particular figures of speech that function as acts of touch, that allow the elegiac speaker 
to touch the dead with language. Agathon speaks a variation of this idea that imagines 
touching as an act of Love: Eros is “so skilled a poet that he makes others into poets. 
Everyone turns into a poet […] when he is touched by Love. We may take this as 
evidence that Love is a good composer” he says (196e).7 “Love” is both a god and a 
concept in the Symposium, and the creator of poets. In the first quotation, touching 
enables philosophical understanding; in the second, touching makes poets. In both 
examples, though Plato is (or at least thinks he is) using “touch” figuratively to mean 
“think” or “study” or “inspire,” the term also invokes a physical touching.  
 Earlier in the Symposium, for instance, when Socrates arrives to the banquet being 
held in honor of Agathon’s winning a poetry competition, the rhetoric of touch turns 
interestingly and explicitly toward the physical body: “Come hither,” Agathon says to 
Socrates, “and sit down by me; so that by the mere touch of one so wise as you are, [d] I 
may enjoy the fruit of thy meditations.” Socrates replies, archly, but not dismissively: “It 
would be well, Agathon, if wisdom were of such a nature as that when we touched each 
other, it would overflow of its own accord, from him who possesses much to him who 
                                                
6 I have not been able to find the original source of this quote in Plato’s work. See Walter Pater, Plato and 
Platonism: A Series of Lectures. London and New York: Macmillan, 144. Print. George Levine uses this 
quotation as an epigram to his book, Dying to Know: Scientific Epistemology and Narrative in Victorian 
England. Chicago and London: U of Chicago P, 2002. 1. 
 
7 Later, Diotima says: “[B]ecause Love inspires people to poetry, and poetry is identical to wisdom, Love is 
wise” (74, n. 82). 
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possesses little […] [e] If wisdom had this property, I should esteem myself most 
fortunate in reclining near to you. I should thus soon be filled, I think, with the most 
beautiful and various wisdom” (7). While Socrates may say this wistfully, in the hope 
that it might be true, and regret that it is not, the possibility that arises here also arises, in 
various ways, in Adonais, Ave Atque Vale, and The Death-Wake. These poems seek, 
through multiple rhetorical and formal strategies, and with varying degrees of success, 
ways of touching the dead so that they, like Agathon, might come to intimate knowledge 
of their desire.8 
 The particular problem of elegiac knowledge, however, is that the object of desire 
is dead and unavailable to the poets. How, then, can the living speakers attain the deathly 
knowledge they seek? The following chapters will show that in the context of elegy, 
knowledge is available only through figures and figuration, which allows the speaker to 
inscribe the love object in the materiality of language, which I take up shortly. I will 
argue that in the absence of an other who can respond, the dead poet’s corpus becomes 
the material substitute for the dead poet himself, and the site of a metonymic relationship 
between the speaker and the dead. The elegiac text, in other words, is a way of touching 
the dead with language. I present an example here from Adonais, which I develop in 
Chapter One, to briefly illustrate how the poem itself helps us to read the process of 
Platonic eros in the nineteenth-century elegy as a textual condition, by which I mean a 
relationship between elegist and elegized enacted in and by the figurative language of the 
                                                
8 In Gill’s translation, this reads: “‘Come and lie down beside me,” Agathon says to him, “so that, by 
contact with you, I can share the piece of wisdom that came to you in the porch’” (175d, 7). Socrates 
replies, archly, but not dismissively: “‘How splendid it would be, Agathon, if wisdom was the sort of thing 
that could flow from the fuller to the emptier of us when we touch each other […] If wisdom is really like 
that, I regard it as a great privilege to share your couch. I expect to be filled up from your rich supply of 
fine wisdom’” (175e, 7). Shelley’s translation of this scene has subtle stylistic and word-choice differences 
that may have implications for this close reading, which I will develop in future work. 
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text. In stanza nine, Shelley is in the middle of conventionally invoking a long procession 
of mourners to visit Adonais’s grave and share his own grief: 
O, weep for Adonais!—The quick Dreams, 
The passion-winged Ministers of thought, 
Who were his flocks, whom near the living streams  
Of his young spirit he fed, and whom he taught 
The love which was its music, wander not,— (ll. 73-77) 
These “quick Dreams,” Adonais’s “flocks,” are representations of Keats’s own poetic 
inventions, figures arisen from his poetic corpus.9 When Shelley calls on them here to 
mourn their creator, they are the figure of speech of metonymy, which reveals 
relationships with connected or closely associated words, ideas, and objects.10 When I 
return to this passage in Chapter One, I explore how this figure of speech functions to 
reveal or posit the body of the dead poet in the body of the text, a process that makes 
reading the dead poet’s corpus an act of touching of his body with/in language. The 
“quick Dreams” that are metonymic representations of Adonais’s poems, are also 
“passion-winged Ministers of thought,” representations of Keatsian love and 
knowledge.11 By linguistically linking the textual “bodies” (figures) in Keats’s poetry to 
                                                
9 The Norton Critical Edition identifies the “quick Dreams” as “living Dreams,” “personifications” of 
“various aspects of Keats’s mental life as his flocks, according to the tradition of pastoral elegy” (l. 73, n. 2, 
413). 
10 Roman Jakobson has identified metonymy as a linguistic process that works by contiguity, and is the 
thought-structure of narrative prose. Later, I expand on the figure of metonymy in elegy and explain how it 
works differently than metaphor, which Jakobson claims is the thought-structure of poetry. 
 
11 In my reading of Adonais in Chapter One, I attempt to explain what “Keatsian love and knowledge” 
mean for Shelley, and how this might shape his figures. 
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the now absent body of Keats himself, amorous and epistemological desire “happen” in a 
single, eroticized figure of speech.12 
 A related difficulty of specifying the kind or nature of this knowledge of the dead 
lies in the fact that there is no single or stable object of deathly knowledge that can be 
articulated precisely.13 Death closes off the possibility of a concrete knowledge of the lost 
object in itself, and in the absence of this possibility, the only kind of knowledge 
available to the poetic speaker is an understanding of his relationship with the lost love-
object. This relational knowledge is not a determinate understanding of subject and object 
as discrete entities; rather, it is an awareness akin to what Roland Barthes calls the 
“transport”—the avenue or structure of linguistic interaction—between the desiring 
subject and the object of desire.14 My poets seek this relational knowledge through 
figures of speech that signify the nature of the relation between themselves as living, 
speaking subjects and their dead love-objects. A figure of speech is not itself a discrete 
subject or a discrete object, but a linguistic construction of the relationship between a 
discrete subject and a discrete object; a more conventional definition of a figure of speech 
is: “a ‘trope’ or ‘turn’ in language from the proper or literal meaning, and is therefore 
entirely intralinguistic.”15 The figures I discuss are not explicitly Platonic in the sense that 
Socrates himself employs them to explain Eros in Symposium; rather, they are 
                                                
12 As it desires the dead as an object of knowledge, and takes pleasure in the pursuit of that knowledge, the 
elegiac text becomes a figure of the epistemology of dying and death. 
 
13 See Goodwin and Bronfen, Death and Representation, and Burke, “Thanatopsis for Critics.” 
 
14 Kostenbaum, Wayne: “In Sade, Fourier, Loyola, he succinctly described his hermeneutic method: ‘I 
listen to the message’s transport, not the message.’ Banish the message. Preserve the exaltation that 
surrounds it. Investigate the perfume that the message leaves behind” (52). 
 
15 Credit is due to Forest Pyle for this articulation. 
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structurally Platonic in how they operate in the text to draw together the εραστεσ 
(erastes) and the εροµενοσ (eromenos), the lover/amorous subject and the beloved object, 
in a relation grounded on the desire for knowledge. 
 The figural and epistemological possibilities of elegiac eroticism I examine in this 
project reveal a correspondence to a modern theory of language, love, and knowledge we 
find in Roland Barthes’s A Lover’s Discourse: Fragments (1978).16 In the discourse of 
love, Barthes writes seductively, “Language is a skin; I rub my language against the 
other. It is as if I had words instead of fingers, or fingers at the tip of my words. My 
language trembles with desire” (73). The amorous elegiac speakers in these poems, I aim 
to show, press their language over, and into, and through, the material and metonymic 
body of the love object, like the Barthesian lover runs fingers over a beloved’s skin. 
These “tremblings” of language manifest in particular moments of figural and formal 
touch between the living speaker and the dead love-object. 
Why the Eros of Mourning?17 
 The elegy is ideal for rethinking eros because, as a love poem as well as a death 
poem, its language dwells at and seeks to traverse the boundary between life and death. 
These conditions—love and death—are the extremes of human experience; they occupy 
the farthest reaches of desire, knowledge, and fear, and inhabit the most intimate spaces 
of the mind. The confrontation with death that elegy stages is a prime opportunity 
through which to think about the relationship between poetic pleasure and knowledge 
because it presents the limit case of a desiring consciousness confronting an ultimately 
                                                
16 This is the year of the English translation. It was originally published in French in 1977. 
 
17 Eros in Mourning is the title of Henry Staten’s 2001 book. 
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unknowable condition. Elegiac speech is the furthest expression of an excessive desire—
the desire for intimacy with the dead—and as such it illuminates the point where the 
poet's longing reaches its limit in language and pathos.18 
My reinterpretation of Eros will show it to be a complex mode of epistemological 
desire in which the elegist’s pursuit of a poetic and philosophical knowledge of death 
gives intellectual and bodily—but not necessarily sexual—pleasure. It may seem odd to 
claim that eroticism is not about sexual pleasure, and at the same time that the elegy does 
represent a kind of amorous relation between the poets that is structurally and rhetorically 
analogous to a lover’s discourse. How can Shelley and Keats, or Swinburne and 
Baudelaire, be considered to have an erotic relationship if sexual desire is not at issue 
between them, and no direct reciprocity is possible? The question asks that we recall the 
Platonic origins of Eros, as an experience of pleasure and knowledge. This is not an 
anachronistic application of Platonic thought to the text, but rather an attempt to show 
how these texts have already inscribed the epistemological pleasure of Platonic eros. 
We will also gain a more flexible and yet more precise, sense of elegiac figuration 
in that metonymy need not be relegated to narrative, and in that the relational action of a 
figure of speech signifies more insistently in elegy because the two objects or ideas that a 
figure can put in relation dwell on opposite sides of the boundary of death. Put 
differently, when a living speaker tries to speak across the boundary of death, to reach for 
the lost-object, he finds it intangible, indistinguishable; when poets cannot grasp their 
                                                
18 Harrison notes that Swinburne’s work “entails a real existential concern as he used poetic depictions of 
carnal desire to ‘express … his sense of life’s inevitably tragic development for all spirited men and 
women: tragic because satisfying our passionate impulses is ultimately impossible’” (62). He also draws a 
smart connection to Swinburne’s Romantic predecessors: “Like Byron and Keats, then, Swinburne 
subscribes to a Romantic tradition that ‘generated a mythology of ‘Soul-making’—of enrichment and 
redemption through desire and through suffering—that went far beyond orthodox conceptions of sexual 
morality and immorality’ (‘Swinburne’s Losses’ 690) (62). 
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desire in concrete terms due to death’s opacity to the senses, the linguistic relation they 
create becomes their significance. 
 Elegy has long been a contested genre, and determining its particular nature and 
characteristics has been the difficult starting point for most major critical approaches to 
this literary mode. Karen Weisman, in her introduction to the recent Oxford Handbook of 
The Elegy (2010), writes, “Elegy inhabits a world of contradiction. The narrative of its 
historical development is torturous at best, and the unraveling of its salient 
preoccupations betrays a persistent entanglement with its generic and formalist relatives. 
In its adjectival form it is all-pervasive in literary criticism, and yet few scholars would 
profess certainty in knowing precisely what elegiac denotes” (1).19 As it has historically 
included an array of forms, meters, moods, speakers, and desires, elegy is among the 
most diffuse literary practices. Originally referring to a Greek stanzaic form—a couplet 
of hexameter and pentameter lines (though even this seems not to be agreed on)—its 
meaning has undergone significant changes over the course of its history.20 The Early 
Modern elegy (which begins with Spenser’s “Astrophel” (1595) for Sir Philip Sydney, 
for example, has roots in classical love poetry and amatory complaint.21 It is only by the 
                                                
19 She continues, in language that anticipates some of my own: “Most scholars of post-classical elegy trace 
its foundations to antiquity, yet in the world of classical studies, there is still no consensus on the origin of 
elegy […] When taken in the more contemporary sense as the framing of loss, elegy can be pulled between 
the worlds of the living and the dead, between the present life of sorrow and the vanished past of putative 
greater joy. Between the extremes of life and death, joy and sorrow, the receding past and the swiftly 
moving present, falls the elegy as we know it today. This is a burden uncertainly borne by many elegiac 
poems and art forms. More than any other literary kind, elegy pushes against the limits of our expressive 
resources precisely at the very moment in which we confront our mortality, which is as much to say that it 
throws into relief the inefficacy of language precisely when we need it most” (1). 
 
20 See Gregory Nagy, “Ancient Greek Elegy” in The Oxford Handbook of The Elegy (2010). 
 
21 “Classical” love elegy is the main the term Gordon Braden uses in his essay in The Oxford Handbook, 
“Classical Love Elegy in the Renaissance (and After)” (153). It is also referred to as the “Latin” love elegy 
(George Luck), or the “Roman” love elegy, and sometimes these terms are used interchangeably. 
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mid-eighteenth century, Thomas Pfau argues, that elegy comes to be understood in its 
modern sense, as the poetry of mourning.22 Though it converges in the late eighteenth 
century around the expression and consolation of grief, in the early nineteenth century it 
undergoes significant formal and thematic expansions that Stuart Curran considers to 
represent “Romantic elegiac hybridity” (238).23 And, in the Victorian era, John 
Rosenberg claims, the category of elegy expands even further, to become “a mode of 
expression that transcends all restrictions of genre” (4).24  
 Thomas Pfau offers a compelling counter-history of elegy derived from Schiller 
and Hegel. He claims that “the elegiac [is] the defining characteristic of aesthetic 
production in Modernity” (548), which we are to understand as the historical self-
consciousness of an era—in this case, the pre-Romantic and Romantic era—that thinks of 
itself and its art in terms of historical discontinuity.25 What happens to the poetry of loss, 
and scholarship on the poetry of loss, when it can be expanded across all genres and 
forms, as Rosenberg implies, or absorbed into history itself, as Pfau suggests? The result 
of this literary-philosophical turn to “Modernity” in the late eighteenth century, with its 
                                                
22 Thomas Pfau, “Mourning Modernity: Classical Antiquity, Romantic Theory, and Elegiac Form,” The 
Oxford Handbook of The Elegy, 546. 
 
23 See Stuart Curran, “Romantic Elegiac Hybridity,” in The Oxford Handbook. 
 
24 It remains, nonetheless, one of the most conventionally- determined genres; that is, elegy is (rather) 
consistently identified as a genre through an extensive set of conventions. According to Peter Sacks, these 
include: a pastoral setting, vegetation myths and deities, an invocation to the Muse, a procession of 
mourners, the questioning and cursing of death, praise for the dead, repetition and refrain, traditional 
images of resurrection, the eclogic division between mourning voices, poetic contests and rewards, and the 
movement from grief to consolation through the possibility of immortality, all of which are done with an 
unusual degree of self-consciousness over the act of elegy itself (2). 
 
25 My argument pushes against what he considers the theoretical limitations of “formal readings” that 
attend to such things as prosody, tone, and literary self-consciousness. I consider attending to the internal 
logic and movements of elegy is precisely how we can understand the erotic epistemology of nineteenth-
century elegiac poetry. 
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punctuated sense of history, has been that “elegy” has come to mean nearly any poem, 
adhering to genre convention or not, that expresses a deeply felt personal loss.26 And 
further, if any poem that expresses a profound loss can be called “elegiac,” then much of 
post-Enlightenment poetry would in some way fall under this heading, and “elegy” 
becomes less a literary mode of mourning than a historical condition that can, 
incidentally, be expressed in poetry.27 Ironically, the genre that confronts the final 
boundary of mortal experience threatens to become a genre without bounds. A parallel 
irony arises from my claim that elegiac poems express a desire for knowledge in response 
to an event that marks the foreclosure of knowledge.  
 One further difficulty of classifying elegy is that the poetry of mourning can take a 
multitude of formal shapes. The three canonical elegies I look at, for instance, are 
composed in three distinct stanzaic forms: Spenserian stanza, In Memoriam stanza, and, 
for lack of a more precise term, the elaborately rhymed and metered, eleven-line Ave 
                                                
26 This view of elegy belongs originally to Samuel Taylor Coleridge, who insisted that, “although elegy 
may treat of any subject, it must remain ‘always and exclusively’ personal”; and his own claim for elegy is 
that it must “center on personal loss, although that loss may be of places or beliefs as well as persons, and 
the person may be imaginary” (Rosenberg 4). 
 
27 The range of poems in the long nineteenth-century that are not in the canonical elegiac tradition but are 
clearly “elegiac” is quite broad. A small selection includes: Charlotte Smith’s “Elegiac Sonnets” (1785); 
Wordsworth’s “Elegiac Stanzas” (1807); “posthumous voice” death lyrics of Christina Rossetti (1830-94), 
and toward the end of the century, Oscar Wilde’s sonnets on the graves of Shelley and Keats (1881). From 
these diverse examples, we can begin to see the categorization problems Weisman refers to, yet the 
difficulty of alighting on a stable definition is precisely what makes it such an exciting problem for 
scholarship. This term comes from Claire Raymond, whose book The Posthumous Voice in Women’s 
Writing from Mary Shelley to Sylvia Plath (Burlington: Ashgate, 2006). Beyond the self-identified elegies 
Adonais, In Memoriam, “Thyrsis,” and Ave Atque Vale, examples of such formal stanzaic poems in the 
nineteenth century include: Charlotte Smith’s Elegiac Sonnets, Wordsworth’s “Elegiac Stanzas,” Keats’s 
ballad “La Belle Dame sans Merci” and various sonnets, Shelley’s “To Wordsworth” and the terza rima 
“The Triumph of Life,” and the sonnet sequences “The House of Life,” “Monna Innominata,” and “Modern 
Love,” among many others. Examples of elegiac poems in non-stanzaic forms would include: 
Wordsworth’s “Ode: Intimations of Immortality,” Coleridge’s “Dejection: An Ode,” Shelley’s “To 
Constantia” and “The Retrospect,” the blank-verse “Alastor,” and “Epipsychidion,” numerous works by 
Emily Bronte and Hopkins, and Swinburne’s “Anactoria,” again among many others. And other types of 
elegiac lyrics would include Wordsworth’s “Lucy” poems and lyrical ballads like “Michael” and 
“Resolution and Independence,” as well as many parts of The Prelude. This is just a brief listing of poems 
that may be considered elegiac under Rosenberg’s expansive rubric, demonstrating the perhaps overly 
inclusive conditions “elegy” has come to involve. 
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Atque Vale stanza. The outlier of this project, Stoddart’s The Death-Wake, is of a wholly 
different formal order. The poem bends and twists grief into a narrative composed in 
wild, sinuous, yet impressively taught, heroic couplets. The heroic couplet is an unusual 
choice not only for an elegy but for a gothic “Necromaunt”—a portmanteau of 
“necrophilic” and “romaunt” (romance)—and I explore the verse form and its 
implications in greater depth in Chapter Three. 
 Scholarship on the elegy has tended to remain tied to biographical, conventional, 
and intertextual interpretations, while critical approaches to the concept of eros generally 
consider erotic experience to be synonymous with sexual desire and bodily pleasure.28 
My arguments will be grounded in figurative language and the formal-metrical 
environments of these elegies. I contend that nineteenth-century poetic performances of 
erotic desire are inherently epistemological; that is, their expressions of desire 
consistently involve a longing to know and take pleasure in the lost-object. By stepping 
outside the critical confines of generic convention, literary influence, and eros-as-sexual 
want, I aim to reevaluate the status of erotic desire and language in a genre that is no 
longer viewed as an amorous mode of speech.29 Reading elegy as an erotic discourse sets 
                                                
28 The most influential of these are Harold Bloom, The Anxiety of Influence: A Theory of Poetry (1973); 
Jerome McGann, Swinburne: An Experiment in Criticism (1972); and Peter Sacks, The English Elegy: 
Studies in the Genre from Spenser to Yeats (1985). There are, of course, notable exceptions to this, which I 
address below. 
 
29 The history of elegy is difficult to trace for a number of reasons, not least of which is that the term 
originally refers to an ancient Greek metrical structure (a rhymed couplet of iambic hexameter and 
pentameter) and not to the genre classification that we associate it with today. Yet there are early roots of 
elegiac eros in what is referred to as the “classical” (or “Latin” or “Roman”) love elegy, and even earlier 
roots in the ancient Greek elegy. For more, see Gregory Nagy on “Ancient Greek Elegy” and Gordon 
Braden on “Classical Love Elegy” in The Oxford Handbook of The Elegy (2010). Later in this introduction, 
I discuss this history in greater depth to complicate the notion that elegy in Modernity is not generally 
understood as an amorous mode of speech. 
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up the mourning relation as one between lovers, in a linguistic structure that places the 
elegiac speaker in the subject position of a lover.  
As a mode of understanding, eros is interpretive, and Geraldine Friedman, draws 
on Hans Georg Gadamer’s hermeneutics as a model for how an object of desire—in my 
context, the lost object, the dead poet—can become, as she writes, “an interlocutor on the 
level of a human subject.” Shelley, Swinburne, Stoddart, and Tennyson each, in multiple 
and various ways, represent their dead poet as or in a text or textual body; in other words, 
as a “work of art [that] ‘says something’ and as such is ‘like a person.’” Representing the 
“hermeneutical problem as ‘lovers talking to each other’ […] suggests privileged access 
between two selves” and “implies that all human experience, including aesthetic 
experience, has an erotic potential” (Friedman 226).30 The definition of eros here as 
“privileged access between two selves” is what I interpret as intimacy. I elaborate this 
further in Chapter One, in the section on Shelley’s poetic theory, to discuss the affinities 
between Shelleyan and Platonic eros, as well as the obstacles to reciprocation when the 
lost object is dead, in order to present an alternate conception—a textual conception—of 
elegiac mutuality.31 The theory of eros and/as epistemology I develop in regard to 
Adonais will serve to ground my readings of the other poems. 
 Chapter One initiates the project by investigating the nuances of a textually erotic 
relationship to explain how this relationship is determined by poetic figuration and poetic 
form. To show how Adonais is an erotic text, I approach the poem from outside the 
                                                
30 Geraldine Friedman, in an incisive essay that influenced my thinking on this issue, discusses the erotic 
potential of the interpretive act in Keats’s “Ode on a Grecian Urn,” as resonant with how Gadamer writes 
the “figure of interpretation as erotic conversation” (226).  
 
31 Put differently, I mean to shift the ground and terms of the erotic-elegiac relation from the dead poet to 
the dead poet’s corpus. 
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confines of biographical criticism and generic convention, to focus on its subtle 
figurations of erotic desire, on its representation of bodies—living and dead—as sites of 
pleasure and knowledge, on Urania’s oddly sexual rhetoric, and finally, on the poem’s 
virtuosic repurposing of the Spenserian stanza as a formalization of his love for the figure 
of Keats.32 The stanzas I examine each perform what I am calling an “elegiac eroticism.” 
This term, elegiac eroticism, is a mourning love for the dead poet that is grounded not in 
a personal relationship, nor in a generically conventional or competitive relationship. 
Instead, it arises from Shelley’s representation of Keats as a body of knowledge and 
pleasure through the figures of his poetic corpus, the only “part” or related object still 
available to him. Put differently, elegiac eroticism is at work in those moments when the 
poem represents Keats as an object of knowledge that Shelley pursues as if he were an 
object of amorous desire. 
Further, I claim that for a poet like Shelley, to situate an idea or person within the 
most intimate recess of himself—the imagination—with such force and urgency 
demonstrates the depth of his feeling. The imagination for Shelley is the prime agent of 
Poetry in human experience, so to elegize Keats in this way is not, as critics such as 
Leavis and McGann have claimed, a solipsistic act of literary Platonism or a self-
referential and self-interested aestheticism, but rather an intimate act, an act of love.33 
                                                
32 On Shelley’s use of the Spenserian stanza, see Greg Kucich, Keats, Shelley, and Romantic Spenserianism 
(1991). I refer to this text later in this chapter, in my examination of the poem’s stanzaic form as a 
materialization of Shelleyan eros. 
 
33 It is the “Power” he alludes to in “Mont Blanc.” 
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“Love-object,” then, is an appropriate term for Keats, and will be later for Baudelaire, 
Julio and Agathe, and Hallam.34 
 The next focus of this chapter is the goddess and Muse, Urania. She plays a number 
of roles beyond Muse, and is called by a number of names, such as “might Mother,” 
“melancholy Mother,” and “Most musical of mourners.” Urania is also one of the poem’s 
clearest references to Platonic eros, as in the Symposium she represents both aspects of 
the love goddess—Venus Urania and Venus Aphrodite, or Uranian Venus and Pandemian 
Venus. But it is in her own speech that Shelley writes her as an erotic figure whose 
longing for Adonais vibrates with the passion of a lover. As an imperfect Platonic lover, 
however, Urania comes to reflect Shelley’s ambivalence not only toward Keats, but 
toward his own Platonism. Barthes offers a nuanced model for elaborating the language 
of Shelleyan eros in A Lover’s Discourse.35 When Barthes seeks the experience of a lover 
who is “speaking within himself, amorously, confronting the other (the loved object), 
who does not speak” (3), he is writing the erotic condition of the elegist. My readings of 
                                                
34 Kelvin Everest, however, in contrast to McGann, and Epstein, argues that “Adonais differs from other 
English elegies in celebrating its subject throughout as a more important poet than the author, which is 
what Shelley really judged Keats to be. The poem is a courteously elaborated compliment to its subject as a 
poet who, it is anticipated, is about to take his place among the major English poets of both past and 
present, whose tradition he has embodied and sustained. In Adonais conception, form, style, imagery, and 
allusion are all to be understood as in graceful honour of the dead” (237). Everest makes this claim based 
on letters written by Shelley in direct reference to Keats’s work as well as on the critical reception of his 
poetry in publications like Blackwood’s Edinburgh Magazine, British Critic, and Quarterly Review, which 
Shelley saw also as an affront to his own work. Everest states, “Shelley’s judgement of Hyperion in the 
first paragraph of the Preface to Adonais is typical of all his recorded views of that poem: ‘I consider the 
fragment of Hyperion as second to nothing that was ever produced by a writer of the same years’” (259, n. 
1). And, “In a letter to Marianne Hunt of 29 October 1820,” Everest tells us, “Shelley reiterated his wish to 
help Keats in his illness by looking after him in Italy, and wrote: ‘I am aware indeed in part [tha]t I am 
nourishing a rival who will far surpass [me] and this is an additional motive & will be an added pleasure’” 
(260, n. 2). 
 
35 In Chapters Two and Three, I argue that this formulation of the lover also shapes those elegies. 
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these moments will illustrate how Adonais is an acute site of Platonic eros.36 I end the 
chapter by thinking about how the poem’s intervention into the discourse of love and 
mourning shapes the current of elegiac eroticism that I propose flows through the other 
elegies I take up in later chapters.  
Chapter Two reads Swinburne’s Ave Atque Vale as an exploration of the erotic 
potential of the elegiac encounter. This chapter is interested in what happens to 
Swinburne’s language when it encounters the dead, and will examine key moments in the 
elegy when figures of speech (like prosopopoeia, metonymy, and simile), and figures of 
bodily affect (like synaesthesia), confront the obscure, immaterial bodies and objects of 
death. What scholars from Eliot through Rosenberg have identified as the fundamental 
“diffuseness” of Swinburne’s poetry, I will articulate as a textual performance of the 
multi-sensory condition of synaesthesia. In general, synaesthesia is firstly a condition of 
the bodily senses, which happens when one sense perception is intermixed with another, 
such that, for instance, sights have a smell, or sounds have a taste. In this intermixed 
sensory state, the faculty and boundary of each individual sense dissolve into each other 
and lose specificity and particularity. What is special about synaesthesia in Ave Atque 
Vale is the epistemological and affective urgency we find in the multi-sensory 
descriptions of death and the insensate dead. In this chapter, I show how this multi-
sensory experience occurs on the level of speech, how in the elegy, synaesthesia is a 
textual condition that happens within its figures of speech. 
                                                
36 It is unsurprising that his desire for perfect intimacy with another has its clearest and most impassioned 
expression in his greatest love poem, “Epipsychidion,” which interestingly is also considered by scholars to 
be one of his most Platonic poems. In this text, Shelley’s ideal of love is that his and his beloved’s “breath 
shall intermix,” and “The fountains of our deepest life, shall be / Confused in passion’s golden purity”; 
“We shall become the same,” he cries out, “we shall be one / Spirit within two frames, oh! Wherefore two? 
[…] One hope within two wills, one will beneath / Two overshadowing minds, one life, one death, / One 
Heaven, on Hell, one immortality, / And one annihilation” (ll. 570-87). 
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My reading of Ave Atque Vale responds to two common critical views on the 
nature of eroticism and the nature of classicism in Swinburne’s poetry. The first position 
holds that Swinburne is an “erotic” poet, a reputation he acquired at the beginning of his 
career, and that is now something of a critical commonplace that predominantly refers to 
the adventurous representations of sexual pleasure in his work. This assertion tends to be 
grounded on the impression that erotic experience is synonymous with sexual desire and 
bodily pleasure.37 Yet, the term itself is not often investigated for other interpretive 
possibilities that may allow us to better understand the subtle complexities of 
Swinburnean eros. A crucial goal of this chapter is to interrogate this association and 
demonstrate the poetic and epistemological virtues of thinking eros beyond the sexual 
body.38 My aim is to discover whether there is scholarly value in shifting our 
understanding of the concept of eros from something circumscribed within the sexual 
body to a more fully embodied condition of knowledge. The second position this chapter 
investigates is the extent and manifestation of his affinity for Greek thought and art. 
Scholarship generally seeks out Swinburne’s Hellenism as it inhabits references and 
allusions to the classical past, and as it manifests in his mastery of attic forms and meters, 
such as Sapphics and Hendecasyllabics.  
This chapter also considers the epistemological possibilities of Swinburnean eros, 
possibilities that have generally been overlooked in scholarship focused primarily on 
                                                
37 This narrow view of eroticism is not exclusive to Swinburne criticism: it reverberates throughout 
Victorian literary studies, although due to the ingrained-ness of this long-standing impression, is more 
problematic for him than for his Victorian contemporaries. The chapter will detail these critical responses. 
 
38 Brennan explains this connection thusly: “Desire, as Swinburne presents it, is closely connected with the 
work of thinking. How is it possible to pursue the dead in thought if one does not believe in a life or reality 
beyond the present? This problem brings Swinburne to the potential, and perhaps the limit, of thought 
itself—what Deleuze calls a thought without an image. How Baudelaire symbolizes this limit says much 
about how Swinburne conceives the poet’s immanent connection with the present” (263-4). 
  20 
representations of sexuality. A key point will be to show how erotic experience in 
Swinburne has linguistic, formal, and epistemological—which is to say, poetic—potential 
beyond sexual pleasure. By reading a poem that is not considered among his “erotic” 
texts, this chapter seeks a textual understanding of erotic experience, one that considers 
Swinburnean eros a product of his figures. In the end, I hope to show that Ave Atque Vale 
inscribes a textually erotic relationship between Swinburne and Baudelaire that represents 
the dead poet as an object of knowledge and pleasure. My argument comes to rest with 
the claim that erotic experience in Swinburne’s poetry is fundamentally epistemological, 
that what inheres even in the explicitly sexual poems is a striving for some kind of 
knowledge beyond the carnal, and below the sensuous surface of the body.  
In the third chapter, I look beyond the canonical elegies to pursue the limit case of 
poetic mourning, a work in which mourning speech turns into necrophilia. This text that 
ventures to the extremity of mourning is all but unknown and requires contextualization, 
which I detail in the chapter. Thomas Tod Stoddart (1810-1880) is the author of The 
Death Wake: or, Lunacy a Necromaunt in Three Chimeras (1831), an example of what I 
call “necrophilic elegy.” What characterizes necrophilic mourning, and distinguishes this 
necrophilic elegy from the conventional elegies, is that the dead love-object—unlike 
Keats and Baudelaire—is not a poet, and so cannot be imagined as a metonymic figure 
representing a poetic corpus. In The Death-Wake, the corpse remains a corpse, does not 
turn the necrophile away from it; it remains, for him, a site and object of pleasure and 
knowledge. This is not to say that rhetorical figuration is not at work or play in these 
poems, of course; it is to say that in a necrophilic elegy, the body of the dead love 
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object—in its beauty and in its decay—remains the primary site of the lover’s desire.39 In 
contrast, in Adonais and Ave Atque Vale, the corpse is the material fact on which the 
poem is grounded, and the mourning poet seeks to recuperate his loss by transforming it 
into a figure of speech. Doing so allows him to avoid the abjection of the decomposing 
body itself and thereby continue to represent the dead beloved as an idealized image. But 
in a necrophilic elegy, the lover’s relationship to the body of the dead beloved continues 
on from where the conventional elegist’s stops. 
 Furthermore, reading The Death-Wake is an intellectually and viscerally 
disorienting experience. The singularly strange, multi-part title integrates a bodily action 
with a poetic genre in the portmanteau “necromaunt”—a combination of necrophilia and 
romance (romaunt)—and its division into “chimeras” rather than “books” or “parts” or 
“sections,” hints at the awesome weirdness of this text. This tale of a monk driven toward 
madness and necrophilia by the death of his beloved nun, resists generic classification 
and formal interpretation on multiple levels: 1) It is a narrative poem shot through with 
moments of lyric apostrophe and excess; 2) It is an elegy, though told not by the primary 
mourner himself; it is spoken by a third-person narrator; 3) The status of the narrator is 
consistently unstable in his relation to the lovers he elegizes, in relation to the time of his 
narration, as well as in relation to the time of the narrated events; constant temporal shifts 
are unannounced and unexplained, marked only by subtle shifts in grammatical tense; 4) 
The narrator’s inconsistent self-representation often blurs the identity of the speaking 
voice, obscuring who is a subject and agent, and who is the silent love object.  
 Speakers like Stoddart’s narrator and monk, I will show, step over the edge of 
mourning and into what Barthes calls the “dissolve” of pleasure: “the site of a loss […] 
                                                
39 “Figurative language is the substance of poetry itself, the heart of the poetic” (Downing 73). 
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the dissolve which seizes the subject in the midst of bliss” (7). This “dissolve” is the 
liminal space of elegy, where language, body, and death meet and touch. This kind of 
necrophilic eroticism, though still Platonic in its interdependence of knowledge and 
somatic pleasure, occurs at the boundary of abjection, a precipice on which pleasure and 
disgust are precariously balanced. 
  
  23 
CHAPTER II 
“ANOTHER SPLENDOUR ON HIS MOUTH ALIT”: SHELLEYAN METONYMY 
AND PLATONIC EROTICISM IN ADONAIS 
My argument in this chapter begins with this proposition: Adonais is a love poem. 
By this I mean that the elegy speaks in a language that represents Keats as a figure of 
poetic pleasure and knowledge—as, in other words, an erotic love object. To make this 
claim of In Memoriam, for instance, is not likely to be contentious, considering the 
intimacy of Tennyson’s friendship with Arthur Hallam; in fact, John Rosenberg has 
recently called Tennyson’s masterwork “one of the great love poems in English” (44). 
But Shelley and Keats were not particularly close in life, and so my proposal cannot be 
supported by biographical or historical interpretations. This chapter argues that the 
elegiac relationship in Adonais is a textually erotic relationship between the speaker and 
the lost-object that is performed rhetorically through particular figures of speech, and 
formally through the poem’s stanzaic structure. In Adonais, I contend, figuration and 
form are the means by which the mourning poet seeks to gain an intimate, albeit 
posthumous, knowledge of the lost-object. It is this desire for intimate knowledge of the 
other that dwells at the heart of Shelleyan Eros. As Shelley writes in “On Love” (1818), 
Love is  
 the meeting with an understanding capable of clearly estimating the deductions of 
our own, an imagination which should enter into and seize upon the subtle and 
delicate peculiarities, which we have delighted to cherish and unfold in secret, 
with a frame whose nerves, like the chords of two exquisite lyres strung to the 
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accompaniment of one delightful voice, vibrate with the vibrations of our own 
[…] (504) 
This passage, pregnant with the language of epistemological want—in the desire to “meet 
with an understanding capable of clearly estimating the deductions of our own”—
expresses Shelley’s understanding of the correspondence of love and knowledge, a 
pleasure immanent in the “nerves” that give exquisite delight as they “vibrate with the 
vibrations” of his own voice. 40 It articulates the chiastic, or intermixed, relation he 
experiences between the intellectual conditions of love and the affective conditions of 
knowing.41 Furthermore, and most importantly, this passage presents a Platonic view of 
love in which understanding another gives epistemological and somatic—which is to say, 
erotic—pleasure. 
The difficulties of concisely communicating his conception of Love as/and 
knowledge in the essay parallel certain ontological and linguistic problems Shelley faces 
in the elegy (and which I continually face in my reading). One such obstacle to attaining 
this intimate knowledge of the other is particular to the elegiac genre itself: the fact that 
the other is dead and therefore cannot respond in language or reciprocate in action. If 
Shelleyan love, like Platonic love, is inter-relational, as the above passage from “On 
Love” indicates, it is predicated on the possibility of mutual reciprocation, and so the 
question arises: How can a poet establish such a connection with a dead other? In this 
                                                
40 See Diotima on spiritual procreation and giving birth in beauty. 
 
41 The chiastic relation is an intermixing, a term I use with particular intention, as it is crucial  in 
“Epipsychidion” as Shelley’s term for the similar love-relation that I find in Adonais: “Our breath shall 
intermix, our bosoms bound, / And our veins beat together; and our lips / With other eloquence than words, 
eclipse / The soul that burns between them, and the wells / Which boil under our being’s inmost cells, / The 
fountains of our deepest life, shall be / Confused in passion’s golden purity, / As mountain-springs under 
the morning Sun” (ll. 565-72). 
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chapter, I will argue that in the absence of an other who can respond, the dead poet’s 
corpus becomes the figurative substitute, the site of a metonymic replacement, for the 
dead poet himself. 
 I also engage the predominant critical position, held by scholars such as Jerrold 
Hogle, William Ulmer, and Stuart Peterfreund, that holds metaphor to be the fundamental 
mode of Shelley’s poetics of love, by investigating how another figure of speech—
metonymy, particularly the metonymy of corpse and corpus—is in some ways better 
suited to perform Shelley’s erotic desire for Keats. I suggest this because, while metaphor 
grasps for an unacknowledged similarity—an identification—between disparate things, 
and transforms them into each other, metonymy reaches for some integral aspect or 
element of the desired object when the object itself is absent. Metonymy, then, reveals a 
more immediate, rather than a distant, connection between the desirous subject and the 
desired object. I want to mention also that I am attempting here to rethink Roman 
Jakobson’s theory of the metaphoric and metonymic poles of language, in which he 
privileges metaphor as the dominant figure of poetic speech, while positing metonymy as 
the dominant figure of narrative prose. My interpretation of Adonais posits metonymy as 
the figure of speech through which Shelley reaches for and tries to touch the dead Keats 
in language. 
 Another difficulty of specifying the kind or nature of this understanding of the dead 
lies in the fact that there is no single or stable object of knowledge that can be articulated 
precisely.42 Death closes off the possibility of a concrete knowledge of the lost object in 
                                                
42 In the Symposium, we learn from Socrates that “Love is always love of something (34, 199e-200e), that 
is, Love always has an object, and this object is something that it  desires but does not possess; therefore, he 
explains to Agathon, “desire is directed as something you need and that if you don’t need something you 
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itself, and in the absence of this possibility, the only kind of knowledge available to the 
poetic speaker is an understanding of his relationship with the lost love-object.43 This 
relational knowledge is not a determinate understanding of subject and object as discrete 
entities; rather, it is an awareness akin to what Roland Barthes calls the “transport”—the 
avenue or structure of linguistic interaction—between the desiring subject and the object 
of desire. I will show in the poem how the impassable boundary of death imposes 
imaginative and representational limits on Shelley’s ability to give concrete language to 
the object of his desire, yet insists at the same time that (the possibility of) an intimate 
understanding of and connection with the dead love-object is not available outside of 
language.44 
As with the difficulties the poem encounters when seeking to identify the 
specifics of the knowledge it desires, Adonais also struggles with the idealizing impulses 
of Shelley’s Platonism. When discussing the Platonism of the elegy, and Shelley’s 
Platonic inclinations in general, scholars have predominantly interpreted it as concerned 
primarily with the immortality of the soul, and while this interpretation holds true, as 
Eros is ultimately aimed at “possessing the good forever,” there is another current of 
Platonic thought moving through the text that elucidates the epistemological and somatic 
nuances of its desire for the dead—the concept of Eros that Plato expounds in the 
                                                                                                                                            
don’t desire it” (34, 200a-b). Shelley encounters this difficulty throughout his work, actually, as his 
constant revisions and restatements of terms and definitions exemplify. 
 
43 The imperative for mutuality is cut off in this instance, as the consciousness that would be capable of 
understanding and representing death and the conditions of death would vanish when the subject dies. 
 
44 At the same time, though, as it seeks an intimate relation with (knowledge of) the dead Keats, the elegy 
struggles with the idealizing impulses of Shelley’s Platonism, and Shelley negotiates these limits by writing 
a mourning text that I believe resonates also with the decidedly non-Platonic, structural conception of love 
outlined in Roland Barthes’s A Lover’s Discourse. 
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Symposium. In “On Love,” Shelley already has imagined this possibility such a 
possibility in mind: to imagine, he writes, 
that the airy children of our brain were born anew within another’s, if we 
feel, we would that another’s nerves should vibrate to our own, that the 
beams of their eyes should kindle at once and mix and melt into our own, 
that lips of motionless ice should not reply to lips quivering and burning 
with the heart’s best blood. This is Love. (503) 
In this passage, the central idea is the notion of the “airy children of [the] brain” that are 
“born anew within another’s.” It is also important to note Shelley’s hope that “lips of 
motionless ice should not reply to lips quivering and burning with the heart’s best blood,” 
as this is a problem of elegy itself: the discontent of speaking to a dead love-object whose 
lips would be “of motionless ice” while the speaker’s own lips “quiver and burn with the 
heart’s best blood.” We will see this logic at work in stanzas twelve and twenty-six. 
The tension between Platonic idealism and mortal skepticism in Shelley’s work 
has been investigated extensively in nineteenth- and twentieth-century scholarship, and 
especially so in Adonais. Mid-twentieth-century examinations of this tension, namely 
those by Notopoulos (1949) and Baker (1948), have generally favored an idealistic 
interpretation of the poem, based primarily on readings of its visionary final stanzas.45 
However, since Wasserman (1959 & 1972), this philosophical tension has become a 
problem not to be resolved but thematized as one of Shelley’s fundamental poetic drives 
                                                
45 Notopoulos also notes this elsewhere in the poem, writing of stanza forty-two: “He is made one with 
Nature […] Which wields the world with never-wearied love, / Sustains it from beneath, and kindles it 
above.” He claims that “the Platonic Beauty in these lines is also synonymous with Love” (296). The 
previous lines walk through his logic, of the Eternal which is Nature and Power, which in comparison to 
Hymn to Intellectual Beauty “shows that the Eternal, Nature, and Power are variant facets of Intellectual 
Beauty,” which “is here presented in its immanent and transcendent character; it sustains the world from 
beneath and kindles it from above with eternal love; thus it is shown that the Platonic Beauty in these lines 
is also synonymous with Love” (Notopoulos 296). 
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and anxieties. By focusing on the figural eroticism in Adonais, I do not aim to discount 
the achievements of this scholarship that is concerned with the poem’s Platonic idealism 
and desire for poetic immortality: ultimately, Platonic Eros, too, seeks the knowledge and 
experience of ideal Beauty and the Good as the means of attaining to the “One.” My aim 
is to identify in Adonais those figures of speech that signify the nature of the relation, the 
mode of relationality, between himself as living, speaking subject and Keats as dead 
love-object. A figure of speech, we must remember, is not itself a discrete subject or a 
discrete object, but a linguistic construction of the relationship between a discrete subject 
and a discrete object. The figures I discuss are not directly or explicitly Platonic in the 
sense that Socrates himself employs them to explain Eros in Symposium; rather, they are 
structurally Platonic in how they draw together the εραστεσ (erastes) and the εροµενοσ 
(eromenos), the lover/amorous subject and the beloved object, in a relationship grounded 
on the desire for knowledge. Through figuration and form, I will argue, Shelley seeks to 
renegotiate the nature of his relationship with the dead Keats in terms of a textual 
eroticism that resonates with the conditions of Platonic eroticism. To briefly clarify the 
points I have been trying to make: we are used to thinking of eros as more or less 
synonymous with sexual desire and bodily pleasure, but I am interested in returning to 
Shelley’s own definitions—in his prose and poetry—of this form of non-sexual love, 
which we also find in Diotima’s conversation with Socrates in Symposium. 
 There are a number of these erotic figurations in the poem that deserve attention, 
but in this chapter I limit myself to only four. My focus will be on stanzas nine, twelve, 
twenty-six, and forty-seven, each of which perform, in various but related ways, what I 
am calling an “elegiac eroticism.” To reiterate, this term, elegiac eroticism, is a mourning 
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love for the dead poet that is grounded not in a personal relationship, nor in a generically 
conventional and competitive relationship. Instead, it is grounded in Shelley’s 
epistemological yearning to know Keats through his poetic corpus, which is the only 
thing still available to him. Elegiac eroticism is at work in those moments when the poem 
represents Keats as an object of knowledge that Shelley pursues as if he were an object of 
amorous desire. 
 I first approach Adonais at the level of genre and convention. Scholars from 
Notopoulos, Wasserman, and Wilson, through Scrivener and Sacks, have claimed 
Adonais as one of the most deeply conventional elegies in the English tradition.46 The 
first stanza’s “skeptical employment of conventions” and “long interrogation of 
conventional gestures and figures of mourning,” Sacks tells us, “marks this poem as a 
true heir of ‘Lycidas’ and ‘Astrophel’” (146-47).47 Yet at the same time as the elegy’s 
opening salvos recall the genre’s history and demonstrate its classical and pastoral 
inheritances, they also challenge that tradition and mark it as the “most archaic and most 
revolutionary of poems” (145). Sacks also notes, in a critique of a limited view of the 
Platonic in the elegy that anticipates my own, that Notopoulos regards Adonais as “the 
purest example of Shelley’s Platonism.48 But he does not take up the question of the 
                                                
46 The poem’s second epigraph and the opening stanza, Sacks explains situate it firmly within the Western 
elegiac tradition. Sacks explains that “the epigraph foregrounds Shelley’s debt to the Alexandrian elegy at 
large. The debt is immediately apparent in the opening line, which reads almost as a translation of Bion’s 
‘Lament for Adonis’” (146). For more, see Scrivener “Adonais: Defending the Imagination” (Shelley’s 
Poetry and Prose: Norton Critical Edition. Ed. Reiman and Fraistat. New York: Norton, 2002. Print. 753-
60). 
 
47 “Perhaps no-one since Milton and Spenser,” he adds, “had so closely reengaged the origins of the genre” 
(347, n. 11). 
 
48 Sacks suggests that “Shelley’s choice of the epigraph indicates his desire to believe in a poetry somehow 
compatible with Platonic thought. The fact that Shelley misattributed the lines to the harsh judge of poetry 
underscores the problem, and it is interesting to see how thoroughly and with what personal urgency 
‘Adonais’ reveals the contradictory nature of Shelley’s aspiration” (146). 
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problematic relation between Shelley’s ideology and his dependence on poetic figures” 
(347, n. 10).49 Though scholars tend to identify the elegy’s Platonism in its idealistic 
abstractions from the mortal, corporeal world to the immortal, universal, spirit realm of 
Ideal Forms and the “One,” and find its classical influences in references, allusions, and 
imagery of the mythic past, it is Shelley’s particular “dependence on poetic figures” that 
orients my intervention into the critical history of Adonais. 
When Shelley invokes the procession of mourners to grieve with him over 
Adonais’s death, he does so in a way that is both highly conventional and idiosyncratic.50 
In keeping with convention, he calls on the various mythic deities and personified forces 
of nature to share in his sorrow; but the language he uses to represent them is shot 
through with what I consider erotic potential beyond convention and competition, and 
this marks the point of my intervention into the critical history of the poem. Issues of 
elegiac convention and Platonism have been examined extensively and productively in 
twentieth-century scholarship on Adonais, but there is still much to say about the poem’s 
other registers. I depart from the conventional approaches to the elegy to focus in greater 
depth on the erotic conditions of its speech and form. In other words, I pursue certain 
                                                
49 Among those scholars who observe the elegy’s Platonism predominantly in reference, allusion, and 
image, are: Milton Wilson, Carlos Baker, Notopoulos, Ronald Becht, and Donald Reiman. Wilson, Becht 
states, sees in the poem the discursive structure of a philosophical argument: “‘The victory of Shelley’s 
Platonism,’” Becht quotes Wilson, “‘has given Adonais a unity and certainty of purpose” that his other 
Platonic poems, like “Prometheus Unbound and Epipsychidion lack’” (195). And Carlos Baker, he 
explains, links “the poem’s Platonism to its patterns of symbolic imagery and to its complex use of 
Urania,” and contends, “The narrative of the first two-thirds and the implied narrative of the last third… 
seem to be of a piece.’” Further, Bloom “sees the poem as falling into two main thematic movements,” 
while Reiman “offers a descriptive account of structure to show how ‘Shelley has interwoven Classical and 
Judeo-Christian myths, conventions of the pastoral elegy and scientific imagery, into his most nearly 
perfect work of art’” (195). 
 
50 Sacks notes that, in contrast to Bion, “Shelley turns immediately to question the efficacy of weeping. By 
so doing, he begins a long interrogation of conventional gestures and figures of mourning. This oddly 
skeptical employment of conventions marks this poem as the true heir of “Lycidas” and “Astrophel,” yet, 
“Shelley’s struggle with his legacy and with his very medium itself is particularly vexed. We can perhaps 
see this in the unusual prematurity with which he initiates the self-questioning or self-qualifying mode” 
(147). 
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figures and figures of speech not as they are determined by Shelley’s self-awareness of 
the elegiac tradition but as they represent the possibility of a posthumous, textual 
intimacy with the dead Keats. 
I transition from the register of genre convention to the register of rhetoric with a 
reading of stanza nine, where we encounter the “quick Dreams” I briefly introduced 
earlier. This is the moment when the poem’s eroticism is activated by a particular figure 
of speech—in this instance, the figure of metonymy. Instead of pursuing the poem’s 
Platonic idealizations through classical reference, allusion, or image, I trace the poem’s 
erotic consciousness through other beings, and bodies, and voices. Figures such as the 
“Splendour” of stanza twelve and the muse Urania of stanzas twenty-three through 
twenty-nine, act and speak in ways that vibrate with amorous longing for the dead poet.  
Shelley’s Theory of Poetic Language and Love 
 In his major prose, Shelley presents multiple entwined theories of the relationship 
between poetry and love, language and desire. His ideas are often abstract and not often 
stable, but an initial understanding of this interaction is essential for investigating the 
complex linguistic landscape of the poem. In the “Defence,” Shelley identifies metaphor 
as the fundamental structure of poetic thought: the language of poets, he writes, “is vitally 
metaphorical; that is, it marks the before unapprehended relations of things” (512). To be 
“vitally metaphorical” is to continually reimagine the relation between seemingly 
incongruous things or thoughts by revealing a previously unacknowledged similarity 
between them. Poetic speech, he says, offers “pictures of integral thoughts” rather than 
perpetuating fixed “signs for portions or classes of thoughts,” and thereby fends off the 
moral catastrophe that would be a language “dead to all the nobler purposes of human 
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intercourse” (512).51 The “noblest purpose” of human experience, for Shelley, is Love, 
the imaginative reinvention of the self in relation to others and the universe: “The great 
secret of morals,” he writes, “is Love; or a going out of our own nature, and an 
identification [which is the process of metaphor] of ourselves with the beautiful which 
exists in thought, action, or person, not our own. A man, to be greatly good, must imagine 
intensely and comprehensively” (517).52 In this essay, Shelley is working toward a theory 
of poetic language in which metaphorical figuration is the imaginative expression or 
performance of love. 
Shelley scholars generally accept his claim for the metaphoricity of love, and 
similarly interpret the loving “identification” of the self with the “beautiful thoughts” of 
another as an act of metaphor. According to Jerrold Hogle, Shelleyan love is “the action 
of metaphor inhabiting our deepest emotional drives” (188).53 William Ulmer states, 
“Arising as a pursuit of integral likeness, Shelleyan eros is metaphorically constituted and 
structured” (6). More recently, Stuart Peterfreund links Shelley’s epistemological desire 
                                                
51 These “signs for portions or classes of thoughts” are identified by the Norton editors as “abstract 
concepts” (512 n. 2). One aim of this chapter is to challenge the criticism of abstraction and abstract 
thought in Shelley’s work, which I see instead as an effort to create an intimate relation by internalizing the 
other into his poetic imagination. 
 
52 Shelley holds an idiosyncratic ontology of perception, writing in “On Life” (1819), that “Nothing exists 
but as it is perceived,” and concerning the relation among all things, he claims, “By the word things is to be 
understood any object of thought, that is, any thought upon which any other thought is employed, with an 
apprehension of distinction. The relations of these remain unchanged; and such is the material of our 
knowledge” (508). Separation and difference are bounded constructs his aims to dissolve so as to reveal 
that the concept of the individual subject is an ontological error: “[T]the existence of distinct individual 
minds similar to that which is employed in now questioning its own nature, is likewise found to be a 
delusion. The words, I, you, they are not signs of any actual difference subsisting between assemblages of 
thoughts thus indicated, but are merely marks employed to denote different modifications of the one mind.” 
He then anticipates the charge of solipsism in response to this view by adding, “Let it not be supposed that 
this doctrine conducts to the monstrous presumption, that I, the person who now write and think, am that 
one mind. I am but a portion of it” (508). 
 
53 See Hogle, Jerrold. “Shelley’s Poetics: The Power as Metaphor,” KSJ 31 (1982): 188 n. 32. William 
Ulmer also notes this statement by Hogle in his own discussion of love and metaphor. 
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with the amorous desire for the O/other: “The end of Shelleyan knowledge is love; its 
means, metaphoric,” he writes (48). I aim in this chapter to reorient the “action,” 
“structure,” and “means” of Shelleyan love around metonymy and the various mouths in 
the poem in order to show how these figures of speech and body embody his erotic desire 
for Keats.54 
 In Adonais, I contend, Shelley metonymically reimagines Keats’s own poetic 
inventions, like the “quick Dreams” (l. 73) and the “Splendour” (l. 100), metonymically 
as if they were his lovers. By representing them also as figures of knowledge, as 
“passion-winged Ministers of thought” (l. 74), Shelley links the amorous with the 
epistemological in a way that echoes his 1818 essay, “On Love.” In this short piece, 
Shelley struggles to reconcile the imperfect power of metaphorical speech with his desire 
for language adequate to the erotic union of individual selves. The essay is also deeply 
informed by Plato’s conception of love in the Symposium (which Shelley himself 
translated, also in 1818), and therefore is particularly helpful for understanding love in 
Adonais. 
Love and death are intimately tied together in Shelley’s work as the two most 
unknowable yet philosophical aspects of mortal life. In “A Discourse on the Manners of 
the Antient Greeks Relative to the Subject of Love,” he claims that sexual intercourse is 
“the link and type of the highest emotions of our nature” and he “commonly represented 
the range of human relationships ‘by categories which are patently derived from erotic 
attraction and sexual union’” (Ulmer 3). At times, Ulmer states, Shelley writes death as 
love’s ideal realization: “Only because death lurks in love, do so many later Shelleyan 
                                                
54 In his discussion of Urania, Sacks does engage with the metonymization of her desire for Adonais, but 
not in quite the same way as. I address this later, in my reading of stanza 26. 
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poems join Alastor in tacitly or expressly urging lovers to ‘Die, / If thou wouldst be with 
that which thou dost seek!’ (Adonais, ll. 464-65)” (34). Peterfreund identifies this 
complex relation as an explicitly epistemological problem, writing that in Adonais, 
Shelley’s speaker “makes explicit his understanding that the price of such knowledge is 
death” (45).55  
However, when critics discuss eros in Shelley’s work, they most often interpret it 
as an experience of the sexual body. Ulmer’s incisive Shelleyan Eros: The Rhetoric of 
Romantic Love (1990), which has been an invaluable starting point and interlocutor for 
this project, focuses on examples that “range from nocturnal emission, to the sexual 
consummation of Titanic marriage, to incestuous rape,” in readings of “Alastor,” “The 
Revolt of Islam,” Prometheus Unbound, and “Epipsychidion” (ix). And though he does 
acknowledge that “Shelleyan love can hardly be reduced to eros” (3), even this 
qualification still implicitly links eros to sexual desire, and implies that love and eros are 
distinct conditions in a hierarchy. Considering eros synonymous to sexual experience, 
however, does not account for the epistemological want inherent in Shelley’s desire. By 
approaching Shelleyan love as a desire for pleasure in and as knowledge, which I see as 
resonant with Platonic love, I aim to reconsider the nature of Shelleyan eros in a text that 
                                                
55 For Shelley, claims William Ulmer, sexual intercourse is “the link and type of the highest emotions of 
our nature” and he “commonly represented the range of human relationships ‘by categories which are 
patently derived from erotic attraction and sexual union” (3). Shelley, as we shall see, aligns love with 
death, at times claiming it as love’s ideal realization. Ulmer writes, “Only because death lurks in love do so 
many later Shelleyan poems join Alastor in tacitly or expressly urging lovers to ‘Die, / If thou wouldst be 
with that which thou dost seek!’ (Adonais, ll. 464-65) (34). Further, and quite helpfully, Stuart Peterfreund 
brings the problem of knowledge into this intricate and often perplexing relation, writing that here in 
“Adonais,” Shelley’s speaker “makes explicit his understanding that the price of such knowledge is death” 
(Shelley among Others: The Play of the Intertext and the Idea of Language, 2002, 87). However, in regard 
to “Adonais,” I wish somewhat to modify Ulmer’s claim that “Shelley’s metaphorical idealism will finally 
accept death as the negative form (specular image) of erotic transcendence,” a “climactic gesture [which] 
remains a last resort. It is an option selected when visionary maidens prove irrecoverable and revolutions 
doomed. Shelleyan eros begins by embracing earthly mediations” (10). In elegy, death is already the 
poem’s metaphorical condition, the starting point for the eros of poetic speech, making this “last resort” the 
elegist’s only resort. 
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has been called “the clearest and purest statement” of Platonism in his work (Notopoulos 
291).56 
Shelley begins his elegy with a conventional wail of mourning—“I weep for 
Adonais—he is dead!” (l. 1)—followed by an invocation of conventional mythic deities 
and personified natural forces to share in his grief. He calls out to the “sad Hour,” a 
personification of the “Horae,” goddesses of the seasons, to “rouse thy obscure compeers, 
/ And teach them thine own sorrow” (ll. 5-6).57 He also repeatedly cries out for Urania—
whom he refers to variously as “mighty Mother” (l. 10), “melancholy Mother” (l. 20), 
and “most musical of mourners” (l. 28 & l. 37)—to “weep for Adonais” (l. 19), “weep 
again,” (l. 28) “lament anew” (l. 29), and “weep anew” (ll. 10-37). The Horae are joined 
by numerous personified affects like “Desires and Adorations,” “Winged Persuasions,” 
and twilight Phantasies” (ll. 109-112). All the mourners in this procession are commonly 
understood as aspects of the poem’s self-conscious conventionality. Shelley calls upon 
them to delegate his own mourning work to others, Sacks argues, for two reasons: “they 
are all inadequate mourners, allowing Shelley to criticize them and to distance himself 
from various forms of unsuccessful grieving; and yet they keep his poem in motion, 
giving it the processional character of traditional elegies, allowing it to achieve the self-
purifying and self-surpassing ceremonies so important to the work of mourning” (148).  
“Airy Children of the Brain”: Figuration as (Spiritual) Procreation 
                                                
56 Everest notes, “Platonic readings have not been dominant in recent years, as Shelley’s critics have 
generally found his scepticism more restless and rhetorical; but studies of Adonais are still sometimes 
shadowed by the assumption of a commitment to some mode or other of transcendence and idealism in 
Shelley’s thought” (261). The close readings to follow take up the rather unproblematic association of 
Shelley’s Platonism with “transcendence and idealism.” my reading aims not at a clear divide between 
idealism and scepticism in Adonais but at the subtler understanding that Shelley’s himself is ambivalent in 
his Platonic commitments. 
 
57 See Shelley’s Poetry and Prose, 411, n. 3. 
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It is with the description of the “quick Dreams” of stanza nine that my argument 
turns from conventional scholarship on Adonais, and toward a figural and formal 
interpretation that steps around Sacks’s claim for their “inadequacy.” By reading 
mourners like the “quick Dreams” (l. 73), the “Splendour” (l. 100) and Urania (stanzas 
23-29) as figures of speech first, and conventional symbols second, their ineffectualness 
as grievers does not overshadow their status as textual embodiments of Shelley’s desire 
for Keats. Stanza nine presents the first real opportunity in the elegy to read the 
procession of mourners rhetorically, that is, as embodied figures of speech that exceed 
their conventional function. Shelley imagines that Adonais’s “quick Dreams, / The 
passion-winged Ministers of thought, / Who were his flocks, whom near the living 
streams / Of his young spirit he fed, and whom he taught / The love which was its music” 
(ll. 73-77), come to grieve his death. These “quick Dreams” are metonyms for the 
inventions of the dead poet’s imagination—as Shelley puts it in a later stanza, “All he had 
loved, and moulded into thought, / From shape, and hue, and odour, and sweet sound, / 
Lamented Adonais” (ll. 118-20)—and by representing them here as figures of love and 
knowledge now in his own poetic imaginary, Shelley begins to create a textually intimate 
relation to Keats.58 The provocatively anticipatory statement from “On Love” (written 
three years before Adonais, in 1818) noted earlier, about the “airy children of the brain,” 
shows that Shelley already had such a possibility in mind. The “quick Dreams” are the 
                                                
58 Kelvin Everest writes, similarly: “Shelley’s central purpose is to establish Keats as a fixed star in the 
constellation of the great poets, and its brilliantly original approach is to weave the products of Keats’s 
poetic imagination into the texture of his elegy. In Adonais the presence of Keats in the English poetic 
tradition is consequently neither a matter of mere assertion nor simply a demonstration of his claims to be 
the inheritor — or indeed more literally the literary offspring — of Spenser and Milton. Keats’s 
comparable stature is everywhere implicit in the poem’s echoing of his living poetic voice, alongside those 
of his peers” (244, italics mine, J.G.). And, in a statement that succinctly sums up the core of my argument, 
he says, “The mode of this echoing may be illustrated by some examples of Keats’s presence as a poet in 
the texture of the rhetoric of Adonais” (244). My hope this that the examples I explore will demonstrate 
how Shelley textualizes Keats, how he represents him within the poem as a textual object of erotic desire. 
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“airy children” of Keats’s imagination, now “born anew” within Shelley’s.59 The 
direction of this movement in the elegy, however, is reversed, as here it is not Shelley’s 
“airy children” that are “born anew” within Keats’s mind, but Keats’s reborn in 
Shelley’s. These metonymic figures for Keats’s own “integral thoughts” (DoP 512) 
perform the work of love commonly ascribed by Shelley scholars (and Shelley himself) 
to metaphor.60 
At the same time as Shelley’s reanimating of these figures is an act of love-
speech, they reflect also his apprehensiveness over attaining immortality through poetic 
language. By giving new life to Keats’s “airy children,” metonymy allows Shelley to fill 
the aesthetic and affective void of his corpse with the now newly “living” corpus of his 
poetry. As Michael Scrivener writes (though of a later stanza), “The poet lives on through 
the survival of poetry, and as the world remembers the poetry, so it breathes life into the 
dead, and keeps alive the hope of utopian transformation”; “The primary meaning of 
immortality in the poem is the entirely naturalistic process by which dead poets live by 
being read creatively by successive generations” (280).61 Here, Shelley does more than 
“remember” Keats’s poetry, and his rebirthing the “airy children” of Keats’s mind is 
much more than a creative reading: it is a procreative reading through which Shelley 
holds out the possibility that not only can poetry keep alive the ideas and ideals of the 
                                                
59 In this rhetoric of reproduction, we see that the language of Platonic immortality is already immanent in 
the text, for, as Diotima explains to Socrates, “Reproduction is the closest mortals can come to being 
permanently alive and immortal” (44). The airy children of the poet’s brain live on past his corporeal death. 
 
60 Ulmer writes, “By nominating metaphor as the imagination’s presiding harmonizing mechanism, Shelley 
inscribes metaphor with the larger contradictions of his antithetical vision. He slights metaphor’s 
presupposition of absence and difference; he tries to make metaphor do too much. The problem refers 
ultimately to the discrepant roles accorded to antitypes in Shelley’s appropriation of The Symposium” (8). 
See my earlier discussion, in the introduction to this chapter, for elaboration on the common critical 
assertions of Shelleyan metaphor as the central figure of love. 
 
61 For an expansion on this problem of poetic immortality, see Ulmer, “Adonais and the Death of Poetry.” 
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dead, but might actually create life anew from those ideas.62 This conception of poetry 
recalls its classical Greek origins in poeisis (ποιεσισ), the act of making. For a poet to 
breathe life into his own aesthetic inventions is unexceptional—this is how poetry works; 
but to breathe new life into another poet’s inventions, especially a dead poet with whom 
he was not particularly close in life, is quite something else.63 For Shelley, for whom the 
Imagination is the prime agent of love and knowledge—in other words, of Poetry—to 
situate his lost object metonymically within that vital, sacred space, is a deeply intimate 
act, an act of love. Sacks, as I have noted above, attends mainly to the failure of the 
“quick Dreams” and all the Splendours as mourners, whom he claims Shelley invokes in 
order to dismiss as ineffectual and thereby contrast with the passion and force of his own 
mourning.64 This genre-based and teleological interpretation associates the elegy with the 
Freudian “work of mourning,” which necessitates the conscious detachment and 
displacement of libidinal desire away from the lost object so that the mourner can escape 
the melancholia that would prevent his consolation.65 
                                                
62 See Plato 209c on figurative children. 
 
63 Michael Scrivener writes similarly about “breathing new life into the dead” (280). 
 
64 Sacks explains: “One of the major tasks of the work of mourning and of the elegy is to repair the 
mourner’s damaged narcissism—but without allowing that repair to have permanent recourse either to the 
melancholy form of secondary narcissism or to the fantasies of the primitive narcissism associated with the 
mirror stage. ‘Adonais’ and In Memoriam are the most obvious examples of elegies that cannot be fully 
understood without observing how they perform this complex reparation” (10). “The work of mourning, 
too, is largely designed to defend the individual against death […] Once again, a forced renunciation 
prevents a regressive attachment to a prior love-object, a potential fixation on the part of the griever, whose 
desire in such cases for literal identification with the dead is another force very much like that of the death 
wish” (16-17). 
 
65 According to Freud, Sacks writes, “‘Melancholy is in some way related to an unconscious loss of a love-
object, in contradistinction to mourning, in where there is nothing unconscious about the loss.’ In order for 
this resistance to be broken, the mind must be repeatedly confronted with the fact until the recognition has 
been achieved. Only once the loss is recognized can the griever continue the work of mourning by 
withdrawing his attachment from the dead” (24). 
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I do not disagree with Sacks on this purpose of the elegy, but in my reading it 
does not matter so much that all of the procession that Shelley invokes turn out to be 
ineffectual as mourners: they are more rhetorically and epistemologically provocative for 
the dynamic locutions that shape them into amorous figures, into “lovers.”66 While Sacks 
is concerned with how Adonais enacts the psychoanalytic work of mourning Keats 
through the conventions of the genre, this chapter is focused on how the poem expresses 
his erotic love for Keats through particular figures of speech. Shelley, of course, is 
sensitive to the problematic bind of seeking intimacy, or love—by which I mean, again, a 
sympathetic knowledge of another’s “inmost soul”—through poetic speech. As he writes 
in “On Love,” of his failure to attain such intimacy with others, “I have everywhere 
sought sympathy, and have found only repulse and disappointment” (503).67 And, in a 
supremely sorrowful statement that throws further into question the possibility that poetic 
language can spark and sustain this kind of intimate relation, he laments, “These words 
are inefficient and metaphorical—Most words so—No help” (504, n. 3).68 When we 
recall, from the “Defence,” how fundamental metaphor is to Poetry, we can better 
                                                
66 I am using “lovers” in the sense of both the Platonic and Barthesian traditions. 
 
67  The full passage reads: “I know not the internal constitution of other men, or even of thine whom I now 
address. I see that in some external attributes they resemble me, but when misled by that appearance I have 
thought to appeal to something in common and unburthen MY inmost soul to them I have found my 
language misunderstood, like one in a distant and savage land. The more opportunities they have afforded 
me for experience the wider has appeared the interval between us, and to a greater distance have the points 
of sympathy been withdrawn. With a spirit ill fitted to sustain such proof, trembling and feeble through its 
tenderness, I have everywhere sought and have found only repulse and disappointment” (503). 
 
68 Shelley comes to this realization as he continues to articulate his ideal sense of love: “This is the bond 
and the sanction which connects not only man with man, but with every thing which exists. We are born 
into the world and there is something within us which from the instant that we live and move thirsts after its 
likeness […] We dimly see within our intellectual nature a miniature as it were of our entire self, yet 
deprived of all that we condemn or despise, the ideal prototype of every thing excellent or lovely that we 
are capable of conceiving as belonging to the nature of man. Not only the portrait of our external being, but 
an assemblage of the minutest particulars of which our nature is composed: a mirror whose surface reflects 
only the forms of purity and brightness: a soul within our soul that describes a circle around its proper 
Paradise which pain and sorrow or evil dare not overleap” (504). 
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understand one of the linguistic and epistemological paradoxes inherent to his work, but 
one which, rather than being aporetic and paralyzing, reinvigorates his passions and 
drives him to seek other modes of love speech.69 If Shelley worries that his words are 
“inefficient and metaphorical,” I suggest a shift of linguistic focus may reveal that 
metonymic language, such as in this stanza, promises (or at least holds out the promise) 
to redeem his words as acts of love. 
Figures of Flowers and Flowery Corpses 
Before moving on to stanza 12 and a crucial instance of metonymic figuration as 
textual embodiment, I want to look at a few earlier examples of conventional elegiac 
symbols, like flowers, to demonstrate how Shelley understands the representational 
obstacle, the metaphorical resistance, that is Adonais’s corpse. By its mere presence, the 
corpse provokes a figural and epistemological conflict in the mourning poet as it signifies 
at the same time the presence and absence, the past beauty and the inevitable decay, of 
the lost love-object. Though the corpse reminds Shelley of Keats’s poetical beauty, he 
cannot but also surrender himself, in very Keatsian fashion, to the knowledge of its 
certain corruption, and so he turns to the imagery of flowers—a core convention of the 
genre—to thematize this linguistic and cognitive conflict. 
In the second stanza, Shelley writes that one of the mourners, a heavenly “Echo,” 
“with soft enamoured breath, / Rekindled all the fading melodies, / With which, like 
flowers that mock the corse beneath, / He had adorned and hid the coming bulk of death” 
                                                
69 Ulmer thematizes this paradox as a central facet of Shelley’s poetics, writing (of “On Love”): “Shelley’s 
association of love and language ends by implicating philosophy in rhetoric and by demanding that a 
poem’s moral or political analysis of love be gauged against the performance of its language as a mode of 
love. ‘On Love’ locates desire in the self’s thirst for an antitypical complement, a beautiful other pursued 
for its promise of wholeness. By adding this erotic model to its confession of metaphorical inefficiency, 
‘On Love’ grounds Shelley’s poetics in contradiction. Shelley’s career was largely an exploration of the 
artistic possibilities of this contradiction” (4). 
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(ll. 15-18). Like this Echo, who here revives Adonais’s “fading melodies,” and like 
Adonais himself, who “adorned and hid the coming bulk” of his own death with P/poesy, 
Shelley, too, shrouds the ugly material “bulk” of Keats’s corpse with the music of these 
lines.70 Yet despite these efforts to recover Keats’s poetic voice, Shelley cannot quite 
sustain the fantasy that aesthetic beauty—represented by flowers—can compensate for 
the silencing void of death that “feeds on [Adonais’s] mute voice, and laughs at our 
despair” (l. 27). Shelley remains sadly aware of the “corse beneath” the flowers, and 
admits that poetry can only “hide” the ugly “bulk of death,” but hiding something does 
not undo or reverse it. In other descriptions of Adonais as a figure of poetic beauty, the 
metaphor of flowers betrays Shelley’s doubt because the flowers he images are always 
either dying or already dead: Adonais is a “pale flower,” a “bloom whose petals nipt 
before they blew,” a “broken lily” (ll. 48-54); later, he is a “sleeping flower” (l. 86).71 
Again and again, these metaphors submit to the paradox of the beautiful corpse: these 
conventional elegiac markers of aesthetic beauty and poetic accomplishment must, like 
the poet’s once-living body and voice, always die and decay. (l. 21). 
There is still more to unpack concerning the problem of elegiac flowers. Shelley 
inverts the metaphor later in the poem when he speaks of Adonais’s “leprous corpse” that 
                                                
70 By “music” I refer to the sonic and somatic pleasure of the metrical and rhythmic regularity of the 
Spenserian stanza, is one of the primary and most consistent ways that Shelley evokes the aesthetic/poetic 
pleasure of this elegant material shape to / gives an elegant material shape to that obscures the “bulk of 
death” that resists concrete representation. I return to the significance of the formal and rhythmic 
consistency of the Spenserian stanzas in my later discussion of Stanza 47. There, I draw a formal parallel to 
Sacks’s discussion of the consolatory effects of linguistic repetition. I look also to Denise Gigante’s 
incisive reading of Tennyson’s “In Memoriam” stanza as a parallel formalization of the elegist’s desire for 
the dead. 
 
71 Sacks offers an illuminating explanation of the status of flowers in elegy, writing that they are a method 
of elegiac self-protection, which, “apart from their figurative meanings and their function of obeisance, also 
add to the temporal or spatial respite within the rites, or within the poem itself; and the flowers, like the 
poetic language to which they are so often compared, serve not only as offering or as gesture for respite but 
also as demarcations separating the living from the dead” (19). 
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“Exhales itself in flowers of gentle breath” (ll. 172-73). Here, it is not Adonais (his dead 
body) who is the flower; rather, his corpse is contrasted with flowers, a contrast made 
sharper by the severity of the adjective “leprous.”72 By juxtaposing the gentle beauty of 
living flowers with the abject ugliness of the decaying body that lies beneath them, yet 
which in its decay will give those flowers life, Shelley reveals his awareness of this 
contradiction. While his understanding of the metaphorical connection between flowers 
and death at first promises to redeem Adonais’s death by recognizing that it will feed the 
future beauty of nature—which is another kind of immortality—because it also insists 
that Shelley realize that Adonais’s beauty is now no more, it becomes at the same time a 
threat to his poetic knowledge, and thereby to his consolation. 
The aesthetic and epistemological limitation of metaphor that these examples 
reveal is that when speaking of death and the corpse that is death’s materiality, the 
identity this figure seeks between apparently dissimilar things is only possible if each of 
those things is in itself stable and decidable. Death, though, is representable only 
abstractly, through shapeless nouns like a “bulk” (l. 18) or a “shadow” (l. 66), things 
which, like Death itself, are without their own substance or sensuous form.73 The corpse, 
too, as the troublesome flower imagery demonstrates, is also representable only in 
imprecise terms. The corpse and Death both function like metaphor itself, which, again, 
though Shelley privileges it as the central figure of Poetry and love in the “Defence,” he 
recognizes here in the elegy as inadequate to them. 
                                                
72 Interestingly, in stanza 49, Shelley entwines these conflicting images with the play on words “fragrant 
copses” (l. 436). 
 
73 Like death itself, a shadow is a thing without its own substance, and is given sensuous form only by the 
coincidence of light falling on some material object. 
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What kind of knowledge, then, can figurative language offer the elegist? If 
metaphor, which is neither the thing itself nor its referent, yet is also both of these, is not 
sufficient to signify or create the erotic relation he seeks with Keats, and does not afford 
him the solacing knowledge that the poetic imagination is immortal, to what other figures 
of speech can Shelley turn, and what other paradigms of knowledge can he draw on, to 
adequately speak his desire for the dead? To elaborate the problem of figuration in love 
and knowledge in Adonais, and to situate it within the longer currents of Romantic 
poetics, I want to revisit Earl Wasserman’s essay on Romantic epistemology, “The 
English Romantics: The Grounds of Knowledge” (1964). Wasserman argues that 
Romantic poetic knowledge is relational rather than empirical or associational, which 
were the predominant philosophies of knowledge in the eighteenth century. He contrasts 
eighteenth-century poets’ analogical understanding of their experiences in the world with 
the relational understanding of Wordsworth, Coleridge, Keats, and Shelley.74 He rejects 
analogy as an adequate epistemic mode for the Romantic poets because it is too “loose” 
to elucidate the “transaction between the perceiving mind and the perceived world,” nor 
does it insist that the “transaction” itself, the interrelation of subject and object, self and 
other, poet and nature, is their fundamental poetic and epistemological concern. He 
argues that analogy maintains the perceiving subject and the perceived object as 
discontinuous entities brought into “loose association” only by the poet’s moral or 
                                                
74 “When the [eighteenth-century] poet is not merely organizing sense data into some picturesque, sublime, 
or beautiful distribution,” Wasserman explains, he usually devotes himself to humanizing the external 
scene by associating it with some emotion, moral theme, historical episode, moving narrative, or 
autobiographical experience. The scene becomes significant only by stimulating the poet to link it with man 
by some loose association. Even when he directly considers the relation of the objective and subjective 
worlds he usually postulates nothing more intimate than analogy” (20). 
 
  44 
affective sensibility.75 Analogical knowledge merely “pretends to a relation between 
subject and object and yet keeps them categorically apart” (21). This is not the intimate 
knowledge of the other, nor of the self in relation to the other, that the Romantic poet 
seeks. 
The achievement of the Romantic poets, Wasserman claims, is that they “chose to 
confront more centrally and to a degree unprecedented in English literature [a] nagging 
problem in their literary culture: How do subject and object meet in a meaningful 
relationship? By what means do we have a significant awareness of the world?” (22).76 
His questions anticipate questions fundamental to my reading of Adonais and to this 
project on the whole: How can an elegist have an erotic relationship with a dead poet, and 
through that relationship grasp some knowledge of that which is forbidden to the living—
knowledge of death itself? And, what is the status or significance of the dead body in this 
relationship? If, as I have claimed above, death resists metaphorical representation by 
exposing the paradoxical beauty of flowers, and the corpse confines metonymy to 
preserving the figures of the love-object’s poetic corpus in the elegiac text, what else in 
language is available to the elegist to speak his desire for the dead. 
Mouths, Commas, Metonymies 
Up to this point, I have been thinking through the figuratively amorous 
relationship with Keats that Shelley writes by metonymically animating the dead poet’s 
textual creations in his elegy. My aim has been to show how the figure of metonymy is a 
                                                
75 “[T]he eighteenth-century poet is forever interrupting his scene-painting to find its moral or emotional 
analogue,” Wasserman writes (20). 
76 In focusing on the relation between subject and object, self and other, poet and language, rather than 
seeking to fix by association the nature and value of the external world with regard to the subject, he 
somewhat relieves criticism of the burden of attempting to determine, with a measure of certainty and 
stability, the nature of things that are too big to know fully, a burden made even greater when the object of 
the poet’s epistemological desire is death itself. 
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poetic act of love that allows Shelley to re-birth Keats’s “airy children” in his (Shelley’s) 
own poetic imaginary. Now, I shift my focus from Adonais’s mourning children to the 
material site and object of their mourning—his dead body—to explore the erotic 
possibilities, and problems, the corpse raises for the speaker. Stanza twelve offers an 
ideal moment to shift attention from the figured mourners to the figured corpse because it 
portrays an instance of intimate touch that seems momentarily to reignite the spark of life 
in Adonais’s body, a flashing possibility that briefly shakes the knowledge that he is 
indeed dead.77 The stanza reads: 
  Another Splendour on his mouth alit, 
  That mouth, whence it was want to draw the breath 
  Which gave it strength to pierce the guarded wit, 
  And pass into the panting heart beneath 
  With lightning and with music: the damp death 
  Quenched its caress upon his icy lips; 
  And, as a dying meteor stains a wreath 
  Of moonlight vapour, which the cold night clips, 
  It flushed through his pale limbs, and past to its eclipse. (ll. 
         100-108) 
This “Splendour,” like the “quick Dreams” of stanza nine, is a personification of Keats’s 
poetic invention, one of the “airy children” of the dead poet’s brain, to recall that 
                                                
77 This is not the first instance of physical contact between one of the mourners and Adonais’s corpse. 
Earlier, “one with trembling hands clasps his cold head” (l. 82), and another “Washed his light limbs as if 
embalming them” (l. 92), but these kinds of touch are more reverent than desirous; they are less erotic than 
other kinds of touch. Touching someone on the mouth, though, is a more intimate act, suggestive even of a 
carnal relationship, and the sexual(ized) rhetoric of bodily touch and somatic arousal foregrounds the 
mouth as a/the site of poeisis and pleasure. 
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excellent phrase from “On Love,” which is now reborn in Shelley’s poetic imaginary; it, 
too, functions metonymically as a figure of love.78 As he says in a later stanza, “All he 
had loved, and moulded into thought, / From shape, and hue, and odour, and sweet sound, 
/ Lamented Adonais” (ll. 118-20). Through the metonymy of corpse and corpus (the 
mouth and the Splendour, respectively), Shelley is able to represent the erotic body that 
once animated this voice as a force of poetic creation. Here, the poet looks to the mouth 
as the primary erotic organ.  
 A simple act of punctuation, the comma after the first foot in line 101—“That 
mouth,”—imposes a rhythmic pause, a caesura, in the line that insists we linger on and 
savor the image of Adonais’s mouth: to adapt Matthew Kaiser’s elegant and provocative 
phrasing, we essentially hold Adonais’s mouth in ours while speaking or reading the 
line.79 The mouth is the organ that “[drew] the breath / Which gave it strength to pierce 
the guarded wit, / And pass into the panting heart beneath, / With lightning and with 
music” (ll. 101-04). This breath that flows through the imagination (the “guarded wit”) 
and the somatically excited body (the “panting heart”) shows the mouth to be vital to 
poetry, the bodily source of “lightning”—which is a common, though inconsistent, 
Shelleyan metaphor for knowledge—and “music.” Shelley thereby sets up the erotic 
priority of the mouth—through which we breath, and eat, and speak, and kiss—as the 
bodily organ or site of poetry. 
I want briefly to pursue the significance of the lightning imagery before 
continuing on with the mouth of stanza twelve. Lightning is a favored Shelleyan 
                                                
78 Becht notes that these Splendours were “kindled into life by his [Keats’s] creative love” (202). 
 
79 Credit for this idea is due to Matthew Kaiser, whose brilliant essay “Pater’s Mouth” (2011), addresses the 
status and significance of this bodily organ in Paterian—and more broadly, Victorian—aesthetic thought. 
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metaphor for the poetic imagination, yet its nature and referentiality are ambiguous and 
shift often in his work. In the “Defence,” this metaphor appears twice, in resonance with 
its use here in the elegy: “Poetry,” he writes, “is a sword of lightning, ever unsheathed, 
which consumes the scabbard that would contain it” (520); and of Dante, whom Shelley 
holds up as an ideal Poet alongside Homer and Milton, he declares, “His very words are 
instinct with spirit; each is as a spark, a burning atom of inextinguishable thought; and 
many yet lie covered in the ashes of their birth, and pregnant with the lightning which has 
yet found no conductor” (528). In these passages, Shelley identifies lightning with 
Poetry, (as) an endless force of imagination with boundless procreative potential. 
In stanza twenty, Shelley inverts the symbolism of lightning and raises doubt over 
the immortality of the poetic imagination. He says, “Nought we know dies: Shall that 
alone which knows / Be as a sword consumed before the sheath / By sightless 
lightning?—th’intense atom glows / A moment, then is quenched in a most cold repose” 
(ll. 177-80). The obscurity of this “sightless lightning” conflicts with the significance 
Shelley grants it in stanza twelve and in the “Defence.”80 Here it is not the poet’s mind 
(“that alone which knows”) that is like lightning; rather, lightning is that which threatens 
to “consume” and “quench” the spark (the “intense atom”) of the poetic imagination; 
though, that Shelley poses this as an open question leaves indeterminate what he 
ultimately thinks of this metaphor.81 Sacks reads the ambivalence of the fire and lightning 
                                                
80 The Norton editors note that “sightless” implies “[b]oth invisible and blind, amoral” (417, n. 5). 
 
81 Becht claims that the imagery of “that alone which knows / Be as a sword consumed before the sheath / 
By sightless lightning?” (ll. 177-78) is “identical with that which Shelley uses in A Defence of Poetry to 
signify a contrary situation—i.e., the power of poetry to survive restriction: ‘Poetry is a sword of lightning, 
ever unsheathed, which consumes the scabbard that would contain it.’ In Adonais, it is poetry—or, at least, 
the creative spirit of the poet—that is consumed” (203-4). 
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metaphors in stanzas eighteen through twenty as expressive of Shelley’s agonized 
yearning for poetic immortality: 
[he] focuses contrastingly on what he would like to see immortalized: not man’s 
genetic power, but rather his intellectual faculty, ‘that which knows.’ And yet, 
this higher faculty is represented by imagery that reflects originally physical 
referents […] The cognitive being is thus represented by a sword, or by an atom 
whose glow is surely related in kind to the ‘unimprisoned flames’ of Nature and 
to the forces that spend themselves ‘in love’s delight.’ Nevertheless, it is with 
such residually erotic and material images of elevation, penetration, and glowing 
radiance that Shelley will have to reach for consolation, trying to cut or burn 
through all material textures (present once again, here, in the form of the sheath). 
(153) 
I want to pursue further the idea that the “intellectual faculty is represented by imagery 
that reflects originally physical referents.” Shelley’s emphasis in stanza twelve on the 
physicality of the mouth, on its carnal and epistemological potential, hints that he may 
not so assuredly want or need to “burn through all material textures” of life to console his 
loss of Keats. I see this as an opening to think about the materiality of poetic speech, 
which I explain below is embodied, figured, in and by the mouth, and allows Shelley to 
touch his lost object in language. 
Beyond the now retrospectively indeterminate status of Shelleyan lightning, the 
stanza also contains a string of indefinite pronouns—“it” (ll. 101-102), “its” and “his” (ll. 
105), “it” and “its” (l. 108)—that, in combination with the torturous syntax and oddly-
placed colon in the middle of line 104, is a grammatical performance of the uncertain 
  49 
distinction between the living and the dead. Most likely, the “it” in line 101 refers to 
Adonais’s mouth, upon which the Splendour lands in a kind of kiss; in line 102, as well, 
“it” likely refers to Adonais’s mouth, that once “gained strength to pierce the guarded 
wit, / And pass into the panting heart beneath.” The fact that Adonais’s mouth is now a 
dead mouth, a mouth that cannot itself speak or kiss, further complicates its privileged 
figural status. 
The Mouth of Many Figures 
Behind these grammatical and referential ambiguities, the rhetoric of this stanza 
heightens the erotic potential of the mouth by reminding us that not only is it the bodily 
organ of speech, it is also a first point of physical contact between lovers—the site of the 
kiss.82 The passage raises the possibility, however fleeting and strange, that a kiss or a 
touch on the mouth may have the power to revive the dead. Yet the second half of the 
stanza reveals a problem inherent to elegy: Shelley knows, as do we, that Adonais is 
dead, yet “the damp death / Quenched its caress upon his icy lips; / And as a dying 
meteor stains a wreath / Of moonlight vapour […] / It flushed through his pale limbs, and 
past to its eclipse” (ll. 104-108). This imagery suggestively mimics the rush of blood that 
reddens the skin when lovers touch. This fleeting trace of a physiological response to an 
intimate touching of Adonais’s mouth, death’s “caress upon his icy lips”—literally a kiss 
of death—leads the mourners (and us) to think, if only for a lightning-like moment, that 
the dead poet might somehow be reinfused with life. It seems as if, for just a moment, the 
corporeal conditions we associate with death—cold, dark, rigid, pale—are overturned, 
                                                
82 This contact, this touch, avoids becoming necrophilic by remaining in the realm of the poetic 
imagination. It is the Splendour that alights on Adonais’s mouth, and “damp death” that “caresses his icy 
lips,” and this keeps Shelley himself at a somewhat safe remove from this taboo because these touches are 
performed by imagined presences, personifications from Keats’s imaginary. In Chapter Three, I look at an 
elegiac poem that takes an explicitly necrophilic turn. 
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and death tinges Adonais’s corpse with the shade and fluid rush of life. But it is “damp 
death” that flushes through his body and instead of reviving his “panting heart” it triggers 
only a cruel reminder of death’s final “eclipse” of this possibility and vanishes this hope. 
Yet this fugitive moment disrupts the assumed certainty of difference between the living 
body and the dead body. 
 Shelley’s achievement in stanza 12 is simultaneously to represent the mouth as a 
metonymy for poeisis and a synecdoche for the erotic (even if dead) body.83 The mouth is 
the passage that links the external world (in the form of air) with the internal “world” of 
the body through the act of breathing: drawing breath brings air into the body, and is then 
exhaled back out of the body as the inspired “breath” of poetic speech. The mouth, then, 
is the point of transformation of what is everywhere around us in the world (as air) and 
permeated into all living things (as breath), yet is in essence still intangible and shapeless, 
into Poetry. The mouth gives material form to what is formless by making language out 
of breath. As the point of intersection between external world and individual body, and a 
point of contact between a desirous subject and an object of desire—through speech or a 
kiss—the mouth is the site where the body makes words.84 This intersectionality 
implicates the mouth in the relation between knowledge and pleasure that is at the heart 
of Shelley’s elegiac eroticism. 
                                                
83 In other words, the mouth is a metonymy for poeisis (Keats’s poetic voice), and a synecdoche for Keats’s 
erotic body; this synecdoche also folds back into (as a figure for) the poetic voice because the body is what 
brings poetry into the world through breath and lingual movement. And we should recall that the Splendour 
is still also a metonymy. 
 
84 We should recall that the Greek term poeisis originally translates as “making.” For more on this, and to 
see how this idea is integral to Platonic thought, see Christopher Gill’s translation of Symposium, p. 42, 
205c and p78, n. 109). 
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To clarify: I am identifying this Splendour, like the “quick Dreams,” as another 
metonymic figure of Keats’s poetry that Shelley brings to life in the elegy; however, the 
greater significance of the Splendour is that, in touching Adonais on the mouth, it focuses 
our attention on the erotic potential of the corpse. Through this intimate touch the mouth 
becomes an ideal synecdoche for the erotic body. In the following section on Urania, I 
continue to put pressure on these figures and bodies. 
“That word, that kiss…” 
The Urania stanzas are among the densest, most rhetorically and affectively 
challenging in the elegy. Scholars from Carlos Baker (1948) and Notopoulos (1949) to 
Peter Sacks (1985) and, more recently, Kelvin Everest (2007), have focused on Urania to 
demonstrate the poem’s self-awareness of the classical mythological and pastoral elegiac 
traditions into which it enters by drawing on the genre’s deep well of convention from 
Bion’s “Lament for Adonis” (year unknown) and Moschus’s “Elegy for Bion” (circa 100 
BCE) through Milton’s “Lycidas” (1637). In addition to her conventional role as poetic 
muse, critics also tend to read Urania with specific attention to her role in Platonic 
philosophy: “Urania in Adonais,” Everest explains, “has sometimes been understood to 
embrace a wider philosophical connotation which carries her significance well beyond 
the broadly literary.85 A number of studies have sought to demonstrate a pervasive and 
central Platonism in the poem’s intellectual framework, structure and style, which can be 
construed as in accord with her Platonic associations” (239).  
                                                
85 However, Everest notes, “Platonic readings have not been dominant in recent years, as Shelley’s critics 
have generally found his scepticism more restless and rhetorical; but studies of Adonais are still sometimes 
shadowed by the assumption of a commitment to some mode or other of transcendence and idealism in 
Shelley’s thought […]” (261 n. 8). 
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In the Platonic readings Everest alludes to, Urania’s significance stems from her 
dual status in classical mythology as “Aphrodite Urania” and “Aphrodite Pandemia,” two 
aspects of the love goddess that Socrates discusses in Symposium. In Shelley’s 
translation, the former is “the Love who inspires us with affection, and exempts us from 
all wantonness and libertinism,” while the latter type of love is “common to the vulgar, 
and presides over transient and fortuitous connexions, and is worshipped by the least 
excellent of mankind” (181b-c). My interest in Urania arises from Shelley’s nuanced 
portrayal of her as a figure of love who represents both the ideal and common aspects of 
Eros.86 I aim in this section to demonstrate how this doubleness links her conventional 
role with her Platonic role: she is a conventional elegiac Muse, and she is a discontented 
Platonic lover whose desire for Adonais is both corporeal and epistemological—in other 
words, erotic. 
Stanza twenty-six is perhaps the poem’s most erotically-charged expression of 
desire for Keats. When Urania appears, she gives one of the poem’s most impassioned 
submissions to the erotic condition of mourning. She cries,  
  Stay yet awhile! speak to me once again; 
  Kiss me, so long but as a kiss may live; 
  And in my heartless breast and burning brain 
  That word, that kiss shall all thoughts else survive, 
                                                
86 Everest acknowledges that “Shelley’s Urania in Adonais might seem to pose an unwanted contrast with 
the lower Cyprian Aphrodite of the source myth in Bion’s handling, where the goddess is distinctly earthy 
and sexual, and so not ideally fitted to Shelley’s adaptation to Keats’s situation; hence the change in 
Urania’s identity in Adonais from lover to mother” (241). Though I disagree over his final assertion that 
Shelley transforms her from lover to mother, I should note, however, that multiple times in the elegy, 
Shelley does refer to her as a mother. For instance, in stanza three, she is the “melancholy Mother” (l. 20), 
and at times refers to Adonais as her son. Relatedly, Earl Wasserman has asked: "Why did Shelley choose 
to make this Venus the mother of Adonais instead of his lover, as in the legend?” I contend that her speech 
in stanza twenty-six supports the possibility that she also yearns for Adonais as a lover, an erotic love-
object. 
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  With food of saddest memory kept alive, 
  Now thou art dead, as if it were a part 
  Of thee, my Adonais! I would give 
  All that I am to be as thou now art! 
  But I am chained to Time, and cannot thence depart! (ll. 226-34) 
As in stanza twelve, the possibility of a kiss carries amorous and epistemological 
implications, but this stanza insists, more strongly and overtly, that love and knowledge 
are directly linked in Shelleyan mourning through poetic speech and the body. Urania 
yearns for a “kiss” and a “word”—acts performed by the mouth—to solace her grief, that 
they might “all thoughts else survive.” This stanza insists that love and knowledge are 
directly linked in Shelleyan mourning through poetic speech and the body. She hopes to 
compensate for or displace the “saddest memory” of Adonais’s death with the material 
substance of words that might touch her body. Her speech reflects Shelley’s elegiac 
eroticism by correlating language and the body in the production of poetic pleasure and 
knowledge. Furthermore, to recall my claim about the erotic status of the mouth in stanza 
twelve, in this passage, Urania herself figures Adonais’s mouth as a synecdoche for the 
desirous body and as a metonymy for the site of language. The text posits, once again, the 
poet’s mouth as (something like) the ur-organ of Shelleyan eros. 
Urania’s grief provokes in her a double-edged epistemological crisis. Though she 
stands directly over his corpse, she at first refuses to accept the empirical fact of his 
death. In having Urania speak directly to Adonais, Shelley relies on the figures of 
apostrophe and prosopopoeia to posit the temporal fiction that the dead poet might 
somehow return to life and “speak to [her] once again,” and “Kiss [her], so long as but a 
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kiss may live.” In this moment, Urania speaks like a lover, desperate for one last kiss-
word from her beloved poet, but she quickly comes to the sorrowful recognition that her 
own immortality—which is the very thing she wants for Adonais—is, ironically, what 
prevents them from embracing once more.87 Strangely, this irony is almost appealing in 
that, by denying to both the immortal Urania and the mortal Shelley a posthumous 
intimacy with Adonais, he and his muse are linked more closely together in their loss. 
More often, in his poetry and prose, Shelley idealizes immortality as the surpassing of 
human intellectual and affective limitations, but here, Urania’s immortality conflicts with 
the very desire she seeks to attain. Michael Scrivener writes, “The poem is skeptical 
concerning the nature of a post mortal existence, but there is no skepticism over the 
imagination, whose values Shelley asserts unequivocally. Although individual poets 
might be lured toward death by the anguish of utopian creativity, poetry itself, 
represented by Urania, is ‘chained to Time’ (st. 26), and cannot escape into a post mortal 
One” (280).  
Urania’s sad knowledge of this limitation of her immortality, which Hegel would 
identify as “unhappy consciousness” and Schiller would call “tragic consciousness,” 
seems antithetical to positivist-idealist interpretations of Shelley’s Platonic desire for 
Keats’s (and by extension his own) poetic immortality.88 If love should, or at least is 
imagined to, transcend the perceptual constraints of individual consciousness and the 
temporal constraints of mortal life—in other words, if poetic love, like Platonic love, 
holds out the promise of immortality—it is a sad irony indeed that immortality might 
                                                
87 Interestingly, the term Urania uses to categorize the word-kiss she desires is “food,” the sustenance for 
life that is taken into the body by the mouth. Sacks also uses the compound “kiss-word” (155). 
 
88 The “positivist-idealist interpretations” I allude to here are those by Notopoulos and Baker, though this is 
not without caveat and complication. 
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actually be a curse. That the intimate, immortalizing touch of love-speech should be 
disallowed to Urania because she is a goddess, raises the question of for whom, if 
anyone, immortal love is allowed. If the satisfaction of erotic desire is not even permitted 
to the immortal muse of Poetry, is immortality truly idealized in the elegy?89 Addressing 
this question asks for a rethinking of what immortality means for Shelley. 
Though Adonais has long been considered Shelley’s most overtly Platonic poem, 
Urania’s unhappy recognition in stanza twenty-six challenges the assumption of an 
idealized, Platonic notion of poetic immortality. Scholars since Wasserman generally 
agree that Urania’s appearance marks a crucial turn in the poem’s dialectic of skepticism 
and idealism, but the direction of this turn is still under debate. Ronald Becht’s idealist 
reading of Urania, for instance, asserts that she “has come to slake wounds of despair, 
and she will do this by furnishing a consolatory wisdom that transcends the speaker's 
restricted understanding of what has occurred. Her arrival,” he argues, “signals a reversal 
in the direction that the poem has taken thus far” (205).90 Though I agree with Becht and 
                                                
89 William Ulmer, in “Adonais and the Death of Poetry” (1993), writes, “Adonais has always resisted 
determinedly skeptical readings. Faced with that resistance, critics wedded to skepticism typically 
appropriate Adonais for secular humanism by claiming that in the text's manifestly Platonic locutions 
Shelley is only ‘speaking metaphorically’ (Cameron, Shelley: The Golden Years 438). In Adonais, 
according to such readings, "immortality" signifies not literally but tropically, as a false surmise, a mere 
figure for something else: therefore the poem is not idealist. Recent theoretical perspectives have 
discredited such interpretations by showing that traditional, humanistic conceptions of value and language 
are variations of the same logocentrism that underlies more overtly idealist doctrines—so that the 
phenomenon of a poet naturalizing the supernatural or ‘speaking metaphorically’ of the One, however 
significant, does not thrust the poem beyond idealism. Nor does it (in the case of skeptical readings of 
Shelley) sunder the text's allegiances to truth: while Adonais acknowledges the unavailability of final truth, 
the poem agonizes over that uncertainty instead of embracing it as a touchstone of enlightenment.” 
 
90 Her transcending perspective, he continues, “penetrates beyond this world to an apprehension of reality 
that removes the terror from death. Viewed from a temporal perspective, the destruction of a young poet by 
‘herded wolves’ and ‘obscene ravens’ can lead only to despair. Viewed from the perspective of the Muse's 
higher wisdom, Adonais' new existence outside the world of time becomes enviable” (205). And further: 
“The spectacle of tragic mortality begins to lose force: "Death / Shamed by the presence of that living 
Might / Blushed to annihilation" (11.217-19). Adonais, of course, does not return to life; he is still a victim 
of the "night of time" that rules the world. But Urania, the protector and "mighty Mother" of poets, operates 
from a privileged vantage point that gives death new meaning” (205). 
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others that Urania’s arrival marks a turning point in the poem’s epistemological and 
affective response to Adonais’s death, he comes to this conclusion by reading Urania as 
“exist[ing] within the temporal world” (205) because she is “chained to Time” (l. 234), 
which implies that she herself is subject to time’s passing.  
In my more skeptical reading, to be “chained to Time” implies being outside 
temporality, that capital-T “Time” itself—which is neither mortal nor immortal, temporal 
nor atemporal, but rather the very ground of these things—is what keeps her outside the 
circumference of mortal life. Even though, as the elegy demonstrates, she can be invoked 
to move through the human world to inspire and mourn for poets, because she is shackled 
to the infinity of Time she “cannot thence depart” into the ideal realm of death with the 
mortal Adonais (l. 234); perhaps the only way for her to do so would be to give up her 
goddess nature—to “give / All that I am”—to “be as thou now art!” (ll. 232-33). Becht 
seems to construe being “chained to Time” as a lower-case condition, in which Urania 
overcomes the discontinuity of being immortal within the mortal time-stream without 
upsetting the very condition—death—over which she is invoked to prevail. Immortality, 
it appears, precludes the very satisfaction of unceasing Love that both muse and poet 
desire from it. 
Love in the Void (Circumference) 
As the poem nears its end, we see that Shelley’s perspective on the virtue of 
mourning has shifted from early insistence—“O, weep for Adonais” (l. 2), “O, weep for 
Adonais” (l. 19), “Most musical of mourners, weep again! / Lament anew, Urania” (ll. 
28-29), “Most musical of mourners, weep anew!” (l. 37), “O, weep for Adonais!” (l. 
73)—to insistent refusal—“Peace, peace! he is not dead, he doth not sleep— / He hath 
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awakened from the dream of life” (ll. 343-44), “Mourn not for Adonais” (l. 362). This 
turn from despair to hope marks a systemic shift in the text’s erotic epistemology, in 
which Shelley arrives, after much agonizing, at a new knowledge of Adonais’s 
posthumous condition and the relation between them. In stanza forty-seven, he seems 
finally to possess an understanding of poetic immortality that melds his Platonism with 
his relational epistemology: 
 Who mourns for Adonais? oh come forth  
 Fond wretch! and know thyself and him aright, 
 Clasp with thy panting soul the pendulous Earth; 
 As from a centre, dart thy spirit’s light 
 Beyond all worlds, until its spacious might 
 Satiate the void circumference: then shrink 
 Even to a point within our day and night; 
 And keep thy heart light lest it make thee sink 
 When hope has kindled hope, and lured thee to the brink. (ll. 415-23) 
To “know thyself and him aright” is to comprehend, or at least apprehend, what Poets do: 
they expand their imagination (“dart thy spirit’s light”) throughout the world and satisfy 
humanity’s search for knowledge of their place in the world and their relation to others 
(“Satiate the void circumference”); this is, as I have suggested earlier about stanza nine, 
an act of poetic love. Immediately following this epistemological imperative—aimed 
outward to the other mourners and the world (the indefinite plural “Fond wretch”), and 
inward to himself—Shelley theorizes the formal and figural (metaphorical) shape of his 
desire for Adonais as a circumference. This image, and correlates like “circles,” are 
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privileged Shelleyan metaphors for the unity, the identity—the perfect intimacy—
between self and other, individual subject and external world/universe, that he strives for 
in so much of his work.91 The circumference is the figurative shape of Shelleyan love, a 
shape that encloses and seals the “bond and the sanction which connects not only man 
with man, but with every thing which exists” (“On Love” 504). 
The metaphor of the “circumference” as the entirety of the universe, and the 
“void” as a signifier for the lack of knowledge left in the universe by the poet’s death, is 
another crucial concept in Shelley’s poetics. In the “Defence” he writes, “Poetry is indeed 
something divine. It is at once the centre and circumference of knowledge […] the root 
and blossom of all other systems of thought” (531).92 Yet the insistence here, in Adonais, 
for the epistemological primacy of Poetry—the “centre and circumference of 
knowledge”—is shrouded in obscure syntax and abstract spatial imagery that puts this 
ideal into question in the very instant it is uttered. A “centre” is a single point, without 
area; a circumference is an outer perimeter, a circle that would enclose this central point; 
the area between the centre and the perimeter is empty space, a “void.” As a conceptual 
metaphor, this image holds together, but Shelley’s linguistic self-consciousness—the 
convolutions of the stanza’s syntax and the obscurity of the imagery—exposes the 
strangeness of the figure. Nonetheless, the density and opacity of this apostrophic address 
                                                
91 For instance, in “On Love,” he writes: “We dimly see within our intellectual nature a miniature as it were 
of our entire self, yet deprived of all we condemn or despise, the prototype of everything excellent or lovely 
that we are capable of conceiving as belonging to the nature of man. Not only the portrait of our external 
being but an assemblage of the minutest particulars of which our nature is composed: a mirror whose 
surface reflects only the forms of purity and brightness: a soul within our soul that describes a circle around 
its proper Paradise which pain and sorrow or evil dare not overleap” (504). 
 
92 Later in the essay, he explains: “Poetry enlarges the circumference of the imagination by replenishing it 
with thoughts of ever new delight, which have the power of attracting and assimilating to their own nature 
all other thoughts, and which form new intervals and interstices whose void forever craves fresh food.” 
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do not negate Shelley’s hard-earned knowledge of the possibility of, and also the 
obstacles to, poetic immortality.  
This stanza presents his theory of poetic knowledge as an ontological necessity; in 
other words, knowledge of the relation (to recall the definition of Shelleyan epistemology 
I have been encouraging) between elegist and lost object is a function of the erotic 
imagination that allows subject and object to, as Wasserman puts it, “meet in a 
meaningful relationship” and gain a “significant awareness of the world” (22). In the end, 
the only thing that can “satiate the void circumference” in the mourner’s soul is 
something which Shelley refuses to let go, even at the risk of his own agency: Love, the 
sympathetic “going out of our own nature” (Defence 517), the “powerful attraction 
towards all that we conceive or fear or hope beyond ourselves when we find within our 
own thoughts the chasm of an insufficient void and seek to awaken in all things that are a 
community with what we experience within ourselves” (“On Love” 503).93 Eros flows 
like a current throughout the poem, much like, as Shelley writes in “Mont Blanc,” “The 
everlasting universe of things / Flows throughout the mind, and rolls its rapid waves, / 
Now dark—now glittering—now reflecting gloom— / Now lending splendour, where 
from secret springs / The source of human thought its tribute brings / Of waters,—with a 
sound but half its own” (ll. 1-6). Aroused by the imagination and conveyed in poetic 
speech, the erotic figures in the text offer the consoling knowledge that, although now 
beyond the reach of rational thought—“the owl-winged faculty of calculation”—and 
beyond the reach of the body, dead poets are not annihilated—they live on in their 
                                                
93 I want to note again the language of emptiness: “insufficient void” is like the “void circumference.” 
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corpus.94 In this self-transcendent moment, even when staring directly into the void abyss 
of death, Shelleyan love can fend off oblivion. 
To close this discussion of Adonais, I want to step back from a rhetorical analysis 
to look at the fundamental structural component of the elegy, the Spenserian stanza. This 
stanzaic structure is the textual shape of the elegy’s eroticism and is the only thing that 
remains consistent throughout the poem. While many scholars have addressed Spenser’s 
influence on the Romantic poets in general, and on the Spenserian echoes and allusions in 
Adonais in particular, only Greg Kucich, to my knowledge, has investigated the 
epistemological implications of the stanza form itself.95 Ronald Becht, for instance, 
examines the overall shape of the poem and discovers a completed structure of thought, a 
“unified sequence of ‘mental events,’” a kind of narrative that “carr[ies] the poet-speaker 
from an initial condition of ‘dejection’ […] to a final state of visionary power” (194).96 
He interrogates earlier interpretations by Milton Wilson, Carlos Baker, Harold Bloom, 
Donald Reiman, and Earl Wasserman, all of whom, despite the differences in their 
evaluations, share a common shortcoming: “in none of them,” Becht states, “do we find a 
                                                
94 In Wuthering Heights, Heathcliff utters this phrase—“The dead are not annihilated”—at the height of his 
rage and the depth of his despair. The lyric excesses of Bronte’s prose mirrors this affective and 
epistemological condition of elegiac poetry. 
 
95 See Kucich, Romantic Spenserianism. 
 
96 Becht’s approach begins from the New Critical premise that “among the characteristics common to all 
works of art are unity and structural integrity,” and endeavors to “explain the structure of Adonais in terms 
of the unified sequence of ‘mental events’ that carry the poet-speaker from an initial condition of 
‘dejection’ […] to a final state of visionary power” (194). “To approach the poem in this manner,” he 
writes, “is to argue that it is ‘about’ the speaker and his state of mind, that it is, in short, the representation 
of a completed activity,” the mental activity of the grieving poet’s response to his loss. “By locating the 
poem’s shaping principle in the specifically mimetic quality of its self-contained mental drama,” Becht 
aims “to demonstrate and emphasize structural features that have received little or no comment” in previous 
scholarship (194). 
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definition of form that is based on a systematic analysis of the peculiar nature of the poet-
speaker’s mental drama” (195).97 
Though Becht smartly surveys, and rightly finds lacking, these earlier studies of 
the elegy’s formal characteristics, he approaches “form” as the overall arrangement of the 
text’s logic and its affective progression from despair to prophetic triumph over death.98 
But there is more to the poem’s form than this: in viewing form as Shelley’s means of 
organizing his shifting ideas and emotions, Becht overlooks the effects of the Spenserian 
stanza itself. His discussion of the macro-scale movement of ideas and affects throughout 
the whole poem, to suggest a sort of narrative progression of Shelley’s shifting thoughts 
and desires and fears, does not account for these self-contained structures that enwrap the 
discrete, micro-scale movements of its epistemological discourse. Even scholars who 
directly address Spenser’s influence on Adonais do not account for the particulars of the 
stanzaic form.99 Everest, for instance, identifies numerous references and allusions to 
Spenser’s poetry, and notes that “Adonais is coloured by a graceful patterning of 
                                                
97 Milton Wilson, Becht states, sees in the poem the discursive structure of a philosophical argument: “‘The 
victory of Shelley’s Platonism,’” Becht quotes Wilson, “‘has given Adonais a unity and certainty of 
purpose” that his other Platonic poems, like “Prometheus Unbound and Epipsychidion lack’” (195). Carlos 
Baker, he explains, links “the poem’s Platonism to its patterns of symbolic imagery and to its complex use 
of Urania,” and contends, “The narrative of the first two-thirds and the implied narrative of the last third… 
seem to be of a piece.’” In addition, Bloom “sees the poem as falling into two main thematic movements,” 
while Reiman “offers a descriptive account of structure to show how ‘Shelley has interwoven Classical and 
Judeo-Christian myths, conventions of the pastoral elegy and scientific imagery, into his most nearly 
perfect work of art’” (195). He states further that critics have mostly “ignored the crucial function of the 
lyric speaker’s crisis in determining its unity and formal design. They have preferred, instead, to approach 
structure through an examination of Shelley’s themes or of his handling of pastoral conventions and mythic 
material” (195). Peter Sacks, too, holds an implicitly teleological view of the poem, as a Freudian work of 
mourning that follows the speaker from despair to consolation. 
 
98 Later, he will write that the elegy’s “formal structure”—by which he means its organization of “mental 
events” into a teleological trajectory from despair and uncertainty to spiritual ascendance and triumph—
“defines the speaker’s condition and combines with his thoughts and feelings to give shape and unity to his 
personal drama. It is, in other words, the internal principle of construction through which the poet has 
organized his material into a self-contained representation of a particular human experience” (210). 
99 Kucich remains the exception to this overlooking. 
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allusions which acknowledge Spenser’s influence on Keats” (243). But beyond 
remarking that the poem is composed in Spenserian stanzas, he stops short of analyzing 
the specific significance of this.100 In what follows, I examine the Spenserian stanza as a 
formalization or materialization of Shelley’s erotic desire for Keats. 
Stanza forty-seven presents Shelley’s theory of love and knowledge through the 
figure of the circumference, which I have explained above is an ideal shape through 
which to understand the formal, performative nature of Shelleyan eroticism. The figure 
and shape of the circumference is analogous to the enclosed, self-contained structure of 
the individual Spenserian stanza, which I propose to call a “little circumference.”101 The 
iambic pentameter and ababbcbc rhyme pattern of the first eight lines create a near 
chiasmus of aural and visual effects, a sense of unity and balance just a bit askew. Of 
course, Shelley often plays with spondaic and trochaic opening substitutions to animate 
the pentameter, and the enjambments across the ab, bbc, cb, and cc lines effect a forward 
momentum that further energizes the stanza. Moreover, the extra foot in the Alexandrine 
accentuates the specular symmetry of the first eight lines by bringing their unity into 
greater relief by contrast.102 This contrast between the hexameter Alexandrine and the 
eight pentameter lines is partially offset, though, by the interlocking rhymes that link the 
first line’s a rhyme with the closing couplet’s paired c rhyme, thereby maintaining the 
                                                
100 Andrew Epstein, too, though he makes passing reference to the “web of allusions and echoes” of 
Spenser which “reveals that Shelley is self-consciously aware of the chain of poets before him who have 
memorialized, transformed, and fed upon their lost rivals” (108), says nothing specific about the stanzaic 
form. 
 
101 Credit is due to Veronica Alfano for this term. 
 
102 As Veronica Alfano has explained in conversation, the Alexandrine is extended because the hexameter 
line wants to be two trimeter lines so as to be divided into a 3 or 4 syllable unit (which most English meters 
want to be, which they all sort of naturally do) while a pentameter line cannot be so divided, which has 
made it distinctly identified with poetic speech instead of song. 
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Alexandrine as part of the whole. Additionally, the enjambment of the closing cc couplet 
makes the last line feel even longer, by extending the eighth line’s pentameter into the 
hexameter Alexandrine, creating the effect of a twenty-two syllable semantic unit. 
This sense of enclosure within each stanzaic circumference is reinforced further 
by the fact that there are no enjambments between stanzas.103 The rhyme and rhythm that 
lure the poet to the brink of this stanza’s final line, and then are momentarily suspended 
across the wordless, soundless void before the next stanza, create a discrete 
circumference of poetic language within which Shelley gives sensuous form to his desire. 
As each stanza closes around itself, encircling figure and image and sound, it is a 
bounded unit; from this perspective, each can be thought of as itself a “centre” from 
which the mourning lover can “dart [his] spirit’s light / Beyond all worlds, until its 
spacious might / Satiate the void circumference.” In this spirit light, each stanza then also 
becomes analogous to a “point within our day and night,” a point of concentration of 
mind that will “keep [the] heart light lest it make thee sink” into melancholia and despair. 
Although, historically, the “point within our day and night” is commonly thought to refer 
to Rome, “the sepulchre of our joy” in the following stanza (l. 424), I read this “point” 
figurally, and more expansively, as a “centre and circumference of knowledge” 
(“Defence” 531) that represents the bounds—the day and night, start and end, the 
                                                
103 With exceptions, stanzaic enjambments are common in Shelley’s poems. “Ode to the West Wind,” for 
instance, is comprised of five interlocked and highly enjambed terza-rima sonnets; and “The Triumph of 
Life” is also comprised of highly enjambed terza-rima stanzas. Future work will expand on the significance 
of enjambment in Romantic and Victorian poetry, and investigate the association or similarity I find 
between enjambment and the corpse. 
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totality—of mortal life.104 There is a danger inherent in this hope though, as being lured 
to the brink of mortal life is to risk death for the promise of immortality. 
Finally, the repetition of this uniform stanzaic structure creates, as Sacks rightly 
argues, “a sense of continuity, of an unbroken pattern such as one may oppose to the 
extreme discontinuity of death” (23). The unbroken stanzaic pattern of Adonais, which 
yet has between its stanzaic circumferences the dissolving “edges” of Barthesian 
pleasure, suggests that Shelleyan eros moves through the elegy in form as well as figure. 
The fifty-five Spenserian stanzas, each in themselves, and together, perform the 
expansive circularity and unity of Shelley’s ideal vision of love. This is not to say, 
however, that poetic form somehow fully resolves the problem of mourning and 
knowledge for Shelley in the end, because although he elevates his vision from the 
skeptical to the ideal by pushing Adonais heaven-ward into “the abode where the Eternal 
are” (l. 495), Shelley himself is “borne darkly, fearfully, afar” (l. 492).  
 In closing, I hope to have shown how Adonais’s figural and epistemological 
gymnastics are the ground of the poem’s Platonic eroticism. If we read the poem as an 
amorous expression of Shelley’s desire for Keats as epistemological object, we see that 
Shelley’s Platonism and eroticism are more complicated than critics usually 
acknowledge. Most often, it is the Platonic concepts of Ideal Forms and the immortality 
of the soul that critics find to most strongly inform Adonais.105 But this philosophical 
                                                
104 The Norton Critical Edition identifies this “point within our day and night” as Rome: “When the 
imagination shrinks to a single point (a centre) after having reached out to scan the universe in stanza 47, 
the poet suggests Rome as the proper point within time (our day and night) to explore” (424). 
105 A line such as “The One remains, the many change and pass” (l. 460), is one of the most common 
references in scholarship on the poem’s Platonism. Notopoulos, for instance, whose book, The Platonism of 
Shelley: A Study of Platonism and the Platonic Mind, is the foundational critical text on this subject, writes, 
“The poem is an inextricable fusion of Plato’s metaphysical view of the ideal and temporal world as stated 
in the Republic. It is restated in terms of immortality versus mortality in the Phaedo, and in terms of 
Intellectual Beauty, immanent and transcendent, versus the transient shadows in the Symposium and the 
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perspective tends to miss another way that his Platonism is inscribed in the poem: in the 
figures of speech and stanzaic form of the text. Shelley’s mourners grieve Keats as an 
object of knowledge and pleasure, and while the poem’s conclusion imagines Keats’s 
soul as “a star” that “Beacons from the abode where the Eternal are” (ll. 494-95), Shelley 
himself is “borne darkly, fearfully, afar” (l. 492), suggesting that his idealism is tempered 
by his recognition—his knowledge—of Poetry’s limitations, which he has attained by 
inventing the erotic relation between himself and Keats through poetic speech. The 
textual pleasures that we encounter here are elements of the poem’s multi-valenced 
eroticism.106 While its desire as an amorous expression may strive to meet the ideals of 
Platonic eros, in its figures and form, Adonais veers toward the disruptions of self, 
language, and knowledge that we encounter in Barthes’s Lover’s Discourse. To conclude, 
I return to where this chapter started: for Shelley to elegize Keats in this way, to mourn 
him, to pursue him, as an object of knowledge and poetic pleasure, is perhaps the most 
intimate act a poet or poem can perform. What Shelley has written is a deeply erotic text, 
a love poem to Keats, who himself becomes, through the elegy’s situating of the mouth 
as erotic organ, a figure of speech for the ultimate love object: Poesy itself.107  
                                                                                                                                            
Phaedrus […] These Platonic themes are sometimes developed separately, but in the last stanzas of the 
pome they are blended into a perfect amalgam of Platonism” (291). 
 
106 This definition of pleasure as indeterminacy is just one aspect of this concept. As with “knowledge,” the 
term “pleasure” will shift and bend as the argument progresses. I will also address the difference between 
pleasure and desire, despite their conceptual closeness in Barthes and in psychoanalysis. 
 
107 Credit is due to Tres Pyle for this suggestion. 
  66 
CHAPTER III 
“AS THOUGH A HAND WERE IN MY HAND TO HOLD”: EROTIC FIGURATION 
AND KNOWLEDGE IN SWINBURNE’S AVE ATQUE VALE 
This chapter thinks about what it means to call Algernon Charles Swinburne an 
“erotic” poet, and investigates how Swinburnean eros operates in the context of elegy. It 
examines key moments in the elegy when figures of speech like prosopopoeia, 
metonymy, and simile, and figures of somatic sensation like synaesthesia, encounter the 
obscure, enigmatic bodies and objects of death, and asks what happens to elegiac speech 
seeks to touch the dead. There are specific moments in the poem when language and 
body meet and touch, when the speaking body and the textual body meet at the boundary 
of death in a relation of knowledge; these moments are the focal points of this chapter. 
This entangling of sense perceptions and the figures of sense perception (the metonymic 
simile of a “shut scroll” as “though a hand were in my hand to hold”) that the elegy 
enacts, the loss of discrete reference that language undergoes when it speaks across the 
boundary of life and death, the “diffuse” or imprecise articulations of deathly bodies—
these are the elegiac linguistic counterpart to the “diffuse” sensory condition of 
synaesthesia. When language can be experienced in and on multiple sensory registers—
heard with the ear, seen (read) with the eye, “tasted” by the mouth (as in touched on the 
tongue when spoken, making taste a sense of touch, and tasting a touching, too)—it 
becomes a sensory object.108 As it moves through the body that speaks or reads it, poetry 
                                                
108 From this perspective, all tasting is a touching, but not all touching is a tasting; touching also happens in 
other sense organs like the ear (ear drum) and eye (retina). I am unsure, though, whether language has a 
smell—that is, while smell is particulate and therefore similarly “touches” the nose (smelling as a touching 
of the body)—that is, whether there is an analogous “smell strata” of language that can be activated by 
poetry, like the “sonic strata” Jakobson discusses. 
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is a somatic event perceivable by multiple senses at once. Put differently, this multi-
sensory potential of poetic speech is the linguistic analogue of bodily synaesthesia.109 
Poetic speech is not material in the way a flower is, though, which does not need 
to be spoken to touch the body: a flower touches the eye that sees it and the nose that 
smells it. Yet I propose that because a flower can effect (touch) the body in multiple 
ways, through multiple senses, and sometimes at the same time, it may be considered a 
kind of synaesthetic object. A sensory object is a basic one that just hits one sense at a 
time and doesn’t activate others; a synaesthetic object, though, can effect more than one 
sense perception, and sometimes at the same time. Swinburne’s synaesthetic objects like 
the pale bitter burning flowers that affect eye, tongue, and skin (touch) and later the “pale 
Titan-woman.”  
The intermixings and meldings of sensory perceptions in Ave Atque Vale are 
interesting for their sensitivity to the nuance of experience, but are more significant for 
their rarity.110 For a poet as deeply synaesthetic as Swinburne to employ this figure so 
sparingly in the elegy suggests something fundamental about the sensory potential of 
elegiac speech. Later in this chapter, I look at moments of multi-sensory shutdown, which 
I refer to as a de-synaestheticizing of the bodies in the poem. I read the faceless bodies, 
disembodied faces, and nonworking body parts in the poem—the “effaced unquiet eyes” 
and “unmelodious mouth” of stanza VIII, the “pale mouths, etc.,” of stanza IX, as anti-
prosopon, what, from de Man, we call disfigurations and defaced bodies. Though they 
may frustrate in their lack of concrete detail and referential potential, they yield a 
                                                
109 I am using the term “synaesthesia” figurally, as a figure of speech for sensory experiences. 
 
110 The exquisite “chill the wintry smell” is one of the few synaesthesia-adjacent moments in the elegy. 
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negative knowledge, the performance of touching yields, their touching is a multi-sensory 
linguistic performance of language crossing textual boundaries, the boundaries of the 
bodies in the text, the body of the text, and the body that speaks or reads the text. The 
connection I am attempting to highlight is a way to understand how the obscure, 
nondiscrete bodies and body parts of death in the poem are the result of the problem of 
synaesthesia in language. 
Julia Kristeva offers a compelling textual model of the multi-sensorial nature of 
love as a linguistic synaesthesia: “The language of love,” she writes, “is impossible, 
inadequate, immediately allusive when one would like it to be most straightforward; it is 
a flight of metaphors—it is literature” (1). Love, figured in and as metaphor, is 
a crucible of contradictions and misunderstandings—at the same time infinity of 
meaning and occultation of meaning— […] It is revealed as such in the 
wandering of metaphorical connotation. Indeed, in the rapture of love, the limits 
of one’s own identity vanish, at the same time that the precision of reference and 
meaning becomes blurred in love’s discourse […] The ordeal of love puts the 
univocity of language and its referential and communicative power to the test. (2) 
Kristeva captures the resistance of eros to the language poets would use to create or 
represent it in a text. She clarifies that, by nature, the discourse of amorous experience is 
“blurred,” and she categorizes the synaesthetic rapture of love as a negative 
epistemological event. By pointing out the inextricability of poetic speech (“metaphorical 
connotation”) and subjectivity (“the limits of one’s own identity”) she figures the 
“rapture of love” as a synaesthetic condition of knowledge and language.111 When she 
                                                
111 In an essay that has been tremendously helpful for me, Jennifer Wagner-Lawlor looks to Kristeva’s 
conception of the metaphoricity of love in her discussion of “Anactoria.” In this poem, she writes, 
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describes love as “a crucible of contradictions and misunderstandings,” simultaneously 
the “infinity of meaning and occultation of meaning” activated by “the wandering of 
metaphorical connotation”—she is also describing the linguistic equivalent of multi-
sensory experience. Synaesthesia is a way to embody or perform in speech a multi-
sensory experience of the body, because it relies on the language of one sense to express 
the activation of another. 
In order to more clearly understand Swinburne’s reputation as an erotic poet, it is 
necessary to delve into the reception history of his work. Upon the publication in 1865 of 
Atalanta in Calydon, and in 1866 of Poems and Ballads, First Series, Swinburne’s poetry 
was celebrated for its formal virtuosity and aesthetic ambition, and reproved for its sexual 
provocations (156).112 Atalanta, John Ruskin wrote in an 1866 letter, is “the grandest 
thing ever yet done by a youth,” and “though he is a Demoniac youth” his “foam at the 
mouth is fine” (156).113 Poems and Ballads, First Series, which includes such infamous 
                                                                                                                                            
“Swinburne's flight of metaphors is a creative language of love, in which the play of language is love 
because its transfer of meaning is a trope of love's desired transference of subject and object. ‘To love,’ 
says Julia Kristeva, ‘comes in here in the place of to be and as: copula and comparison, existence and 
image, truth and deception. A drifting together of the symbolic, the real, and the imaginary’” (919, 162). 
 
112 Atalanta, John Ruskin writes, is “the grandest thing ever yet done by a youth—though he is a Demoniac 
youth—whether ever he will be clothed and his right mind—heaven only knows. His foam at the mouth is 
fine, meantime” (156). Ruskin, John. “To Charles Eliot Norton.” 28 Jan. 1866. Letters of John Ruskin to 
Charles Eliot Norton. Ed. Charles Eliot Norton. Vol. 1. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1905. 156-57. In 
another letter, Ruskin is slightly circumspect toward Poems and Ballads, First Series: “For the matter of 
it—I consent to much—I regret much—I blame or reject nothing. I should as soon think of finding fault 
with you as with a thundercloud or a nightshade blossom. All I can say of you or them—is that God made 
you, and that you are very wonderful and beautiful. To me it may be dreadful or deadly—it may be in a 
deeper sense, or in certain relations, helpful and medicinal. There is assuredly something wrong with you—
awful in proportion to the great powers it affects, and renders [it] at present useless.” See Ruskin to 
Swinburne, 9 September 1866. Cited in PL, 139. In Rikky Rooksby, A. C. Swinburne: A Poet’s Life. 
Aldershot: Scolar Press, 1997, 141. Henceforth abbreviated as PL. 5.] 
 
113 In a letter to Thomas Dixon in 1866, William Rossetti writes, “Swinburne’s superiority over his 
contemporary poets, with the sole possible exception of Tennyson . . . lie[s] in his mastery of all the literary 
or artistic resources of poetry.” [William Michael Rossetti to Thomas Dixon, 2 September 1866, in Selected 
Letters of William Michael Rossetti, ed. Roger W. Peattie (Pennsylvania State University Press: University 
Park, 1990), 150. 
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works as “Laus Veneris,” “Dolores,” “The Leper,” and “Anactoria,” received a rather less 
generous welcome.114 The negative critical response to the adventurous sexuality of 
Poems and Ballads long-overshadowed the other the aesthetic and intellectual virtues of 
his poetry.115 Another still-influential criticism of Swinburne comes from T.S. Eliot, over 
a lack of intellectual depth and the supposed imprecision of speech. Eliot’s view that 
arises from what he considers Swinburne’s privileging of the sensuousness of poetic 
speech over the poetry of making sense. Eliot refers to this as “diffuseness,” a problem of 
poetic speech not properly grasping its object. When a lack of concrete description and 
reference obscures the relation between words and objects, Swinburne’s poems do not 
offer “images and ideas and music,” but “one thing with a curious mixture of suggestions 
of all three” (133). He “uses the most general word,” Eliot continues, “because his 
                                                                                                                                            
 
114 John Morley, for instance, excoriated the young poet, calling him the “libidinous laureate of a pack of 
satyrs.” Robert Buchanan, who would later be known for his rebuke of Dante Gabriel Rossetti and Pre-
Raphaelite aesthetics, claimed that Swinburne’s poems were “unclean for the sake of uncleanness” 
(source?). Morley’s review of Poems and Ballads, First Series, was published on August 4, 1866, in the 
Saturday Review. Buchanan’s review appeared in Athenaeum on the same date. Though such critiques were 
rightly refuted by other of his contemporaries, such as W.M. Rossetti and Ruskin, they influenced scholarly 
responses to Swinburne for the next century. 
 
115 Swinburne’s verse “eclipses or sacrifices thought,” one nineteenth-century reviewer stated (Hyder 14). 
To this, Swinburne responded: “Except to such ears as should always be kept closed against poetry, there is 
no music in verse which has not in it sufficient fullness and ripeness of meaning, sufficient adequacy of 
emotion or of thought, to abide the analysis of any other than the blind scrutiny of prepossession or the 
squint-eyed inspection of malignity’” (Hyder 14). “To Swinburne,” Hyder tells us, “poetry was not music 
capable of separation from thought” (14). This imprecision is in sharp contrast to the Victorian emphasis on 
particularly and specificity. See Carol Christ, The Finer Optic, for more. As Jerome McGann notes, “[S]o 
shocking was the advent of this epochal book that it would come to obscure the range of Swinburne’s 
work—a range so extensive that one can sometimes scarcely imagine how it came to be thought narrow or 
precious” (207). See McGann, Jerome. “Swinburne’s Radical Artifice; or, The Comedian as A.C.” 
Modernism/Modernity 11.2. April 2004: 205-218. More recently, Stephanie Kuduk-Weiner has 
commented: “To a large degree […] Poems and Ballads, First Series has set the terms for interpreting, 
evaluating, and assessing the significance of all his poetry. Those terms—aestheticism, sexuality and 
sensuality, technical virtuosity—invest a great deal of significance in the otherworldliness and abstractness 
of the volume’s descriptive passages. Resulting accounts enlist Swinburne in the ranks of an anti-
Enlightenment Romanticism whose truth claims are intelligible largely as a rejection of those asserted by 
Enlightenment rationalism, and whose preference for imagination and reverie rather than reason and 
observation entails a deliberately vague descriptive practice” (13). 
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emotion is never particular, never in direct line of vision, never focused; it is emotion 
reinforced, not by intensification but by expansion” (134).116 Moreover, his demand that 
poetic speech “present[s] the object, is so close to the object that the two are identified,” 
is particularly problematic for elegy because the identification or substitution of word and 
object is not possible—the love object is dead and immaterial or otherwise hidden from 
the sight of the living. What Eliot decries as the “hallucination of meaning,” when “the 
object has ceased to exist,” I read as a performance of and as meaning itself.117 His view 
does not consider other possible modes of poetic performance, other ways that poems 
speak and make meaning, and Swinburne calls on many more resources of poetry than 
Eliot accounts for in this essay. For instance, Swinburne relies on aural signifiers to 
produce meaning in the absence of concrete sensory objects. In elegy, where there is no 
concrete object to enclose in words, the somatic effects of the sounds of speech and 
rhythm—what can be called the materiality of speech—can communicate desire and 
voice the “human feelings” that Eliot cannot hear (136).  
While Eliot thinks of poetic diffuseness—non-particularized perception, 
language, and affect—as a failure of meaning, recent scholarship by John Rosenberg and 
Stephanie Kuduk-Weiner considers this kind of generalized non-specificity a poetic 
                                                
116 Criticism such as Eliot’s was responsible for Swinburne’s general neglect in the first half of the 
twentieth century; not until the 1960s did his work begin to recapture scholarly interest; according to Clyde 
Kenneth Hyder, the resurgence in interest was in large part due to the publication of Cecil Y. Lang’s The 
Swinburne Letters, 1959-62 (3). Catherine Maxwell and Stefano Evangelista similarly credit Lang with 
recuperating Swinburne’s reputation, and praise Hyder as well: “While he commanded a select minority of 
admirers and supporters, Swinburne’s own reception was muted until the 1960s when his fortunes began to 
revive owing to the good offices of scholars such as Cecil Y. Lang, editor of the monumental six-volume 
Swinburne Letters (Swinburne 1959-62),” as well as collections by Clyde K. Hyder in the late 1960s and 
early 1970s (3). 
 
117 Interestingly, I find that what he says of authors whose work he esteems more highly is applicable to my 
way of reading Swinburne: “But the language which is more important to us is that which is struggling to 
digest and express new objects, new groups of objects, new feelings, new aspects, as, for instance, the prose 
of Mr. James Joyce or the earlier Conrad” (136). 
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virtue.118 Extending this line of thought, when I look to stanzas 1-4 in the next section of 
this chapter, I read under the hypothesis that the “diffuse” or “deliberately vague” 
conditions of Ave Atque Vale are not limited to reference, image, and affect; they also 
happen in certain multi-sensory experiences and figures of speech.119 I suggest that the 
“curious mixture of suggestions” of sound, speech, and thought, and the “expansion” of 
emotion, describes the synaesthetic mode of relation that is the fundamental condition of 
Swinburnean eros. 
 The second position this chapter addresses is the poem’s relation to the elegiac 
tradition. Most studies of the elegy attribute the experimental and dynamic (if 
impersonal) nature of its language, imagery, and form to Swinburne’s reimagining of the 
classical and pastoral conventions of the genre to better fit Baudelaire.120 While 
Swinburne’s elegy is aware of the classical conventions, they are not the dominant 
influence on its voice and form. This chapter proposes an approach to the elegy’s 
classicism that is not dependent on the conventions of the genre, and which in fact reveals 
the constraints of genre criticism. The elegy’s classicism, I will show, exceeds references 
                                                
118 John Rosenberg writes that while “Traditionally, the English poet has prided himself on particularity 
[…] Our very conception of poetry has been shaped by the practices of the metaphysical poets and by 
Keats’s dictum that the poet must have ‘distinctness for his luxury.’ We are at a loss in reading a poet who, 
like Swinburne, is diffuse not by default but by design” (163). Stephanie Kuduk-Weiner observes a similar 
non-specific quality throughout Swinburne’s work, and refers to it as “a deliberately vague descriptive 
practice” (13). 
 
119 Swinburne’s tendency toward somatic and affective impression over concrete imagery and 
representation stems from his interest to represent “the effect of the thing instead of the thing itself.” The 
consistency in the elegy of non-specific images, bodies, objects, affects, and figures of speech belies the 
difficulty of describing death and the dead from across the boundary of life, and the resulting linguistic and 
somatic difficulty of distinguishing the various sense perceptions in poetic speech and form. 
 
120 Brennan writes that criticism by Bloom and Sacks on the competitive nature of Ave Atque Vale “is 
astute in its account of Swinburne’s relation to the elegy genre. Though the poem centers on Baudelaire, 
Swinburne’s depersonalized mode is certainly a reaction to the more personal connections Tennyson, 
Arnold, and Shelley seek to establish with their precursors” (254). 
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and allusions to the classical past, to poets like Sappho and gods like Apollo, and its 
pastoralism is an anti-pastoral inversion of the conventionally idyllic atmosphere of the 
elegiac tradition. While scholars have generally focused on the poem’s references and 
allusions to classical poets and mythic figures as evidence of Swinburne’s attentiveness 
to elegiac convention, such recallings of antiquity confine the text’s classicism to 
associations that do not account for its nuanced figurations of love and knowledge in the 
face of death. I believe it is more exciting and theoretically provocative to think the 
poem’s classicism rhetorically and structurally, in order to show the epistemological 
undercurrent of its figures of speech and versification. 
The third issue this chapter interrogates concerns the nature of Swinburne’s 
classicism. His Hellenic affinities are most commonly interpreted through conventional 
references and allusions to the classical past, as well as through his mastery of classical 
forms and meters such as Sapphics and Hendecasyllabics. Instead, I propose an approach 
to the elegy’s classicism that is not dependent on the conventions of the genre, and which 
in fact reveals the constraints of generic criticism. The poem’s classicism exceeds claims 
grounded on references and allusions to the classical past—to poets like Sappho and 
mythic gods like Apollo—and its inversions of the idyllic pastoralism of the elegiac 
tradition. While scholars have generally focused on the poem’s references and allusions 
to classical poets and mythic figures as evidence of Swinburne’s awareness of elegiac 
convention, this view confines the text’s classicism to associations and reinvests the 
elegy in the literary tradition; it also does not account for the elegy’s subtle and 
sophisticated reimagining of classical tropes like metonymy and prosopopoeia.121  
                                                
121 The dimensions of Swinburne’s classicism, too, though having been smartly investigated in major 
studies by Margot K. Louis (Swinburne and his Gods), Yisrael Levin (Swinburne’s Apollo), and Charlotte 
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There is, however, a problem of elegiac convention that is worth mentioning here 
because it arises in a figure of speech that I have so far been arguing is a crucial figure of 
eros—the corpse/corpus metonymy—yet here it seems to turn itself back into a 
convention. Peter Sacks elaborates this problem from within the elegiac tradition: 
“Swinburne regarded Baudelaire as a pioneer and model,” Sacks writes, “and it is with 
this in mind that we should recognize how fully ‘Ave Atque Vale’ exploits the elegy’s 
generic association with issues of lineage and inheritance” (206).122 Once again, though, 
the focus on “issues of lineage and inheritance”—which encompasses the competitive 
anxiety that Bloom and McGann propose—tends to overshadow non-generic elements. 
While I agree that Swinburne reveres Baudelaire as an aesthetic ideal and model, I view 
this as more than a nod to the conventions of literary inheritance and influence. In an 
excellent recent essay, Thomas Brennan similarly critiques these interpretations by 
Bloom, McGann, and Sacks: “They follow the traditional notion of the elegy as a 
competitive genre, a view that does not account for Swinburne’s lingering over 
Baudelaire—as a corpse but also as a corpus or body of work—throughout his poem” 
(251). The poem’s “lingering” over Baudelaire as corpse and corpus, this chapter will 
argue, reflects Swinburne’s erotic pursuit of the dead poet. Rather than setting himself in 
                                                                                                                                            
Ribeyrol, have been under-examined in the elegy. It is through a Platonic interpretation of Eros, I will 
argue, that the elegy’s classical affinities are better understood.  
 
122 Sacks expands: “Swinburne considered Baudelaire to be the great pioneer of this aesthetic creed; hence 
even though Baudelaire as a personality appears nowhere in the poem, Swinburne’s tribute succeeds in 
feeling not only fitting but deeply sincere. The very qualities that make ‘Ave Atque Vale’ seem 
impersonal—all of its gorgeous imagery, symbolism, and mythological machinery—confirm Swinburne’s 
fervent admiration for Baudelaire and his heartfelt desire to assume the mantle of the elder poet” (Sacks 
206). Erik Gray, citing this same passage in Sacks, adds: “Swinburne’s poem simultaneously gestures back 
to a long poetic tradition and looks forward to the more stylized, more detached form of elegy that would 
emerge, or re-emerge, in the twentieth century” (Gray 282). 
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an agonistic or competitive posture toward the dead poet, Swinburne pursues what I 
claim is a textually erotic relationship with the dead Baudelaire. 
When scholars attend to erotic experience in his work they tend to do so at the 
exclusion of other interpretive possibilities that I suggest offer a more nuanced 
understanding of the complexity and diversity of the figures, forms, and images at play in 
his poetry. And even when scholars engage erotic experience as a formal problem, eros 
remains grounded in bodily materiality and carnal pleasure. For instance, in a cleverly 
counter-intuitive reading of the erotic in Swinburne, John Rosenberg has recently 
claimed: “Virtually all of Swinburne’s most powerful poetry is an elegy to the 
evanescence of love” (171); “There are scarcely any lovers in Swinburne’s poetry,” he 
continues. “There is much passion but little conjunction; emotion is felt but not 
communicated and not returned. Swinburne has mistakenly acquired the reputation of an 
erotic poet; he is rather the elegist of love’s impossibility” (177). The impossibility of 
love is a common theme in Swinburne’s work, and the lack of “conjunction” and 
reciprocation is clear in poems like “The Leper,” “Anactoria,” and “Laus Veneris.” Yet 
this view of love’s lack maintains a straightforward, and straight, association of eros with 
sexual love.  
A central question for this chapter, then, is: What has been the effect on 
Swinburne studies when eros is consistently equated with sexual desire and bodily 
pleasure, and when only such explicitly sexual examples like these are claimed as 
evidence of Swinburne’s erotic poetics? Harrison encourages a rethinking of 
Swinburnean eroticism similar to my own: “Sexuality and sexual rhetoric,” he writes, 
“not only allowed Swinburne to express social critique and anti-Christian sentiments, but 
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also helped him to conceptualize his own theological framework” (63). I would amend 
this to claim that the erotic figuration and imagery in the elegy helped Swinburne to 
conceptualize his own epistemological framework. 
The referential and formal dimensions of Swinburne’s Hellenism, particularly his 
mastery of classical prosody and his knowledge of Greek poetry and thought are well 
addressed in the scholarship.123 However, as with those critical views that reduce the 
eroticism of the elegy to conventional reproductive imagery, the rhetoric and figural 
logics of classical (Platonic) thought have been under-examined in favor of identifying 
allusions and references that assume representational transparency and privilege the 
positivism of Greek thought.124 The erotic-linguistic constructions I pursue in Ave Atque 
Vale do not fit the positivist “Olympian vision,” as Charlotte Ribeyrol refers to it, of a 
classical Greece that would provide “secure ideological foundations” for the elegist.125 
Instead, these figures reveal themselves as textual inventions in the same moment they 
                                                
123 Charlotte Ribeyrol, for instance, writes: “Swinburne’s intensive education in classical Greek language 
and culture is without question”; he was “a learned Hellenist, trained at the best institutions offering a 
classical education in nineteenth-century Britain, from Eton to Oxford” (52).” Erik Gray smartly (and 
counterintuitively) interprets the elegy’s classical referentiality as an aspect of its radical 
(un)conventionality. Ave Atque Vale is, he writes, “in no sense ‘private’: Swinburne had no personal 
knowledge of Baudelaire—indeed, he began his elegy while the latter was still alive, after hearing a false 
report of his death. Nor does Swinburne’s poem concern itself with topical issues; to the contrary, all of its 
references are classical and mythological. Its title is taken from Catullus, and there follow allusions to 
Sappho, the Muses, Dryads, Proserpine, Venus, Niobe, and the House of Atreus. Yet the poem’s constant 
invocation of classical tropes and its virtuosic formal polish do not stifle it. Rather, Swinburne’s elegy 
manages to be at once strictly conventional and utterly radical. Swinburne’s radicalism, here as in all of his 
poems, lies in his willingness to grant precedence to aesthetic value over every other consideration—
including traditional morality, and even individuality” (281). While I agree that these conventional 
references do not at all “stifle” its energy or affect, Gray’s view is still representative of the relatively 
narrow sense of the elegy’s debt to classical thought. For other investigations of Swinburne’s Hellenism, 
see Margot K. Louis and Yisrael Levin, among others. 
 
124 The assumption of aesthetic-referential transparency of Greek art comes to us from Winckelmann. See 
David Ferris, Romantic Urns, for an incisive re-examination of this ideal of classical art in Romantic 
poetry. 
 
125 Ribeyrol challenges the positivist presumption by examining the darker corners of Swinburne’s 
classicism, his “liminal and transgressive excursions into marginal Hellenic territories” which were “often 
obscured by the exclusively Olympian vision of Greece extolled by most Victorians in their quest for 
secure ideological foundations” (52). 
  77 
express their desire, and so they sort of undermine themselves; this implies that the erotic 
relation, the intimate textual relation Swinburne seeks with Baudelaire, is possible only 
within the language and form of the poetic text. 
My argument about the elegy’s classicism builds on the work of Sacks, Gray, and 
Ribeyrol, but shifts focus from its referentiality to its rhetoricity. Swinburne’s elegiac 
classicism entails more than mythic reference and allusion, whether idealizing and 
Olympian (as per Gray), or “liminal and transgressive” (as per Ribeyrol): for me, the 
elegy’s classicism inheres and operates in the figures of speech that represent the relation 
between the amorous subject and the dead love object. These relational figures—which, 
as in Adonais, I consider figures of love—perform the conditions of Platonic eros by 
representing the pursuit of knowledge (in the figure of the lost object) as an experience of 
somatic and intellectual pleasure. Ave Atque Vale, however, presents the desire for 
knowledge in a very different way. Neither the “pale Titan-woman,” the metonymy of 
corpse and corpus in the “shut scroll,” nor the many anti-prosopons, signify positively 
and encourage rational thought or intellectual order, but rather the loss of these things in 
the pursuit of the dead.126 It is worth noting here another variation of the problem of 
elegiac knowledge: if Swinburne’s erotic figures signify the undoing of reason and 
rationality, how can this be considered knowledge, and how can this knowledge give 
                                                
126 “Greek Antiquity progressively appeared throughout the nineteenth century as a powerful signifier of 
rationality, purity, and order,” Charlotte Ribeyrol tells us in an illuminating recent essay on Swinburne’s 
Hellenism (52). “What is striking in Swinburne’s poems,” she states later, “is the instability of the Greek 
reference which constantly shifts from the archaic to the later, Hellenistic periods or from the mystery gods 
(Demeter, Persephone, and Dionysus) to the deities of Olympus [and] the God Apollo is repeatedly said to 
be both ‘Destroyer and Healer’” (55). “Swinburne’s Hellenism is dual, Janus-like,” she writes. “His 
Hellenic inspiration exceeds the limits of Olympus to offer readers shocking glimpses of Chthonian and 
Dionysian depths […] revealing repressed features of ancient Greek culture, in particular colour as opposed 
to marmoreal whiteness, darkness as opposed to Apollonian light, suffering as opposed to health and 
innocent joy” (54-55). We see the opposition to Apollonian light in the Sun-Gods ineffectual mourning. 
But more problematically, I would also add “Platonic as opposed to carnal eroticism,” though this is a 
reversal of the order. 
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pleasure? As I develop later in this chapter, elegiac figuration offers what we can think of 
as a negative knowledge, or the negative epistemology of mourning. 
Swinburne’s Elegiac Anti-Pastoral 
From its first line, Ave Atque Vale sets itself apart from the elegiac tradition.127 
Like Adonais, Ave Atque Vale self-consciously engages key, recognizable conventions of 
the genre, with imagistic nods to the pastoral tradition, references and allusions to 
antiquity, and the performance of symbolic acts, such as the strewing of flowers and the 
posing of questions.128 Like Adonais, Ave Atque Vale strews flowers over the dead and 
poses questions about poetic immortality and the limits of human knowledge. Unlike 
Adonais (and earlier forebears), Ave Atque Vale does not first implore a muse or a god to 
share Swinburne’s grief: he speaks directly to the dead poet, and the flowers he proffers 
are not sylvan and bucolic.129 In addition, though the elegy seeks no sympathy from 
fellow mourners, and seeks nothing more for the dead poet than silent rest, it also seeks 
nothing less than the impossible: to make the dead speak again, for the lost object to 
respond to the address of the living. 
My focus in the opening stanzas is the imagery that gestures toward the pastoral 
tradition of elegy only to turn sharply into a severe anti-pastoral atmosphere. “Shall I 
                                                
127 What is radical about Swinburne’s elegy is the continual, insistent turning or inversion of conventions to 
fit more closely the aesthetic of the lost object. These conventional things do not occur in the common 
order of elegiac events, nor do they fit the aesthetic expectations of an idyllic pastoral setting, a sympathetic 
community of mourners, a compassionate muse bereft. 
 
128 “Since the first question with which Thyrsis opened his lament for Daphnis, in Theocritus’s ‘First Idyl,’ 
the convention of questions, sometimes private and gnomic but more often in a sharply interrogative mode, 
addressed to a particular auditor, has echoed throughout the history of the elegy” (Sacks 21). 
 
129 The canonical elegies typically open with an invocation to the muse, not to the dead poet himself; also, 
this opening invocation is usually an imperative statement, not an interrogative question. Shelley’s opening 
lines, for instance, are posed desperately to the Muse and the heavens; he implores Urania to grant him the 
inspiration and voice to compose his mourning song, and cries for all of creation “weep” with him and 
share his grief. 
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strew on thee rose or rue or laurel, / Brother, on this that was the veil of thee?”, he asks 
quietly (ll. 1-2). At first glance, this opening scene of Swinburne’s mourning, at the site 
of Baudelaire’s grave, is idyllic, set in a natural world of “quiet sea-flower,” “meadow-
sweet and sorrel,” and “summer-sleepy Dryads / Waked up by snow-soft sudden rains at 
eve” (ll. 3-6).130 Swinburne poses this question with a knowing irony, however, and the 
notion that Baudelaire would prefer such staid, traditional signifiers lasts a mere six lines. 
As the specifically named, serene flowers of the pastoral conceit give way to the harsh, 
unnamed “Half-faded fiery blossoms, pale with heat / And full of bitter summer” (ll. 7-9), 
we begin to see that when Swinburne “does” the conventions, the result is twisted, 
distorted, yet perfectly appropriate:131 the colorless, burning, bitter flowers he offers 
Baudelaire are fleurs du mal, flowers of evil.132 More importantly, however, we glimpse a 
                                                
130 As Sacks explains, “the strewing of flowers, or, figuratively, of elegiac poetry, is an extremely 
conventional act, redolent of vegetation rituals and the origins of the genre” (207). The kinds of flowers 
Swinburne proposes in the following lines, however, are not conventional; in fact, these “fiery blossoms” 
are anathema to the traditionally pleasing rose and laurel. They scorn and mock the tradition. I return to the 
idea and act of mocking later in this chapter. 
 
131 “Swinburne’s connection with Baudelaire is complicated by a combination of both poets’ conscious 
representation of a perplexingly paradoxical existence in their poetry along with the problematic effect of 
cultural influences on perceptions of their poetry,” writes Tony W. Garland (634). “Swinburne,” he 
continues, “identifies Baudelaire’s focus as ‘sad and strange things—the weariness of pain and the 
bitterness of pleasure—the perverse happiness and wayward sorrows of exceptional people.’ By stressing 
Baudelaire’s juxtapositions of extreme emotional reactions, Swinburne reveals an enthusiasm for similar 
topics and an interest in cycles of pain and pleasure” (634). 
 
132 To Sacks, this choice of symbolic flowers indicates “Baudelaire’s and Swinburne’s revision of the 
pastoral clichés. Here, the world of pastoral is made harsh; luxuriousness and sweetness are crossed with 
fervor and astringency” (208). Thomas Brennan comments similarly on Swinburne’s aesthetic relationship 
with Baudelaire through his reading of the French poet’s Les Fleurs du Mal. He writes, “the ‘half-faded 
fiery blossoms, pale with heat’ indicate Baudelaire’s and Swinburne’s revision of the pastoral clichés. Here, 
the world of pastoral is made harsh; luxuriousness and sweetness are crossed with fervor and astringency. 
Furthermore, these southern flowers are more truly elegiac than the easily woven garlands of the north, for 
they are all reliquary, bearing the marks of a withering passion” (208). 
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vital point of sympathy in their poetics—the synaesthetic condition of poetic experience, 
and the insynaesthesia of the dead. I return to this later in the chapter.133  
The language of the stanza becomes progressively less specific as the stanza 
progresses, and yet it is more evocative: the first three flowers are named, but not 
described; the flowers Swinburne offers are unnamed, but sensorially detailed. In the shift 
from specific names (“rose,” “rue,” “laurel”) to nonspecific sensory phenomena (“half-
faded fiery,” “pale with heat,” “bitter summer”) these natural objects lose their identity 
but gain something more important (to Swinburne): somatic and epistemological 
potential, which becomes erotic potential in the following stanzas. Though we do not 
know what these flowers are, we do know how they look, feel, and taste. The poem 
suggests that sensory and affective knowledge of natural objects and phenomena is more 
important to the poets than empirical knowledge of floral nomenclature and literary 
convention. 
As the language slips from precise, concrete terms to one-word, vague 
descriptions, as it de-specifies, the flowers become indistinct; that is, they lose their 
singular identities and discrete characteristics, the qualities by which we can call them 
“rose” or “rue” or “laurel.” When the individual forms of discrete sense objects dissolve 
into nondifferentiation, they meld into a harsh amalgam of intermixed perceptions—fiery 
and pale, hot and bitter—that is the condition of synaesthesia. How this multi-sensory 
experience, sparked by the encounter with erotic bodies, figures, or objects in the elegy, 
                                                
133 Here I am using synaesthesia as the opposite of “discrete”: in synaesthesia the sense impressions 
become mixed up and/or indistinguishable or indifferentiable from each other. See Jennifer Wagner-
Lawlor, “Metaphorical Indiscretion,” for more. 
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translates into the “diffuseness” or “indiscretion” of elegiac speech, will be a continuous 
thread throughout this chapter. 
The landscape (actually, seascape) of the poem, like the flowers, is unlike the 
elysian pastoral settings of “Astrophel,” “Lycidas,” and Adonais. In Ave Atque Vale, 
nature is violent, unforgiving, even murderous. Whatever conventional potential there 
was in the semi-idyllic first stanza is undone in the second by the “wild sea” that has 
abused and drowned Sappho, “the supreme head of song” (ll. 12-22).134 Yet Baudelaire, 
the speaker tells us, thrives in this kind of environment. His “ears knew all the wandering 
watery sighs” of a tempestuous ocean that even Sappho could not survive.135 Unlike other 
poets, Baudelaire pursued more passionately, experienced more intensely, and understood 
more deeply, the paradoxical conditions—the “fervid languid glories”—of human 
experience (l. 12). What is remarkable is that even in this undifferentiated, evil seascape, 
Baudelaire has a privileged understanding of the contrastive multiplicity of sensory 
perceptions that produce poetic knowledge.  
There is a crucial nuance here that raises a problem for elegiac speech: 
Swinburne’s description of Baudelaire’s sensory acuity subtly reveals the limitations of 
his sensory knowledge. Although “His ears knew all the wandering, watery sighs / Where 
the sea sobs round Lesbian promontories,” he actually he knew no farther than these 
mysterious “sighs.” Death and nature, it seems, obscure things even from the most 
perceptive poets. Sacks proposes that Baudelaire has “a mourner’s intimate knowledge of 
                                                
134 The lines read: “The wild sea winds her and the green gulfs bear / Hither and thither, and vex and work 
her wrong, / Blind gods that cannot spare” (ll. 20-22). 
 
135 To a degree, this passage feels like the beginning of a blazon, where Swinburne represents the love 
object as a series of disconnected body parts. 
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a mournful sea,” bonding him to Sappho and Swinburne.136 The indefinite grammar and 
contorted syntax of lines 14-18, as well as obscure language like “sighs” (the frequency 
of which increases as the poem progresses), hint otherwise, however. 
Baudelaire’s equally sensitive eye also caught things hidden from others: “Thou 
sawest, in thine old singing season, brother / Secrets and sorrows unbeheld of us: / Fierce 
loves, and lovely leaf-buds poisonous, / Bare to thy subtler eye, but for none other,” 
Swinburne says (ll. 23-26)137. In his praise that these “[s]ecrets and sorrows” of love and 
nature were available only to Baudelaire’s “subtler eye,” Swinburne simultaneously 
demonstrates his own sensory and poetic acuity by recognizing these deep contrasts of 
experience—beautiful things that are dangerous (“lovely leaf-buds poisonous”) and 
idealized experiences that are violent (“fierce loves”)—which were the achievement of 
Baudelaire’s poetic vision. What the dead poet’s hyper-acute eye perceived, however, 
exceeds Swinburne’s language: “Sin without shape, and pleasure without speech” (l. 29) 
are obscure, enigmatic images resistant to concrete description. In the “wandering, watery 
sighs” of the previous stanza, and now in these, the elegy insinuates a persistent concern: 
the negation of discrete sensory perception and knowledge.  
                                                
136 As Sacks explains, “Baudelaire has a mourner’s intimate knowledge of a mournful sea that grieves for 
Sappho, herself a passionate griever. The further connection with the presently mourning Swinburne 
implies not just the bond between all three but a certain relation between poetry itself and grief, between 
song and separation. Paradoxically, these poets are connected most by their passionate responses to 
disconnection” (209). Melissa Zeiger argues (mostly) similarly: “Sappho initiates the poet, as her devotee, 
into a textual world figured in the poem simultaneously as a classical underworld and the place of 
writing—the place of what Derrida calls ‘graphic relations between the living and the dead’” (34). Their 
connection is through a shared negative, or at least uncertain, knowledge experience, reflected in the 
knowing ears that now “know not”: there is a waxing and waning, a push and pull, between knowing and 
not knowing that mimics the rolling kiss of the waves. 
 
137 I have drawn on a similar observation Brennan makes about the sensory shift between these stanzas. He 
writes, “Having considered what Baudelaire heard, Swinburne then turns to what he saw [but] the focus 
centers on what is not available in the present; Baudelaire appears to have had access to knowledge not 
allowed his successors” (259). 
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As the poem goes on, textual bodies and objects proceed to lose their senses, and 
the figures of speech that activate the relation between the speaker and the love object 
also begin to dissolve. When we consider Swinburne’s poetics in general, we recognize 
that such obscure, cryptic imagery is not a shortcoming but a performance in language of 
experiences that are just beyond the reach of language. Unlike certain of his nineteenth-
century predecessors and contemporaries, namely Wordsworth, Keats, Browning, and 
Rossetti, precision of reference and particularity of image are not Swinburne’s primary 
concerns.138 As Rosenberg observes, “Traditionally, the English poet has prided himself 
on particularity […] Our very conception of poetry has been shaped by the practices of 
the metaphysical poets and by Keats’s dictum that the post must have ‘distinctness for his 
luxury.’ We are at a loss in reading a poet who, like Swinburne, is diffuse not by default 
but by design” (163). But diffuseness is not the same as vagueness, he reminds us, and 
this distinction is essential for understanding the ambiguities of Swinburne’s poetics: 
“The vague poet,” Rosenberg writes, “cannot see or speak clearly—in short, is not a poet. 
Swinburne is often called vague, but no one who has read his best poetry closely could 
ever accuse him of imprecision or carelessness with words” (164). What Rosenberg calls 
the “diffuseness” of Swinburne’s language, and Wagner-Lawlor terms “metaphorical 
indiscretion,” I identify as the synaesthetic condition of Swinburne’s poetry. In the 
following sections, I examine moments of synaesthetic figuration and figural dissolve—
what de Man refers to as “disfiguration”—that signify the sensory closure of the bodies in 
the text and the body of the text in order to understand how de-synaestheticization of 
language and the body can still be erotic.  
                                                
138 On Victorian particularity, see Carol Christ, The Finer Optic: The Aesthetic of Particularity in Victorian 
Poetry (1975). 
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Having praised the aesthetic and epistemological achievement of Baudelaire, 
Swinburne then describes him as one who suffered greatly the pains of this knowledge: 
  O sleepless heart and sombre soul unsleeping, 
   That were athirst for sleep and no more life 
   And no more love, for peace and no more strife! 
  Now the dim gods of death have in their keeping 
   Spirit and body and all the springs of song, 
   Is it well now where love can do no wrong, 
  Where stingless pleasure has no foam or fang 
   Behind the unopening closure of her lips? 
   Is it not well where soul from body slips 
  And flesh from bone divides without a pang 
   As dew from flower-bell drips? (ll. 34-44) 
The repetitive phrasing (the thrice-spoken “and no more”), imperfect anaphoras (“Is it 
well now” / “Is it not well”), and recurrent negative diction (five “no”’s strewn among the 
negative adverbs “sleepless,” “unsleeping,” “stingless pleasure,” “unopening”), 
compound on each with the weight of the affective and somatic traumas of poetic 
experience. Also, the figure of the mouth takes on particular importance here. Though 
their representations of the poet-lover’s mouth are contrary, both Shelley and Swinburne 
write the mouth as a primary organ of pleasure and knowledge, a synecdoche for the 
erotic body.139 When we encounter a closed mouth here, it is also a synecdoche, but for 
                                                
139 This representation of life as discord and love as violent reveals a crucial point of difference between 
Swinburne’s and Shelley’s poetics of elegiac love. In Chapter One, love is—or at least strives to be—a 
redemptive force of the imagination which promises to fill the existential void left by the death of the 
beloved other. Additionally, Adonais’s posthumous existence is not one of sleep or rest like Baudelaire’s, 
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the epistemologically resistant body of the dead. This “unopening closure” offers no 
affirming knowledge or positive pleasure; instead, it posits the mouth as a void, a site of 
negation of pleasure and knowledge. Yet even when closed, erotic mouth can be 
(negatively) generative of poetic knowledge.  
The poet-lover’s mouth, an organ of speech that is also an organ of pleasure (as 
the site of the kiss) and of pain (with its rabid “fang,”), is the signifier of Swinburne’s 
negative epistemology. Like the shape of an open mouth, metalepsis is a figure of 
circularity that turns and returns (in)to itself, endlessly, a beginning that endlessly moves 
toward its end, and an ending that always returns to its beginning, to begin anew. Yet a 
circle also cuts itself off from what is around it, a figure of, at the same time, infinity and 
closure. The beginning-ending circularity of metalepsis signifies the potential of poetic 
figuration to keep the dead returning to life. The “unopening closure” of this mouth, 
however, signifies death’s foreclosing of poetic speech and of the pains of love.140 But it 
is also “pleasure’s mouth,” reminding us that, open or closed, kissing or biting, the mouth 
is a nexus of pleasure and knowledge, or, in Ave Atque Vale, of negative pleasure and 
negative knowledge.141 
                                                                                                                                            
but of triumph, of glorious rebirth into the pantheon of poetic genius, the “abode where the Eternal are” (l. 
495). 
 
140 Sacks lucidly explains this ambiguity of elegiac pleasure: “Death brings the desired extinction of desire, 
in a region where both the spirit and body are gathered together with the springs of song. But despite their 
ease, these lines seem burdened by contradiction. When the definition of pleasure or beauty has already 
been so inextricably entwined with bitter passion, the undoing of that bond now seems to unravel the 
existence of pleasure and beauty themselves. Although ‘pleasure has no foam or fang,’ that consolation is 
surely offset by the image of her lips’ ‘unopening closure.’ The complex enjoyments of the living seem 
here to have been drastically replaced by the anaesthesia of the dead” (Sacks 211). 
 
141 Matthew Kaiser states, “Pater places the mouth at the nexus of sense perception.” “The mouth,” he 
explains, “becomes gateway to the soul, a site of love, where subjectivity expands and unfurls, opens onto 
an interior vista. Mouths of course do more than taste. They bite, suck, inhale, exhale, and lick, among 
other things. Pater’s etymologically informed invocation of the word ‘taste’ incorporates a repertoire of 
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Baudelaire’s death seems at first to be a restful vacancy of mind, which 
Swinburne often terms a “sleep.”142 Swinburne hopes that the dead poet is not disturbed 
or intruded upon by any sense experience, nor beset by any desire: “O quiet eyes wherein 
the light saith nought, / Whereto the day is dumb, nor any night / With obscure finger 
silences your sight, / Nor in your speech the sudden soul speaks thought, / Sleep, and 
have sleep for light” (ll. 51-55).143 This total vanishing of sense perception and 
consciousness, reinforced again and again by the piling of linguistic negations, posits 
Baudelaire as a null or negative object. Brennan argues, “The opacity of the corpse to 
light, as well as to ‘day’ and ‘night’ […] highlights that a knowing subject or mind is to 
him simply a fiction. Nothing—even Swinburne’s own vacancy—is transformed by the 
reality of Baudelaire’s corpse” (262)144. Even though death’s undoing of mind may 
underscore, as Brennan claims, the fiction of a posthumously “knowing subject” while 
“continuing to raise his work as a problem” (262), I contend that something vital is 
indeed transformed by this sad mortal knowledge: Swinburne’s own subjectivity, his 
                                                                                                                                            
intimate motions, little acts of discovery and discernment: hence, the importance to Pater of the kiss, the 
touching-mouth” (51). 
 
142 The stilling of desire and the quieting of speech and the closing of the senses in death, are characteristic 
of Swinburne’s poetry. We know from poems such as the “Hymn to Proserpine,” “The Garden of 
Proserpine,” and “The Triumph of Time,” among others, that Swinburne commonly envisions death as an 
extinction of mind, self, and desire that he consistently metaphorizes as “sleep.” At the end of “Hymn to 
Prosperine” for example, he writes, “there is no God found stronger than death; and death is a sleep” (l. 73). 
Antony Harrison writes, “As perhaps the most elegiac among a host of elegiac Victorian poets, Swinburne 
was obsessed with the finality of death, along with its Keatsian easefulness […] poem after poem insists 
that death is oblivion” (179). 
 
143 It seems important somehow that the eyes—the organ of vision/seeing, which in stanza III were the 
“subtler eyes” of the poet—are now the cause of (or have the potential to cause) such existential pain, 
angst, and agon; the very thing which makes Baudelaire a great poet is the same thing that causes his and 
Swinburne’s own distress; but the poet, this implies, lives in and through this pain—his life is/as trauma, 
the poetry depends on the pain of living poet. 
 
144 “What looks like a negation of Baudelaire,” he continues, “is really Swinburne’s way of continuing to 
raise his work as a problem. Death is unremitting [and] all of Baudelaire’s striving and all the fruits of his 
striving cannot accrue to him in any way” (262). 
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agency as an elegiac speaker, is now threatened by his new understanding of death’s 
epistemological (im)possibility. This new knowledge is of mortality’s limited 
epistemological reach and the limits of its linguistic articulation in the face of the dead. 
To give language to encounters with death and the dead, the poem warns us, is to lose the 
possibility of discrete, self-contained, affirmative speech. 
 Brennan’s attention to the corpse in the passage above opens up an exciting avenue 
for my reading: Baudelaire is certainly the poem’s central love object, but he is not the 
only dead body in the poem that signifies (or de-signifies) erotically. I turn now to these 
other corpses, these other insensate bodies, in order to see how sensory closure, 
represented in the figure of anti-prosopon and sense organs that do not function, relates to 
the synaesthetic condition of Swinburnean eros. The subtle moments of sensory closure 
that I have just looked at in stanzas 2-4, find their fullest expression in the figure of the 
“pale Titan-woman” of stanza 6. These earlier examples sort of build up to her, as one at 
a time Baudelaire’s senses shut down until she happens, as an event. Interestingly, until 
we reach her, there are no whole bodies in the poem (not even Baudelaire’s), just body 
parts (mouths, eyes, ears). The stanza reads: 
   Now all strange hours and all strange loves are over, 
    Dreams and desires and sombre songs and sweet, 
    Hast thou found place at the great knees and feet 
   Of some pale Titan-woman like a lover, 
    Such as thy vision here solicited, 
    Under the shadow of her fair vast head, 
   The deep division of prodigious breasts, 
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    The solemn slope of mighty limbs asleep, 
    The weight of awful tresses that still keep 
   The savor and shade of old-world pine-forests 
    Where the wet hill-winds weep? (ll. 56-66)145 
The difficulty of Swinburne’s erotic bodies and figures begins here with a non-figural 
poetic element, the ambiguous meter. The metrical environment of Ave Atque Vale is 
somewhat contested: some scholars identify the meter as ten lines of iambic pentameter 
and a final trimeter line, while others identify two entwined, iambic tetrameter, In 
Memoriam stanzas within the eleven lines.146 This uncertainty is part of the poem’s 
performance of desire for the obscure dead. 
In this stanza, metrical disruptions begin right away, in the second foot of line 
fifty six, and intensify as it approaches the poem’s crux. The iamb that opens the first 
line—“Now all”—quickly gives way to a spondee with “strange hours,” creating what 
feels like a triple-stressed foot—“all strange hours.” The substitution of a spondee for an 
iamb is repeated in the second half of the line, making “all strange loves” another triple-
stressed foot. This parallel metrical construction, balanced and hovering on the caesural 
“and,” slows the rhythm of the line because the sequential, heavy stresses require more 
time to enunciate than would easily undulating iambs. 
                                                
145 There is a strong imagistic resonance in this stanza to the representation of Moneta in Keats’s “The Fall 
of Hyperion.” 
 
146 Peter Sacks sees two In Memoriam stanzas embedded and scans the stanza as tetrameter; Yisrael Leven 
identifies the stanzas as iambic tetrameter as well, writing that “the ten consecutive four-beat lines in each 
of Swinburne’s stanzas echo Tennyson’s iambic tetrameters” (86). He continues: “By simultaneously 
referring to and destabilizing the Tennysonian form, Swinburne expresses a sense of grief too intense to be 
contained within the strict poetic form we find in In Memoriam” (86). 
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I propose this scansion for a specific reason: this stanza appears to carry forward 
Swinburne’s hope that Baudelaire’s death is silent and restful, but something odd is afoot. 
Although “all strange hours and all strange loves are over, / Dreams and desires and 
sombre songs and sweet,” what is actually strange, and counterintuitive, is that these 
things—time, love, dreams, desires, music—are poets’ fundamental materials and 
desires, the things they trade in, what they live and die for. This irony—that what they 
need to be poets are the very things that cause them suffering—suggests that “strange” 
carries particular significance here. As one of the over-arching intellectual and rhetorical 
conditions of Swinburne’s poetics, the term often carries an unexpected metrical stress 
throughout his work.147 Such strangenesses of meter and meaning are written into many 
earlier parts of the elegy: it is implicit in the catachreses of “Half-faded fiery blossoms” 
(l. 8), “fervid languid glories” (l. 12), and “lovely leaf-buds poisonous” (l. 25); it is 
explicit in the “strange dreams in a tumultuous sleep” (ll. 30); it lurks in the paradoxical 
“unopening closure of [pleasure’s] lips” (l. 41), and in the metaleptic “end and the 
beginning” that “are one thing to thee, who art past the end” (ll. 45-46). Thus, when it 
                                                
147 To be clear, this is more an impression that an specific observation—I have not actually counted. 
Charlotte Ribeyrol, in “Swinburne: A Nineteenth-Century Hellene?” (a title appropriated from William R. 
Rutland’s Swinburne: A Nineteenth-Century Hellene, 1931) addresses the implications of “strange” in 
Swinburne’s poems: “In his play [Atalanta in Calydon] Swinburne deliberately shifts attention to Atalanta, 
who is described throughout as ‘strange’ because of her refusal to conform to gender roles: ‘She the strange 
woman… even she / Saw with strange eyes and with strange lips rejoiced’ (Swinburne 1904, 4.307; 2000, 
300). This adjective encoding homoeroticism (Pulham 2007, 162)” she continues, “is significantly used in 
both ‘Hermaphroditus’ and ‘Fragoletta’. By refuting the telos of marriage and social conformity, Atalanta 
embodies a dangerous otherness, verging on the barbaric” (64-65). As I will explain shortly, the Titan-
woman in Ave Atque Vale similarly embodies a “dangerous otherness” in her resistance to concrete 
description, which also is a kind of resistance to normative gender roles. Her strangeness also manifests in 
her imposing physicality, which holds power over both Baudelaire’s body and Swinburne’s verse, and is 
thereby a similar kind of blurring of gender roles. This female body dominates the both the dead male body 
and the living male voice. Furthermore, as I explain below, “strange” implies also Swinburne’s uncertain 
knowledge of how to write her properly as an object of both poets’ desire and at the same time a kind of 
negative agent. In her imposing physicality that resists concrete description and puts pressure on the meter, 
she, like Atalanta, is a “dangerous other.” 
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occurs in this stanza it is reasonable to expect the term to be particularly important, and 
accordingly read with a stress that it would not otherwise hold in a regular iambic line. 
This piling of stressed syllables, effected by the gravity of a single word, allows only a 
brief pause for breath at “and” and “are,” making this first line feel dense, laborious, and 
sets a slower pace for the rest of the stanza.  
The second line, after an initial trochaic inversion, wants naturally to fall into 
iambs (“Dreams and desires and sombre songs and sweet”), but the homophony of these 
words effects a different rhythm. Alliteration, assonance, and consonance are among the 
most prominent features of Swinburne’s poetry, and these sonic echoes create the 
rhythmic momentum, the sonorous spell, that has long been associated with his work.148 
Their effect is usually to quicken a phrase or line, as the repeated allophones allow for a 
faster repetition of labial movements without the need to change the shape of the lips or 
the position of the tongue. This is not always the case, of course, depending on the 
particular phonemes that are repeated, but the two alliterative-consonant sequences here 
—“Dreams and desires” and “sombre songs and sweet”—contain within them three 
assonant, hard “e” sounds (in “Dreams,” “desires,” “sweet”) and successive, rolling, 
sibilant “s”’s that slide one word quickly into the next.149 We would expect these sonic 
resonances to closen the connection of the words and thereby speed up the iambs, but the 
accumulated sonic effect is in tension with the diction and meter; as with “strange,” the 
enunciative weight of these words resists a quicker tempo. The inconsistent relation 
                                                
148 Early receptions of his work tended to dismiss its sonority as a distraction from its lack of substance. 
 
149 Susan Wolfson’s essay, “Romantic Measures: Stressing the Sound of Sound” (Meter Matters: Verse 
Cultures of the Long Nineteenth Century. Athens: Ohio UP, 2011: 53-77), inspired and authorized this 
reading of letters and sounds. 
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between word, sound, and meter is yet another indication of ambiguous poetic 
knowledge, and we should not expect a stable rhythm or epistemological ground going 
forward. 
It is helpful to note at this point that the stanza has actually not yet posed its 
question. This deferral compounds the rhythmic uncertainty because the vocal inflection 
and stress of interrogative syntax is different from that of declarative syntax. At this 
point, we cannot tell whether “Hast thou” (l. 58) is an iamb or a trochee, and so the 
intention of this stanza is not yet clear. The elision of the indefinite pronoun “that” in line 
fifty six—“Now [that] all strange hours and all strange loves are over”—and the 
postponement of end-stopped punctuation, further suspends this determination. If “Hast 
thou” is read as an iamb—“Hast thou”—the line sounds more like the beginning of an 
assertion that Baudelaire has indeed found a restful place death. Yet, to recall 
Swinburne’s strong skepticism over the existence of an afterlife, such potential moments 
of elegiac satisfaction, whether implied by the meter or posited by the language, should 
not be uncritically accepted150. Only with the final punctuation mark does the stanza 
reveal itself as a question; with this knowledge, we can re-scan the line with a trochaic 
stress—“Hast thou”—which is a more natural inflection for a question. This seemingly 
minor difference in stress has a disproportionate effect on the stanza’s meaning: it makes 
the difference between an optimistic knowledge of death’s restful calm, and what is 
actually a subtle yet crushing acknowledgment that death and the dead will (to some 
degree) always remain obscure to Swinburne, just beyond his sensory and linguistic 
grasp. This metrical alternative is a prosodic performance of the epistemological 
                                                
150 I have noted Antony Harrison on Swinburne’s conception of death, above. 
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indeterminacy of death, which will next be embodied in what I consider the central erotic 
body and figure of mourning in the elegy, the “pale Titan-woman.” 
 
 “Like a lover”: Swinburne’s Devastating Simile 
Margot Louis has identified Apollo, who first appears in stanza thirteen, as the 
elegy’s “chief mourner” (153), and in conventional, referential reading, he clearly is. The 
“god of all suns and songs,” Swinburne tells the dead poet, “Mourns thee of many his 
children the last dead, / And hallows with strange tears and alien sighs / Thine 
unmelodious mouth and sunless eyes” (ll. 145-52). Apollo, who touched Baudelaire’s lips 
“with bitter wine, / And nourished them indeed with bitter bread,” from whose hand the 
“soul’s food came,” and who now seeks to “save thy dust from blame and from 
forgetting,” fits the conventional status of elegiac muse (ll. 138-47); interestingly, Louis 
notes in contrast, Sacks claims “‘the bitter Venus, another fatal mother,’ as the elegy’s 
muse.151 She helpfully reminds us, though, of Apollo’s limitations: “while paying high 
tribute to the French poet, Swinburne is careful not to exaggerate Apollo’s power. The 
‘God of all suns and songs’ can only hallow the ‘unmelodious mouth and sunless eyes’ of 
the dead; he cannot call them back (151-4). The consolations of art will not ‘make death 
clear or make life durable’ (171-2)” (215 n.7).152 But Swinburne, as we know, likes to 
                                                
151 Sacks, Louis notes in contrast, “‘suggests that Swinburne’s muse in this poem is the bitter Venus, 
another fatal mother (English Elegy, 223-4)” (Louis 215 n. 7). 
 
152 Levin remarks: “As Louis writes, the poem provides us with ‘the earliest careful celebration of the art-
god’s power in Swinburne’s poetry’ (Swinburne and His Gods 71). ‘Ave Atque Vale’ marks Swinburne’s 
transition from a mythological to a mythopoeic approach to Apollo. While Swinburne’s earlier writings 
merely allude to Apollo, the mythological figure, ‘Ave Atque Vale’ presents the first instance in which 
Swinburne reshapes Apollo according to his own poetic needs” (86). “In many respects, the Apollo we find 
in ‘Ave Atque Vale’ is a typical post-Keatsian Apollo; he is a complicated figure that evokes conflicting 
reactions in the poet” (86). 
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think beyond poetic tradition: he has already challenged a conventional elegiac symbol 
by offering “pale flowers,” rather than “rose or rue or laurel,” to Baudelaire in the first 
stanza. We know, too, that Swinburne tends toward alternate muses like the mortal 
Sappho and Proserpine, the goddess of death. With this in mind, I propose another 
mourner as the central figure of grief in the elegy: the “pale Titan-woman like a lover.” 
The "pale Titan-woman like a lover" is prime example of the various bodies and 
figures of speech that I identify as central to Swinburne’s elegiac eroticism. As an 
embodiment of Baudelaire’s poem, “The Giantess,” she fits the corpse-corpus metonymy 
because in this moment she is the corpus, a text within a corpus, which is now in another 
poetic text (Swinburne’s). The “Titan-woman” exceeds her intertextual and referential 
functions and comes to signify the intersection of knowledge and pleasure in the elegy.153 
Though silent and passive, when Swinburne’s language reaches her body it confronts a 
monument to Baudelaire that is also a monument to the silencing of speech and the 
closure of the senses in death. She seems without agency, inanimate and ekphrastic, and 
indeed she is; but she is also much more.  
Firstly, she is an immediate contradiction. Her presence undoes the stanza’s initial 
implication that in death, “all strange loves are over,” by suggesting that Baudelaire 
might now find himself “at the great knees and feet / Of some pale Titan-woman like a 
lover” (ll. 58-9). If “all strange loves are over,” is she then something like an ideal 
                                                
153 Sacks and Brennan both read her intertextually, identifying her origin in Baudelaire’s poem “The 
Giantess,” but they read her in different directions, toward different ends. “The description of the giantess,” 
Sacks writes, “is itself perfectly appropriate to an elegy […] She is the idealized maternal figure for whom 
so many elegists have sought and to whose protective presence so many have desired to return.” “Unlike 
Baudelaire,” he continues, “he calls the giantess a ‘Titan-woman,’ hence pointing to her fallen stature. She 
is herself a figure of loss. She evokes a landscape marked by weeping winds. Even her breasts, the source 
of nurturing power and the conventional site of calm union, are threateningly ‘prodigious’ and marked by a 
‘deep division’” (214). 
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love(r)? As a being “Such as thy vision here solicited” (l. 60), she is a familiar, 
aestheticized object of desire that Baudelaire had imagined into existence.154 Has 
Swinburne let slip some further hope that the poet’s death is not just a dreamless sleep in 
perfect silence, but an experience that may satisfy Baudelaire’s, and thereby his own, 
desire for a death that is not oblivion?155 This possibility would challenge scholarly 
readings that argue that, for Swinburne, death is simply oblivion, not some kind of 
amorous afterlife in an idyllic or mythic realm. It would also challenge Sacks’s claim for 
her as a consolatory site of displacement for Swinburne’s grief that would fend off his 
sinking into melancholia. But that Swinburne opens up this possibility through an 
apostrophic address to one who he knows still cannot answer, shows the line to be more a 
fleeting hope than a firm belief.156 Nonetheless, to recall my argument about Keats’s 
“quick Dreams,” which Shelley lovingly reanimates in Adonais, when Swinburne writes 
her into being as an embodiment or monumentalization of Baudelaire’s own poetic 
desire, he performs a metonymic act that I interpret as an instance of erotic love.  
Secondly, the “Titan-woman” is silent and starkly undefined, existing only as a 
“pale” outline. She has a “fair vast head,” but no face or mouth with which to speak or 
kiss; she has “mighty limbs,” but they are nondescript beyond their “solemn slope”; she 
has “awful tresses” of hair, but their only specific quality is the vague scent of “old world 
                                                
154 I draw a parallel here, which I also mention below, to a key part of my argument about Adonais, 
concerning Shelley’s metonymizing of Keats’s poetic inventions as an act of textual love (though unlike 
them, Swinburne does not reinvest her with life in the elegy). 
155 On Swinburne’s references to Baudelaire as a reflection of his own ideas about death, Brennan writes, 
“Bloom, McGann, and Sacks make clear that Swinburne appropriates Baudelaire's refusal to believe in 
immortality beyond its survival in his reputation. Death has led Baudelaire out of "the mystic and the 
mournful garden" of life (1.180). ‘Ave Atque Vale,’ therefore, can be read as Swinburne's recognition of 
his own mortality through meditation on Baudelaire’s” (254). 
 
156 Because the dead love object cannot reply, maybe Barthes, “No Answer”: “The amorous subject suffers 
anxiety because the loved object replies scantily or not at all to his language […]” (167). 
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pine-forests” (ll. 61-65); and she is “asleep” (l. 63), unmoving and unresponsive to the 
dead poet and the living speaker alike. In these ways, she is ekphrastic, a statuesque body 
in eternal repose. She might also be considered an epitaphic body, akin to a gravestone, 
though one which does not call out to anyone. Uttering nothing, motionless and 
emotionless, she is without subjectivity or agency, an inscrutable object that represents 
death as the void of consciousness and the stilling of epistemological possibility. Her 
vacancy and opacity reflect Swinburne’s awareness of the limits of elegiac figuration—it 
cannot construct subjects.157 
At the same time, however, as she appears to close off the possibility of 
subjectivity and knowledge in death, she exerts a subtle yet significant influence over the 
dead poet in the poem and the living speaker of the poem. Her body is oddly sexualized, 
with a “fair head,” “prodigious breasts,” and “solemn[ly] slop[ing] limbs” (ll. 61-63); as a 
mere object of the male sexual gaze, she seems to be without agency. Yet this is 
misleading, for while in this regard she signifies both poets’ visual pleasure and the 
possibility of the dead poet’s sexual satisfaction, she simultaneously signifies the bodily 
vulnerability of those who would love her, like Baudelaire, and the linguistic 
vulnerability of those who would write her into being, like Swinburne.158 She towers over 
the dead Baudelaire at her feet, and the language Swinburne uses to describe her is tinged 
                                                
157 I return to this problem of figurality and subjectivity later, in my discussion of the “effaced unprofitable 
eyes” in stanza VIII. The facelessness and speechlessness of so many of the bodies in the poem offers an 
important point of contrast with Adonais over the figure and force of prosopopeia to give life in elegiac 
poetry. This also recalls Brennan’s claim, which I discuss earlier, that “The opacity of the corpse to light, as 
well as to ‘day’ and ‘night’ […] highlights that a knowing subject or mind is to him simply a fiction” (262). 
He continues, “What looks like a negation of Baudelaire, therefore, is really Swinburne’s way of 
continuing to raise his work as a problem. Death is unremitting,” and “all of Baudelaire’s striving and all 
the fruits of his striving cannot accrue to him in any way” (262). 
 
158 Of course, as she refers to Baudelaire’s poem “The Giantess,” he, too, has written her into being, but 
that is not at issue here, in this moment. 
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with violent potential in the “deep division of [her] prodigious breasts,” the “solemn slope 
of [her] mighty limbs,” and the “weight of [her] awful tresses” (ll. 62-64, italics mine).159 
She is, after all, a Titan goddess.160 Swinburne’s eroticized bodies—living and dead, 
mobile and monumental—here and in so much of his other work, seem always to mix the 
promise of physical and poetic pleasure with the threat of destruction.161 She is, then, a 
kind of negative erotic agent whose imposing physicality exerts power over Baudelaire’s 
body and Swinburne’s speech. Though she is not a proper subject, her body, under which 
Baudelaire might find shade and contentment (but also possibly danger), and over which 
Swinburne must press his language, is a site of epistemological resistance. We have 
already felt her influence on the meter in the scansion of line fifty-nine. As the stanza 
moves forward, we will hear and feel her negative agency again, this time more strongly, 
in the devastating simile “like a lover.”  
The first part of this line scans easily enough, as an anapest followed by two 
trochees: “Of some pale Titan woman”; the second part of the line is less 
straightforward, and has two possible scansions with dramatically different implications: 
                                                
159 Sacks argues similarly, writing, “Even her breasts, the source of nurturing power and the conventional 
site of calm union, are threateningly ‘prodigious’ and marked by a ‘deep division’” (214). Even though, 
etymologically, in the nineteenth century “awful” usually meant “awesome,” our contemporary sense of 
“awful” as fearful also fits with these intimidating characteristics. 
 
160 She also contrasts strongly with the poem’s earlier representation of a female body—Sappho—who was 
“vex[ed] and work[ed] wrong” by the “wild sea” and “green gulfs” (ll. 20-21). Though Sappho was “the 
supreme head of song” (l. 18), she is now without any agency. The “Titan-woman,” on the other hand, 
seems unaffected by anything; unlike Sappho she is not abused by a scornful sea, though she is used as an 
object of both male poets’ gaze. But as I will show, she is also a negative agent with influence over both 
poets. 
 
161 Rosenberg writes: “The association of love with death is the underlying theme of almost all Swinburne’s 
major poetry. He is of course best known for a variant on that theme—the pain implicit in all pleasure. 
Virtually incapable of using the word pleasure without its alliterative opposite, Swinburne is undeniably 
sado-masochistic, but this lurid aspect of his lyricism has obscured his true achievement. His greatest love 
poetry is addressed not to these literary ladies with sharp teeth—Dolores, Faustine, and the rest—but to his 
bitter, salt mother the sea, and to those bleakly beautiful, ravaged margins of earth that yield their substance 
to her” (171). 
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“like a lover” can be read as an anapest (with an elided final off-beat/unstressed 
syllable)—“like a lover”—which would make the line a tetrameter and create something 
like a metrical chiasmus (anapest-trochee-trochee-anapest); or, it can be scanned as two 
trochees in a pentameter line—“like a lover”—in keeping with the trochaic rhythm of the 
two preceding feet. If it is an anapest—a scansion that feels more natural—scanning it as 
anapest-trochee-trochee-anapest feels, at first, to be a more natural cadence because the 
second anapest rolls over the preposition “like” while the rising stress emphasizes 
“lover.” Rolling over the preposition minimizes the aural impact of the simile and masks 
the rhetoricity of the Titan-woman as Baudelaire’s “lover.” By concealing her status as a 
figure of speech—she is now a simile as well as a metonym—this scansion encourages us 
to interpret her as a figure of posthumous love for the dead poet. 
We reach a very different conclusion, however, if we read the line as a five-beat 
pentameter, which scans as an anapest followed by four trochees: “Of some pale Titan 
woman like a lover.” This scansion emphasizes her status as a simile, drawing attention 
to the figurality and fiction of posthumous love. The stress on “like”—which would now 
have an equal stress and weight as “lover”—exposes Swinburne’s unhappy knowledge 
that there is no posthumous love for dead poets.162 Meter and figuration are supposed to 
be how poets discover and attain knowledge, how they come to understand the relational 
nature of language that links them to the world. When, however, a mourning poet speaks 
across the threshold between the living and the dead, the knowledge he gains can only be 
about the limits death imposes on his poetical instruments. 
                                                
162 This concept of “unhappy consciousness” comes from Hegel and Schiller, through Pfau; this metrical 
self-consciousness pops up again in stanza X. 
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Although the Titan-woman is a silent and static simile, she is also a negative 
agent whose imposing physicality dominates Swinburne’s verse. Neither sight, nor 
sound, nor speech can pierce through her mass and opacity, and so these lines are forced 
to slow down, to wind around her body and pass only over her surface—her “skin,” as 
Barthes would put it—leaving both poets unsatisfied in their desire to know her. In a 
moment like this, when poetic speech, in its pursuit of deathly knowledge, presses against 
an impenetrable body, the elegy becomes, in figure and meter, a lover’s discourse.163 In 
this stanza, Swinburne’s language, its rhythm and rhetoricity, trembles as it moves along 
the outline of her body, insisting that the mourning poet submit to the sheer textuality of 
an amorous elegiac relation. 
For an inanimate, immobile, unspeaking being, she is surprisingly flexible in her 
tropological status. As an erotic body and a figure of speech—actually, two figures, a 
metonym and a simile—she is the central nexus of pleasure and epistemological 
possibility in the elegy; and yet she is vacant. Pressing his language against the Titan-
woman’s body yields Swinburne only a negative knowledge of death. This 
unknowingness, however, is what propels the poem forward into the prosodic and 
rhetorical agitations of the following four stanzas, where Swinburne resigns himself to 
this impossible love. Barthes reminds us that the relationship between lovers is, in the 
end, unknowable: the lover is “caught in this contradiction: I believe I know the other 
better than anyone and triumphantly assert my knowledge to the other,” he writes (134). 
                                                
163 Lacan offers a helpful link to Plato: “In the Symposium., we may find this allocution: it may well be 
Agathon whom Alcibiades is addressing and whom he desires, though he is being monitored by an analyst, 
Socrates. (Love's atopia, the characteristic which causes it to escape all dissertations, would be that 
ultimately it is possible to talk about love only according to a strict allocutive determination; whether 
philosophical, gnomic, lyric, or novelistic, there is always, in the discourse upon love, a person whom one 
addresses, though this person may have shifted to the condition of a phantom or a creature still to come. No 
one wants to speak of love unless it is for someone)” (74). 
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Earlier, when Swinburne drew our attention to Baudelaire’s “subtler eye” that perceived 
“[s]ecrets and sorrows unbeheld of us” (ll. 24-26), and now, when he imagines the Titan-
woman as a lover “[s]uch as thy vision here solicited” (l. 60), he demonstrates how well 
he understands Baudelaire: this is Swinburne asserting his knowledge of the other. Yet, 
as the tangled syntax, uncertain meter, and superficial level of his description of her 
indicate, Swinburne is painfully self-conscious of the fact that this knowledge will always 
be circumscribed, because “the other is impenetrable, intractable” (Barthes 134). And 
when this impenetrable other is dead, its resistance to poetic speech and interpretation is 
even stronger: the dead poet and his images (like the “Titan-woman”) will remain 
mysterious to the elegist and his images. Seduced by a relational knowledge he knows 
will always be just beyond his grasp, Swinburne “shall never manage to solve the 
question the other asks,” and so when he admits here, through meter and figure and 
image, that “the other is not to be known,” he is, in Barthes’s articulation, “seized with 
that exaltation of loving someone unknown, someone who will remain so forever […]” 
(135). Through the failure of his speech to establish an intimate relation with the dead 
poet, Swinburne now “knows what he does not know” (Barthes 135). The Titan-woman’s 
impenetrability to language forces Swinburne to recognize that only by representing her 
as an object of his beloved poet’s own desire, as an aestheticized body, an immobile work 
of art—in other words, a poetic text164—can he write his desire for Baudelaire.165 
                                                
164 Though it contrasts with the Shelley in terms of the direction of desiring subjects and objects, and with 
regard to the fact that, unlike Urania, this Titan-woman does not speak her passion, eros finds voice in both 
elegists’ textual figurations of what Barthes calls “a body of bliss consisting solely of erotic relations” 
(TPoTT 16). Barthes continues: “thus with the text” which significantly replaces “the common notions, the 
fundamental assumptions of ancient philosophy. Does the text have human form, is it a figure, an anagram 
of the body? Yes, but of our erotic body. The pleasure of the text is irreducible to physiological need” (16). 
 
165 As Barthes asks, “[I]sn’t knowing someone precisely that—knowing his desire?” (134). 
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A Cadence of Dead Sighs 
After the encounter with the “pale Titan-woman,” the poem turns its focus back to 
Baudelaire’s senses, but what were once acute (in stanzas II and III) are now obscure and 
enigmatic at the poem’s midpoint. In stanza VIII, the once-acute ear now hears only 
“Some dim derision of mysterious laughter,” “some little sound of unregarded tears,” 
“some cadence of dead sighs.” The imprecision of this language is the result of death’s 
obscuration of its sounds, sights, and objects, and the repeated indefinite pronoun 
reinforces the inexactness of his perceptions.166 His adjectives and nouns, too, are 
formless, tenebrous: “dim” and “mysterious” are just that, and a “cadence” is more a 
descriptive term for a poetic rhythm than a specific term identifying a particular rhythm. 
Moreover, this is a “cadence of dead sighs,” a doubly inexact expression in which the 
idea or concept of a sound is the only thing with substance.167 A sigh, like a laugh, is a 
vocal expression that is not properly speech; rather, it is a bodily utterance, “a word from 
the body,” as Barthes puts it (15). Only the spondaic stress of “dead sighs” grants these 
speechless sounds a perceivable form, as meter can give material substance to things 
otherwise immaterial and unperceivable. The poet’s “subtler eye” is also thwarted. He 
gets only a “gainless glimpse” of the goddess Proserpine’s head, and so, like the “blind 
warders of the dead,” he, too, is effectively sightless. Rosenberg rightly observes that 
                                                
166 We must be careful to remember that the direction of cause and effect is constantly in question in Ave 
Atque Vale: is it death that makes language inadequate, or language’s unavoidable imprecision that makes 
death uncommunicable? This is another instance of metaleptic poeisis that the elegy has struggled with 
from the beginning. 
 
167 On the materiality of sound and meter see: Peter de Bolla, “The Materiality of Aesthetic Experience,” 
Stephen Arata, “Rhyme, Rhythm, and the Materiality of Poetry: A Response,” and Vincent Colapietro, 
“Love and Death: And Other Somatic Transactions. 
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Swinburne’s “focus [is] less upon things seen than forces felt. At times he is nearly a 
blind poet, all tongue and ear and touch” (163). In Ave Atque Vale, though, even 
Swinburne’s other senses submit to the unintelligibility of death. When trying to hold 
converse with the senseless dead, the elegy reveals that the living, too, are rendered 
functionally blind, deaf, and mute.168 
Within the uncertainty of reference over whether these deathly sounds and sights 
reflect images from Baudelaire’s poems, or whether they are Swinburne’s imaginings 
reflected back at himself, the poem begins to blur and meld the speaker and the love-
object.169 Like Swinburne, who loses sight of the “sweet strange elder singer,” we lose 
sight (and sound) of the poets as individuated, distinct voices and bodies. What 
Swinburne’s senses can perceive in this moment are only the discomfitingly ambiguous 
sounds and sights of his own forsaking. The spectral din of the Charon-like “blind 
tongueless warders of the dead” who mock him with their “effaced unprofitable eyes” 
and “pale mouths” (ll. 82-86), is scornfully aimed at his own “hearkening spirit” (l. 87).  
Facing the foreclosure of his vision and hearing, and the inexactness of his 
language for them, Swinburne can turn only to the non-verbal sounds of speech to convey 
understanding. Here, the echoic figure of alliteration produces a sensation perceivable to 
the senses but not interpretable by the rational and cognitive faculties; what else might it 
                                                
168 The last two lines of stanza IX, which I address in depth below, are explicitly resigned to this sensory 
failure: “Still the foiled earnest ear is deaf, and blind / Are still the eluded eyes” (ll. 98-99). 
 
169 The “dim derision of mysterious laughter,” the “gainless glimpse of Proserpine’s veiled head,” the “little 
sound of unregarded tears,” and the “cadence of dead sighs” (ll. 81-86), may be intertextual references to 
events or experiences in Baudelaire’s poetry, reverberations and images from the poetic corpus that drew 
Swinburne’s original affection. Brennan, too, raises this possibility in his discussion of the intertextuality of 
the Titan-woman in stanza VI: “The logic of ‘Ave Atque Vale,’ he writes, “is not one of Oedipal rivalry 
with the dead but one in which the dead and the living represent moments in a collective flow of desire that 
precedes their organization into individual and autonomous subjects […] In the process of evoking 
Baudelaire, Swinburne himself gets lost in the flow of images much as Baudelaire is lost in the woman. In a 
sense, he becomes the "thou" he addresses” (254). 
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allow for if not rational, empirical knowledge? I suggest it a bodily apprehension or 
somatic impression that are embodied modes of knowledge. The odd mixing of sound 
and sightlessness in the “gainless glimpse” posits the sonic materiality of poetic speech in 
an attempt to endure death’s closure of thought and sensation. But the “gainless glimpse” 
is sound without sight, created by an alliterative syntax that admits it cannot see. Even 
more troubling is that this sound, the only thing in this moment that has presence and 
mobility, is not a sound from the dead but from Swinburne himself, and gives no 
knowledge of erotic relation. 
These lines insinuate yet another obstacle to Swinburne’s elegiac knowledge in 
the failed figures of prosopopoeia. Prosopopoeia should allow a poetic speaker to 
breathe life into his textual bodies by ascribing them a face, and thereby speech and 
subjectivity. In Adonais, this ascription is an act of love. But in Ave Atque Vale, the 
linguistically animated bodies and body parts—the “warders of the dead,” the 
“unprofitable eyes,” and the “pale mouths”—that might have shared Swinburne’s loss, as 
convention would hold, are, to adopt de Man’s term, “disfigured.” The “effaced 
unprofitable eyes” (l. 84)—eyes without a face, that see nothing—are representative of a 
consistent pattern of facelessness in the poem. Throughout the elegy, there are bodies 
without faces, faces without functioning sense organs, and faces that despair has made 
unrecognizable.170  
                                                
170 Swinburne reveals an understanding of elegiac speech that anticipates what de Man proposes in 
“Autobiography as De-Facement” about the figure of prosopopoeia: “As soon as we understand the 
rhetorical function of prosopopoeia as positing voice or face by means of language, we also understand that 
what we are deprived of is not life but the shape and the sense of a world accessible only in the privative 
way understanding” (81). In Romanticism after Auschwitz (2008), Sara Guyer comments similarly on this 
passage in de Man. 
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If prosopopoeia posits a subject in (or as) a text by granting an object a face and 
facial organs, it is this elegy’s consistent undoing of this figure, its continual de-facing of 
bodies, that exposes the unhappy consciousness lurking within elegiac figuration: the sad 
self-knowledge that death will always, in the end, forbid all but a textually erotic relation 
with the lost object, and even that will remain to some extent obscure. From the 
“unopening closure” of pleasure’s mouth (ll. 40-41), to the featureless “pale Titan-
woman,” the “effaced unprofitable eyes” of death’s warders, through Baudelaire’s 
“unmelodious mouth and sunless eyes” (l. 152), and finally to the “obscure Venus” with 
“face no more called Erycine” (ll. 157-60), the poem again and again insists that the dead, 
their objects of desire, their warders, and even their godly mourners, are all in some way 
de-faced, to some degree undone.171 If an embodied affect like “stingless pleasure,” or 
someone, like Baudelaire, has a mouth, it does not work: a mouth that is an “unopening 
closure” is a doubly-silenced speech organ, and a poet’s “unmelodious mouth,” a mouth 
which cannot sing, is not truly a poetic mouth. “Sunless eyes,” too, are eyes that do not 
see. “The erasure or effacement, de Man writes, “is indeed the loss of a face […] to be 
disfigured means primarily the loss of the eyes” (100).172 All of these bodily organs and 
faculties that fail to do what they should are functionally dead.173 
                                                
171 Of the mourning goddess, Venus, Brennan writes, “Swinburne’s imagining of her in the present results 
from an erasure or forgetting of her past images. She is ‘That thing transformed which was the Cytherean’ 
(l. 158) and ‘the face no more called Erycine’” (l. 160). By speaking of Venus as a ‘thing’ and a ‘face,’ 
Swinburne emphasizes that she is an artifact thought and made by human beings. In this process, past 
images of her—the Cytherean and the Erycine, are necessarily remembered and forgotten” (268). 
 
172 “This trajectory from erased self-knowledge to disfiguration is the trajectory of The Triumph of Life” 
(100). 
 
173 Furthermore, and more devastatingly, even if one does have the agency to hear and to see, like the 
speaker, these faculties are cruelly curtailed by death’s sensory obscurity. In the last line of the stanza, he 
laments that his own “foiled earnest ear is deaf, and blind / Are still the eluded eyes (ll. 98-99). 
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I contend that Ave Atque Vale takes one step beyond even this revelation of this 
fiction, of “the prosopon as mask and not as face,” to say that these faces are more than 
“disfigured” and this figure is more than undone: what the poem creates are anti-
prosopon, negative reflections of figures that actively resist efforts to have converse with 
the dead. Although Swinburne calls on prosopopoeia to speak his love for Baudelaire, it 
is just as much an anxious voicing of his own death—in his desire for the dead, 
Swinburne renders himself among them.174 “[I]n the rapture of love,” Julia Kristeva 
writes, “the limits of one’s own identity vanish, at the same time that the precision of 
reference and meaning becomes blurred in love’s discourse […] The ordeal of love puts 
the univocity of language and its referential and communicative power to the test” (2). It 
is an achievement of Ave Atque Vale that, although language and knowledge are severely 
“blurred” by the facelessness of all these figures, the poem acknowledges this by 
emphasizing, through repetition and metrical stress, the limit-word “only” in the final two 
lines of stanza VII: “These only,” Swinburne mourns, “these the hearkening spirit hears, / 
Sees only such things rise” (ll. 87-88). 
Though Swinburne’s “flying song flies after” Baudelaire, in a gesture that 
attempts to touch with speech what cannot be touched with the body or perceived clearly 
by the other senses, the vast facelessness in the poem concedes that elegiac speech falls 
short of its desire for the dead: “Our dreams,” after all, “pursue our dead and do not find,” 
he laments (l. 96). The only thing he can know, it seems, is that he cannot fully know the 
dead, and that his pursuit will be an infinite asymptote, an endless approaching of the lost 
                                                
174 To paraphrase de Man, this figure simultaneously gives life to the dead and brings death to the living. 
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object that will not become a reaching.175 In stanza 10, I take the opportunity opened here 
to discuss the idea of an “endless approaching” of language to the boundary of death as a 
figural process.176  
An Endless Approaching 
Through the miasmic dolour of the sensory field, Swinburne conveys the dimness 
of this moment in his relationship with Baudelaire. After his submission to the failure of 
the prosopon in the previous stanza, he intensifies his efforts in stanza IX when the visual 
and sound “strata” of the verse performs itself more fully, speaks out more insistently, in 
repetitions of sound (allophones), diction, and even typography.177 Yet these things that 
are the material substance of language with which Swinburne tries to “touch” 
Baudelaire’s ear and eye, have instead the opposite effect. He laments, he resigns to the 
impossible distance always between them:  
  Thou art far too far for wings of words to follow, 
   Far too far off for thought or any prayer. 
   What ails us with thee, who are wind and air? 
  What ails us gazing whence all seen is hollow? 
   Yet with some fancy, yet with some desire, 
   Dreams pursue death as winds a flying fire, 
  Our dreams pursue our dead and do not find. 
   Still, and more swift than they, the thin flame flies, 
                                                
175 Guyer has already made a parallel claim about prosopopoeia: “Even at the moment of understanding 
prosopopoeia, we only discover that understanding is our limit” (43). 
 
176 “Touching never does away with the interval between us, but turns the interval into an approach” 
(Nancy np.) 
177 Princeton Encyclopedia of Poetry and Poetics: “Since alliteration is a device of the sound stratum of 
poetry, the vagaries of spelling systems must be discounted: is it sounds not letters that count” (36). 
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   The low light fails us in elusive skies, 
  Still the foiled earnest ear is deaf, and blind 
   Are still the eluded eyes. (ll. 89-99) 
Let me begin on the level of sound. The profusion of alliterative “f” words (of which 
there are fourteen), and the repetition of anaphoric phrases (“far too far,” “What ails us,” 
“Dreams pursue”), are palpable in a stanza whose imagistic and insubstantive atmosphere 
is, like the dead poet himself, of “wind and air” (l. 91). The incantatory pleasure of this 
stanza, the rolling rhythm of the speaker’s breath, nearly distracts from the emptiness of 
the scene; but, like the “gainless glimpse” in the previous stanza, the material, somatic 
effect of sound, gives a measure of concreteness to such vaporous, non-sensory concepts 
as “wings of words,” “thought,” “prayer,” and “Dreams.” Once again, we hear and feel 
the elegy attempting to give sonic form and sensory possibility to what is physically 
formless. 
As I have been arguing, Swinburne relies consistently on the somatic rhythms and 
affect of verse and poetic sound to impart sensory potential to conceptual abstractions. 
Sadly, in yet another bitter elegiac irony, the “thin flame” of Baudelaire’s spirit recedes 
ever farther away into “elusive skies” the more Swinburne speaks to him. The exhalation 
of breath necessary to pronounce the fricative cascade of “f” sounds expels a rush of air 
from the mouth that risks driving away the very thing he desires.178 Positing the 
materiality of words, granting substance to words made of “wind and air” to impress an 
affect—in this case, despair—also risks undermining the intimate relation those words 
                                                
178 Further, the “Dreams [that] pursue death as winds a flying fire” is a potentially self-conflicting simile, 
for while wind can fan flames into a blaze, they can also put them out; as one can blow on a flame to kindle 
a fire, one can also extinguish a flame with a breath. 
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sought to establish in the first place. Furthermore, in the recurrent “ll” words—“follow,” 
“all,” “hollow,” and the thrice-repeated “still”—the two parallel, vertical lines that form 
the doublet of the letter create a kind of visual barrier that repeats typographically the 
boundary across which the elegiac speaker cannot adequately image, and ultimately 
cannot speak.179  
Lastly, rhyming words like “follow” and “hollow”—to recall my earlier claim 
about the rhyming of “bloom” and “gloom” in stanza VII—is a veiled implication that 
pursuing the dead in speech is a vain endeavor. Arbitrary or not, the rhyme/the rhymed 
words echo with, echoes with its own emptiness.180 If Baudelaire is now indeed “far too 
far for wings of words to follow,” Swinburne must be aware that he is essentially 
speaking to himself. This is yet another instance of apostrophic address that turns back on 
its speaker to reveal nothing but its emptiness.181 The repetition of these apostrophes also 
problematizes a genre convention: the “sense of continuity” through repetition to which 
Sacks has already drawn our attention in Adonais. There, repetition propels Shelley 
forward by allowing him to speak in an “unbroken pattern such as one may oppose to the 
                                                
179 I have appropriated here Matthew Kaiser’s concise articulation of the visual imagery evoked by 
typography in his discussion of Walter Pater’s use of parentheses in Greek Studies (1895): “The swell of 
Pater’s parentheses echoes typographically the contours of the statue’s mouth, in which our lingual eye is 
encouraged to enter” (51). Also, Susan Wolfson’s “Romantic Measures: Stressing the Sound of Sound,” in 
Meter Matters (2011), is very helpful for articulating this idea. 
 
180 Stephanie Kuduk-Weiner argues: “Swinburne approaches language as a system of sounds whose 
grammar and names for things are arbitrary and therefore full of nonsemantic connections and coincidences 
[…]. His sound poetry does not set itself up against meaning; nor does it seek ‘pure sound’ in the manner of 
his symbolist or decadent contemporaries. What his poems do attempt is to attend to the associations that 
arise whenever the sounds of language are joined together, to follow patterns of sound toward meaning” 
(21). 
 
181 This is a way the elegy remains skeptical about the nature of apostrophic address, in that it must invent 
in language the object to which the poet desires to speak, in order to create a relationship between himself 
and the absent presence he has recreated in language through this figure—a “hollow” figure—who cannot 
actually be and cannot actually respond. 
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extreme discontinuity of death” (Sacks 23). However, because the repeated words, 
phrases, sounds, and questions in Ave Atque Vale are addressed directly to the dead, it 
becomes an incessant acknowledgment of the sensory and epistemological gap—the 
erotic discontinuity—between elegist and elegized. 
This gap opens another way of interpreting Swinburne’s self-awareness of this 
problem as itself an erotic experience. His unknowingness has a compatible model in the 
figure of the Barthesian lover.182 In the “efforts of the amorous subject to understand and 
define the loved being ‘in itself,’” he says, the lover is “caught in this contradiction: on 
the one hand, I believe I know the other better than anyone and triumphantly assert my 
knowledge to the other […]; and on the other hand, I am often struck by the obvious fact 
that the other is impenetrable, intractable, not to be found; I cannot open up the other, 
trace back the other’s origins, solve the riddle” (134). The erotic event, for Swinburne as 
for Barthes, manifests as a negative epistemology, a negative knowledge, of the other. 
This problem of negative erotic knowledge returns us to the earlier dilemma of 
breath when speaking or reading the poem. It is not only Swinburne as amorous, speaking 
subject who is complicit in the epistemological conflict/distance between knowing what 
one desires and knowing what one is able to say of that desire. A reader of Ave Atque 
Vale, too, participates in this distancing: when we read these words aloud, we are 
engaged in the same breath acts and lingual movements as the speaker; in reading, we can 
feel this somatic effect which, in effect, places us in the subject position of the mourner 
                                                
182 My intention for Barthes is not just to use his Lover’s Discourse as a model or framework to be applied 
to Ave Atque Vale, though this is helpful for my interpretation. I hope that by bringing Barthes into 
conversation with my elegists to reevaluate his place in and relevance for Platonic, nineteenth-century, and 
modern theories of the rhetoric of elegiac and erotic love. 
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speaker ourselves.183 The sounds of poetic speech, the “sounds of thy sad soul,” seek a 
somatic understanding of the dead as they cross from one sense perception (sound) into 
the medium of another sense perception (the body), or as they cross from one register of 
poetry (the sonic strata) to another (the somatic strata) disallow such intimacy within the 
text itself.184 While Swinburne’s intention is to fashion a textually erotic intimacy with 
Baudelaire, it is the materiality of poetic speech that keeps them ever apart. 
Stephanie Kuduk-Weiner is particularly lucid on the inlucidity of the movements 
of poetic sound between subject and object, between the living sensorium and the sensory 
vacancy of the dead. Swinburne’s “own sensuous experience of the sounds of language 
during the act of composition also leads him to meaning and insight” she writes. “In 
particular, these sounds lead him to a kind of knowledge whose meanings are generated 
by means of a recognition of the space between language and the world. In this way, the 
sound-driven poems once again invert the strategies of the descriptive poems, dwelling 
not in a world that must be mediated by language but rather in a language severed from 
direct connection with the world. Thus the divergent strategies Swinburne uses in both 
his sound-driven and descriptive poems foreground poetic language as a vehicle of 
meaning and pleasure” (26). In multiple poetic registers—speech, sense perception and 
sensation, and mind—this stanza recreates the distance between them that Swinburne has 
been trying to traverse; it is sad, then, if not surprising, that “dreams pursue our dead” but 
                                                
183 Christopher Craft writes similarly about the problem of speaking homoerotic desire. 
184 In a recent essay on knowledge and poetic form in Swinburne’s later poems, Stephanie Kuduk-Weiner 
concisely and compellingly explains this kind of shared experience: “The sounds of poetic language, the 
most visceral elements of the reader’s experience of poetry, are at once the poet’s most direct link to the 
sensuous aspect of the reader’s aesthetic attention and technique for modeling the poet’s own relation to 
sound” (22). 
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“do not find” them. Now “far too far for wings of words to follow,” the “sweet strange 
elder singer,” is an absent presence, a marker of the chasm between life and death. 
The Shut Scroll 
 Up to this point in the poem, neither figures (like prosopopoeia and simile) nor 
sounds of speech have allowed Swinburne the subtler knowledge and intimate relation he 
seeks from the dead poet: “Not thee, O never thee, in all time’s changes,” he cries, “Not 
thee, but this the sound of thy sad soul, / The shadow of thy swift spirit, this shut scroll / I 
lay my hand on, and not death estranges / My spirit from communion of thy song—” he 
cries (ll. 100-104).185 These lines sustain the knowledge that it cannot ever be Baudelaire 
himself that poetry will allow him to embrace.186 But while the primary bodily senses of 
sight and sound closed in the opening stanzas, the faculty of touch is activated here. In 
this figurally transformative moment, the sound of Baudelaire’s soul and the shadow of 
his spirit are metonymized to inhabit the “shut scroll,” and the dead poet becomes a body 
of text within the textual body that is the elegy itself.187 
 The metonymy of corpse and corpus in the “shut scroll” holds out for Swinburne 
the possibility of intimacy across the boundary of death, which now cannot “estrange” 
                                                
185 Sacks makes a somewhat similar claim about a different part of the stanza: “Narrowly speaking, 
Baudelaire’s death cannot keep Swinburne from the former’s poems” (217). This lament is conventional 
except for the apostrophic nature of the lines. 
 
186 Brennan makes the opposite claim: “Baudelaire is not ultimately displaced in ‘Ave Atque Vale’ but 
continually embraced by Swinburne. The older poet inhabits his thought, memory, language, and sense. 
Instead of representing a future to him, Baudelaire merely impresses on him the continuing flow of images 
in the present that iterates repetition. Swinburne’s accomplishment is to realize that any poet, instead of 
standing apart from this flow, may be able to refine his perception by becoming one with it” (256). 
 
187 Again, Brennan argues in parallel: “By clasping the book and not the dead man, Swinburne thus submits 
himself to the task of living and working in language even though his ‘pursuit of images’ does not hold out 
the possibility of bearing any fruit (Sacks, p. 223). We can also see that the ‘barren’ pursuit of images’ 
resembles the oblivion described by Bloom: for both critics Swinburne borrows images of his precursor in 
order to make a place in the tradition for his own endeavor” (253). 
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them.188 The somatic knowledge afforded by versification, the rhythms of speech that 
move through the body, a sensory experience at the limit of sensation—what Jakobson 
calls the “sound shape of language”—is the materiality of poetic speech.189 Touch is the 
most intimate of the sense perceptions even as it is the most diffused throughout the body 
and has no single locus like the eye or ear. And, because it is diffused throughout the 
body, it is the most encompassing or most fully embodied mode of sense perception and 
somatic knowledge. Yet touching the dead with language remains a problem for the 
language of touching, and also for the speaking body that is touched back when its speech 
touches the dead.  
Swinburne can, though, lovingly recall Baudelaire’s “memories and melodies” as 
if they were material, tangible: “These I salute, these touch, these clasp and fold” he says, 
“As though a hand were in my hand to hold” (ll. 105-08). Very quickly, it seems, the 
already—and now doubly—immaterial “sound” of a soul and “shadow” of a spirit are 
transfigured into the materiality of speech; in other words, they materialize in the poem 
as Baudelaire’s poetic corpus. I want to look more closely now into the figures of line 
108, “As though a hand were in my hand to hold.” This has 3 figural levels or dimensions 
to clarify: “As though” is simile; the comparison of reading a poetic text to holding 
hands, is an analogy; but, the figure or mechanism for this connection is metonymy. The 
metonymic analogy of reading a text as holding hands—something one does with a 
                                                
188 “The repetition of Baudelaire’s corpse in both his and Swinburne’s corpus allows both poets to imagine 
an ‘afterlife’ for their work in terms of future readers (p. 116). Most importantly, regardless of whose body 
we situate in this process, the process itself, as Prins suggests, raises the problem of subjectivity (132). 
However, where she sees a non-naturalized rhythm—or poetic text—as the marker for the corpse, I extend 
this process to the position of the reader” (Brennan 252). 
189 The stanza also performs his contentment through its metric stability; in contrast with the previous 
stanzas, there are no jarring trochees or spondees here to upset the iambs, no sharp or dissonant sounds, or 
broken rhythms. 
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proton philon, an intimate friend or lover—for a moment has a strong consolatory effect. 
For Swinburne, holding Baudelaire’s words in his hand is the only thing that can grant 
him intimate contact: in language alone can he embrace the beloved poet.190 Still, 
something holds him back from committing fully to this ideal. Swinburne never quite 
revels in his poetic idealizations in the same way or to the same degree that Shelley does, 
and an irrepressible doubt intrudes on this fragile moment in the subtly pointed simile 
“As though” (l. 108).191 
As a material signifier for reading, touching Baudelaire’s poems can only ever be 
a figural experience, can only ever be like holding his hand, and the iambic meter 
emphasizes that Swinburne understands this more clearly than before. The earlier simile I 
looked at, the “pale Titan-woman like a lover” (l. 59), falls anapestically at the end of the 
line, making its rhetoricity subtle by stressing “lover” rather than “like.” In contrast, by 
beginning this line with the iambic simile “As though,” the stanza foregrounds the 
rhetorical nature of this this touch192. The indeterminacy at play in the last two lines of 
stanza 10, created by the conditional conjunction “Or” and amplified by the passive 
                                                
190 In the text, Swinburne’s hand, too, is a synecdoche of his own poetic imaginary. 
 
191 Potential complication in that, as an iamb, “As” is unstressed while its object, “though,” is stressed, 
which de-emphasizes it as a simile, which is the opposite of what I want to say here about its significance. 
Not sure how to reconcile this with my earlier reading of the simile “like a lover” in stanza 6, where it is an 
anapest that allows us to read right over it. My attention to Swinburne’s use of simile here is in partial 
conflict with my discussion of “like a lover” in stanza VI. There, the simile is nearly elided by the meter 
(iambic—“like a lover”) and its placement at the end of the line. Here it is less susceptible to reading over 
because it begins the line, and, as an iamb, “as” is unstressed while “though” takes the stress, so technically 
the simile “as” is de-emphasized and not as insistent as its object. 
 
192 Sacks draws a smart contrast to In Memoriam through the scene when Tennyson reads Hallam’s letters 
and feels a mystical reunion with him, observes: “Swinburne remains resolutely with the scroll itself. The 
swell of compensatory verbs—Salute, touch, clasp, fold—may seem to redress the privations listed in 
stanzas 7-9. But the object of these verbs is only the sound, the shadow, the shut scroll, never the hand. The 
‘As though’ reminds us not just of the difference but of the fact that such a difference is precisely that of 
figuration itself. ‘As though’ indicates the distance through which the mourner has turned. The act and 
fabric of that figuration lie between him and the dead” (217). 
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grammar, further threatens to expose this happy fiction: “Or through mine ears a 
mourning musical / Of many mourners rolled” (ll. 109-110). After the first rhetorical 
remove in the metonymy of touching Baudelaire through his text, and the second remove 
created by the simile, the shift from active to passive voice across a conditional 
conjunction indicates yet another barrier between them. It is as if Swinburne cannot 
decide which sense (of touch or of sound) and which figure of speech (metonymy or 
simile), can bring them most closely together across the divide of death. 
Clearly, much rests on the status of figures of speech. As a heuristic model and 
philosophical framework for my hypothesis of elegiac eroticism as an experience of 
pleasure and knowledge, I turn to a paradigmatic example of this linguistic phenomenon 
in post-Enlightenment aesthetic theory: the “as-if” of Kant’s “Analytic of the 
Beautiful.”193 In aesthetic judgment—which is essentially what Swinburne is doing in 
this stanza—Kant claims that the beautiful resides not in the object of contemplation but 
within the mind of the disinterested, contemplating subject.194 In response to what only 
                                                
193 Two essays on the Kantian “as-if” that illustrate how crucial yet problematic this linguistic construction 
(simile) is for aesthetic judgment,  have been invaluable for my thinking about figuration in Ave Atque 
Vale: Eva Schaper’s “The Kantian ‘As-If’ and Its Relevance for Aesthetics” (Proceedings of the 
Aristotelian Society, New Series, 65 (1964-1965, p219-234)); and Kalliopi Nikolopoulou’s brilliant 
comparative reading of Adorno alongside Kant, “‘As-If’: Kant, Adorno, and the Politics of Poetry” (MLN 
121.3, p757-773, 2006)). Though neither Schaper nor Nikolopoulou address Ave Atque Vale or elegiac 
poetry specifically, their essays help clarify the relation between the structure of figural, poetic speech and 
the unhappy elegiac consciousness of Hegel/Schiller, and have helped me to develop a parallel line of 
thinking about the erotic affect and effect of simile. Schaper refers to an older translation which, 
interestingly, employs the “as-if” in different passages from those I will look at, indicating the prevalence 
of this language in Kant. In her translation, Section 45 reads: “Nature was beautiful, when it appeared as 
art; and art can only be called beautiful when we are conscious of its being art whilst it yet appears to us as 
if it were nature […] Fine art must exhibit the appearance of nature, though we recognize it as art” (229, 
italics mine, J.G.). She states: “Here Kant’s aesthetic term, ‘beautiful”, indicates the fundamental 
requirement for an aesthetic object: that it must appear. Natural objects must appear as if wrought by art, art 
objects as if produced by nature; yet in both cases we know that this is only an appearance” (229). 
 
194 He writes, “In order to decide whether or not something is beautiful, we do not relate the representation 
by means of understanding to the object for cognition, but rather relate it by means of the imagination 
(perhaps combined with the understanding) to the subject and its feeling of pleasure or displeasure” (89). 
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can be called a “beautiful object,” the imaginative faculty operates in harmony with the 
bodily senses of perception to create a stable, congruent image of the external object in 
the mind; in other words, this image is a mental representation—but not a 
conceptualization—of the thing, the imagining of which gives the subject pleasure. And 
because the pleasure experienced in the presence of the beautiful object rests upon the 
possibility of its communication to others, aesthetic judgement is a relational experience 
predicated on the notion of the sensus communis.195 As such, this judgment is ultimately 
dependent on the problematic assumption that language can adequately to convey this 
mental representation to others. Kant, perhaps despite himself, indirectly admits this in 
his own explanation of aesthetic experience, writing, “if [a person] pronounces that 
something is beautiful, then he expects the very same satisfaction of others: he judges not 
merely for himself, but for everyone, and speaks of beauty as if it were a property of 
things. Hence he says that the thing is beautiful […],” while in fact the beautiful resides 
in the reflective subject (98). The necessity of the “as if” in Kant’s determination reveals 
a mournful, elegiac—or, some would say, tragic—consciousness of the aesthetic event as 
a figural condition, a product of speech that situates beauty only in language.196  
Kalliopi Nikolopoulou offers a brilliant rereading of the Kantian “as-if” that helps 
to concretize my claim that the elegy’s self-conscious rhetoric reveals Swinburne’s deep-
                                                
195 “By ‘sensus communis,’” Kant explains, “must be understood the idea of a communal sense, i.e., a 
faculty for judging that in its reflection takes account (a priori) of everyone else’s way of representing in 
thought, in order as it were to hold its judgment up to human reason as a whole and thereby avoid the 
illusion which, from subjective private conditions that could easily be held to be objective, would have a 
detrimental influence on the judgment” (173-74). His emphasis on “as it were” in this passage suggests a 
similar figurativeness to the “as-if.” He puts it another way just one page later, in order to refine his 
meaning with regard to the non-conceptual nature of aesthetic experience: “One could even define taste as 
the faculty for judging that which makes our feeling in a given representation universally communicable 
without the mediation of concepts” (175). 
 
196 The “tragic consciousness” of Kantian aesthetic theory was a shared concern of Hegel and Schiller; I 
should note that de Man argues that Schiller misreads Kant; also see Thomas Pfau, “Mourning Modernity.” 
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seated anxiety over the possibility of a textually erotic relationship with Baudelaire.197 
She states that Kantian aesthetics “is based on conceptual indeterminacy,” which can be 
seen in how he “constructed many of his philosophical arguments by way of analogy, 
using the structure of the ‘as if,’” a rhetorical structure that shows how “art speaks in the 
language of pure possibility, that is also, of impossibility: if art points to the possible, it is 
also by allowing for the impossible” (761). I propose that Swinburne’s metonymic 
analogy, “As though a hand were in my hand to hold,” should be understood similarly: it 
allows for something physically possible—touching a text with one’s hand, reading it 
with the eye and ear—while simultaneously admitting the impossibility that this 
experience could translate into an intimate touch of the dead poet himself; yet for a 
fleeting moment, the poem holds out this impossibility as being within reach.198 
When the love object is dead and his body unavailable to the living speaker’s 
senses—that is, when the senses cannot clearly differentiate the various bodies and body 
parts of the dead—we see the potential for the figure of metonymy, because of its 
contiguous reaching, to allow the speaker to touch the love object. It is due to the 
contiguity of this figure that the poetic text becomes an extension of the poet’s body, 
unlike metaphor, which is a figure of identification between formally discernable 
objects.199 Swinburne’s aesthetic judgment of Baudelaire’s corpus, his assertion of the 
dead poet’s text as beautiful, manifests metonymically in the erotic pull of reading (as a 
                                                
197 Her argument, however, is aimed in different direction than mine, as she focuses on how “Adorno’s 
understanding of the universality of the lyric bears a structural resemblance to Kant’s aesthetic judgment” 
(767, n. 22). I am claiming a conceptual parallel to her analogical argument. 
198 Nikolopoulou writes, “analogy as resemblance, but also as dissimilarity, marks a moment of poetization 
of the concept […] In other words, analogy foregrounds and performs the aspect of indeterminacy, 
common to both Adorno’s and Kant’s aesthetics” (761). 
 
199 This characteristic is the reason Jakobson associates it with narrative fiction rather than poetry, for 
which metaphor, a figure of identity, is centrally operative. 
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touching of) his poems, and in the seductive analogy of holding hands.200 These 
figurations—metonymy and analogy (or synecdoche and simile)—are the 
epistemological and affective structures of Swinburne’s understanding of love and death. 
Yet, because they admit, in their very structure, their rational impossibility, these 
relations that the figures create are not conceptual thoughts, not products of cognition or 
reason, but products of poetic language. Just as in Kantian aesthetics, as Nikolopoulou 
tells us, “beauty is simply whenever it is announced” (767), Baudelaire-as-text is where 
Swinburne’s speech posits him to be: in “These memories and these melodies,” and in the 
“mourning musical” that rolls through his—and now our—ears (ll. 105-110).201 
Swinburne thus inscribes the lost love-object as an erotic text (the “shut scroll), in his 
own erotic text (the elegy), as a means of embracing him; nonetheless, he recognizes the 
tenuousness of the language that makes this textual relation possible in the first place. In 
this moment, Swinburne wants to take one step beyond his reality, even while knowing 
that the somatic and figural difficulties of poetic speech will keep him always one step 
behind his desire.202 
 
                                                
200 I recognize the potential problem with saying that Swinburne is “doing” Kantian aesthetic judgement 
because he clearly is not disinterested (although he is somewhat distant), and he is communicating only 
with the dead poet, so there can be no similar sensus communis. 
 
201 She says, “A beautiful object is not so because of the sum of its predicates, for this formulation 
presupposes concepts and reduces the aesthetic judgment to causality. Instead, beauty is simply whenever it 
is announced. Beauty stands beyond justification, legitimation, or qualification, and yet it is because of this 
capacity that it becomes in Kant the site of potential universality—hence, the site of legitimation” (767). 
Sappho, Swinburne’s ideal poet, defines beauty as otto tis eratai, “whatever one loves,” an interestingly 
similar formulation. 
 
202 Again, Nikolopoulou offers an elegant explanation of this double-bind: “For Kant, this ideality could be 
understood within his overall project of searching for conditions of possibility, a search that always throws 
him at least one layer behind reality” (768). 
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CHAPTER IV 
NECROPHILIC EROS IN THOMAS TOD STODDART’S THE DEATH-WAKE; OR, 
LUNACY: A NECROMAUNT IN THREE CHIMERAS 
 I began this project with the proposition that historical and genre-oriented criticism 
have not sufficiently accounted for the amorous and epistemological conditions of elegiac 
speech in the nineteenth-century. I suggested that by attending to the figural and formal 
registers of canonical and non-canonical poems, we might gain a different conception of 
elegy, as an amorous, rather than competitive, poetic mode that represents the lost object 
as a figure of love and knowledge. In Chapter One, I claimed that in Adonais it is the 
figure of metonymy that allows the intimacy of touch through the textual body. By 
directly reaching for a particular aspect or element or part (synecdoche) of the lost object 
itself, metonymy establishes a more intimate relation with the dead. In Chapter Two, I 
focused on how the desire for the dead undoes a crucial figure of speech, 
prosopopoeia.203 This figure posits a face on a dead, inanimate, or non-human object, 
which is to say that it grants speech, subjectivity, and agency, to what should be and 
remain dead. Prosopopoeia is meant to vitalize (or revitalize) the dead, but in doing so it 
destabilizes knowledge of the distinction between what is living and what is dead. In 
Swinburne’s elegy, this already unstable figure undoes itself to become anti-prosopon, 
the de-faced bodies of death. 
 This chapter has two aims: to introduce Thomas Tod Stoddart’s poem to literary 
scholarship, and to find out what happens to language, bodies, and knowledge when 
mourning speech cannot console grief, and the mourner turns not to a corpus, but to the 
                                                
203 See de Man, “Autobiography as Defacement” and “Shelley Disfigured,” and Cynthia Chase, 
Decomposing Figures: Rhetorical Readings in the Romantic Tradition. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins UP, 
1986. 
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corpse itself as the literal, rather than the textual, remains of the love object. In their 
desire for the dead, I argue, prosopopoeia and metonymy are necrophilic figures, 
linguistic performances that seeks to reinfuse the dead with life and give subjectivity to a 
dead love-object. The challenge of this poem is that its figures and bodies operate on two 
registers due to the poem’s double frame of narration and figuration. What Adonais and 
Ave Atque Vale perform in speech becomes, in The Death-Wake, a performance of Julio’s 
grieving body and of the narrator’s speech. I begin with a synopsis of the poem and a 
look into the scant publication and reception history, before moving into the focal points 
of my argument. 
 Reading Stoddart’s poem, the full title of which is, The Death-Wake, or Lunacy: A 
Necromaunt in Three Chimeras (1831), is a singular, and singularly disorienting, 
experience. Its closest analogue in terms of formal and figural unpredictability and sheer 
strangeness is probably Thomas Lovell Beddoes’s Death’s Jest Book (1850); there are 
also strong echoes and powerful inversions of Coleridge’s Rime of the Antient 
Marinere.204 Stoddart’s poem relates the tragic romance and posthumous love between a 
monk, Julio, and a nun, Agathe. In an unnamed monastery, impossible to situate in time 
or place, Julio and Agathe meet secretly and quickly fall in love, finding in each other a 
kindred loneliness and a longing for intimacy they each had been denied throughout their 
lives.205 But Agathe dies suddenly, and Julio’s unbearable grief turns what might have 
                                                
204 Lang remarks: “His mood is that of Scott when Scott was young, and was so anxious to possess a 
death’s head and cross-bones. The malady is ‘most incident’ to youth, but Mr. Stoddart wears his rue with 
indifference. The mad monkish lover of the dead nun Agathé has hit on precisely the sort of fantasy about 
to inspire Théophile Gautier’s Comédie de la Mort, or the later author of Gaspard de la Nuit, or Edgar Poe. 
There is here no ‘criticism of life’; it is a criticism of strange death; and, so far, may recall Beddoes’s 
Death’s Jest-Book, unpublished, of course, in 1830. Naturally this kind of poetry is ‘useless,’ as Mr. Ruskin 
says about Coleridge, but, in its bizarre way, it may be beautiful” (6). 
 
205 See Chimera I. 80-111 and 157-78. 
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been recognizable as a conventional mourning poem—in other words, something 
identifiable as an elegy—into a bizarre tale of necrophilic love and despair that stands 
well outside the elegiac tradition. Yet The Death-Wake resonates with the 
epistemological and textual eroticism of the canonical elegies of the nineteenth century in 
ways that pose questions not only about the elegiac genre, but more broadly about the 
century’s aesthetics and poetics of death and mourning. These questions regard the issues 
of elegiac knowledge and pleasure which I engage in the chapters on Adonais and Ave 
Atque Vale, but here they are reoriented around a narrative of necrophilic love and loss. I 
return to these issues in depth after a synopsis of the poem. 
The Tale of Julio and Agathe 
 Agathe’s untimely death drives Julio to the brink of madness, and on the night of 
her burial, unable to let go of his libidinal attachment to her, he furtively digs up her 
corpse and absconds with her to the sea. After finding on the shore a “silver shell, / That 
had been wasted by the fall and swell / Of many a moon-borne tide into a ring” (I. 37-39), 
he performs an impromptu marriage ceremony before setting out into the “great heaving 
solitude” (I. 85) on a kind of perverse honeymoon that is eerily reminiscent—in tone, 
image, and event—of Coleridge’s Rime of the Antient Marinere (1798). 206 During their 
aimless voyage, they encounter a ship full of sailors who are horrified at the sight of 
Agathe’s propped-up corpse and the seeming madman at the helm, “[l]ike a sea demon” 
(II. 178), who yet looks over her so lovingly. After miraculously surviving a storm that 
wrecks the larger ship, and attempting but failing to save a sailor who recoils at the sight 
                                                
206 This seashell ring is important to note because—as the remains of a dead sea creature—the shell is (like) 
a corpse, and by making it into a sign/symbol of his love for Agathe, it becomes a signifier for necrophilia 
itself. 
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of her, the poem takes an hallucinatory turn—reminiscent of Coleridge’s Rime—in which 
nightmarish apparitions from the “desolate repose / Of the deep waters” (II. 480-81) rise 
up to torment Julio for his transgression. 
 After an uncertain period of time at sea, Agathe’s body, up to this point 
inexplicably untouched by the physical signs of death (save a few suggestive instances), 
begins to decay, and, as if in some kind of somatic sympathy, Julio’s body deteriorates 
even further. Near the end of the poem’s second Chimera, they land on an unnamed, 
seemingly uninhabited island, where Julio hopes to remain with her forever, unbothered 
by the world. Once there, however, as they both continue to decompose rapidly, Julio 
falls ever further into despair and madness, and pleads with the heavens and the ocean to 
relieve his wretched agony and let him join Agathe in death. 
 Unexpectedly, there is another person on the island, a nameless hermit, who 
witnesses Julio’s desperate behavior and fearfully approaches him on the shore. He asks 
Julio to “tell thy dismal tale” (III. 184), which he does, before begging the hermit to 
“leave me to my madness, or to die! (III. 194). The poem nears its end with Julio’s death. 
A wave crashes over them as he embraces Agathe for the last time, and as they are 
carried out into the oblivion of the sea he bellows out her name in a final love cry. Their 
bodies, still entwined, wash back up on the shore, and the hermit buries them together, 
granting them a shared eternity in the grave (III. 449-63). Shortly after, he makes a 
Dickensianly serendipitous discovery when he sees in the water where the doomed lovers 
once lay, a small, gold cross, which he recognizes as the very same one he had given to 
his young daughter so many years ago, before sending her off to the monastery! (III. 474-
89). We learn that this hermit is Agathe’s father, who in penance for his neglect of her as 
  121 
a child has isolated himself on the island in an act of contrition. From this shock of 
recognition and regret, the old man dies, his body resting atop the lovers’ grave like a 
macabre headstone (III. 490-535). The poem closes with the narrator’s lamentation for all 
three of them, a final note of sorrow that serves as their epitaph. 
Publication & Reception History 
 The Death-Wake is an outlier poem in this project in multiple ways. Almost the 
entirety of Stoddart’s work is angling poems; The Death-Wake stands out for its 
controversial subject-matter (necrophilic love) and its oddly Romantic modes of speech. 
The poem received scant acknowledgment by the literary establishment of its time: two 
rather unkind reviews were published in Blackwood’s Magazine, and it was dismissed by 
Stoddart’s own professor at Edinburgh University, Christopher North (Lang 10). 
Curiously, the poem was plagiarized by someone named “Louis Fitzgerald Tasistro,” and 
Lang reports that Edgar Allen Poe “praised the piece while he was exposing Tasistro’s 
‘barefaced robbery’” (11).207 In her memoir of her father, Anne Stoddart mentions The 
Death-Wake only twice, the first time writing that his childhood ambition to write an 
“immortal tragedy exhausted itself in ‘Death-Wake’ and ‘Abel Massinger’” (20-23), and 
the second time noting only that Christopher North was “severe” toward it (98). Beyond 
this, Andrew Lang’s thirteen-page introduction to an 1895 edition of the poem seems to 
be the only extant critical engagement with the text.208 In his brief, laudatory introduction 
to Stoddart and the poem, Lang writes of “an accent original, distinct, strangely musical, 
and really replete with promise. He has a fresh unborrowed melody and mastery of work, 
                                                
207 See Ingram’s biography of Poe for more. 
 
208 Though there is no commentary, a brief excerpt of The Death-Wake appears in Jerome McGann, The 
New Oxford Book of Romantic Period Verse. Oxford: Oxford UP, 2002. 747-50. 
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the first indispensable sign of a true poet” (3-16).209 The Death-Wake is “a breath of the 
spirit of romance, touching an instrument not wholly out of tune, but never to be touched 
again,” a work that “strikes, of course, on the common reef of the Romantic” (14). 
Chimerical Narrations 
 From the synopsis it should be apparent that The Death-Wake stands quite apart 
from the other elegies I look at. How to place it within the elegiac current of the 
nineteenth century, then, is a crucial question of this chapter. In this section, I introduce 
certain obstacles to answering this question, which are also, and more importantly, the 
grounding conditions and events that shape its unique form and modes of speech, and 
raise the question in the first place. The canonical elegies from Spenser through 
Swinburne are written as first-person lyrics in which the speaker himself is the primary 
mourner. In Adonais and Ave Atque Vale, the poet and the mourner are the same figure; 
in The Death-Wake, the narrator speaks in the figure of the “poet,” while Julio speaks as 
the poem’s primary mourner. The voice that frames the text, and the voices that speak in 
the text, introduce a second register of mourning to the poem—while Julio mourns 
Agathe, the narrator mourns them both—that obscures the relationship among them. At 
times he speaks from the remove of a distant observer, a disinterested witness and 
conveyor of their tragic affair; at other times he is intimate, impassioned, and speaks of 
Julio and Agathe as if he knew them; there are even instances when he speaks as if he 
were Agathe’s lover, and their identities begin to blur; and there are moments when he 
speaks directly to them, and occasionally to us. The shifting between third-person and 
first-person speakers creates an unstable multi-frame narrative that is complicated even 
                                                
209 He continues: “His rhymed heroic verse is no more the rhymed heroic verse of Endymion, than it is that 
of Mr. Pope, or of Mr. William Morris. He is a new master of the old instrument” (5). 
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further when narrator’s voice shifts without warning among the past, present, and future 
tenses, a temporal disorientation that is central to its eroticism. 
 The inconsistent narration resulting from the division of speaker and mourner raises 
the second line of inquiry of this chapter. The split between primary speaker and primary 
mourner destabilizes the figures of speech—metonymy and prosopopoeia—that I have 
proposed in the previous chapters are central to nineteenth-century elegiac eroticism. 
Furthermore, neither Julio nor Agathe are poets and so do not, like Keats and Baudelaire, 
leave behind a corpus to, as Swinburne says, “clasp and fold, as though a hand were in 
my hand to hold.” The textual intimacy that Shelley and Swinburne seek through 
metonymy is not possible for Stoddart’s mourners. I return to this and the related problem 
of prosopopoeia later in this chapter. 
 The third concern of this chapter is the effect of Agathe’s dead body on acts of 
touch and touching. In Adonais and Ave Atque Vale, the corpse is not physically present 
to the speaker, but available to him only in language. Agathe’s corpse, however, is 
directly available to Julio’s physical touch, though not the narrator’s. The immediacy of 
the corpse and the possibility of touching the dead body itself changes the nature of the 
elegiac relation among the three characters. For the necrophilic lover Julio, this is the 
most intimate contact the living can have with the dead. Though Burke has stated that 
“death is only an idea, not something known by us as we know our bodily sensations” 
(369), and de Man calls “death” “a displaced name for a linguistic predicament,” I 
propose that in a necrophilic elegy like The Death-Wake, the faculty of touch offers a 
relational knowledge of death. Specifying the exact nature of this knowledge, however, is 
a challenge because Agathe’s corpse signifies on multiple levels: for Julio, the corpse is 
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Agathe; that is, he looks on her dead body not as a symbol or representation of death, but 
as his still-embodied beloved. For the narrator, Agathe’s corpse is the material signifier 
of death, and unlike Julio, he can only know her through the language and figures of 
touch. Throughout this chapter, I examine the epistemological resistances faced by the 
amorous subject Julio, who rejects Agathe’s death, and by the unstable narrator who tells 
their tale, and at times speak his own desire for the dead. The double-register of 
mourning produced by the presence of two speakers creates two, often indistinguishable, 
amorous relationships within the poem.  
 The further epistemological danger of necrophilia is that it blurs the distinction 
between what is living and what is dead. When touch collapses the physical distance 
between them, it unsettles not only the amorous subject’s relation to the dead, but also the 
self-knowledge the subject should gain from confronting the corpse: a recognition of his 
or her own inevitable mortality. These interrelated tensions touch upon the major 
innovations of Stoddart’s poem, and it is important to set them up here as interconnected. 
In the following discussion I address each one individually and in greater depth in order 
to illustrate their particular tensions.210 
 Narration is not the common mode of elegiac speech. In the English tradition, 
elegies are spoken by a first-person lyric speaker who is the primary mourner in the text. 
This is in part due to the fact that, historically, an elegy is an occasional poem, composed 
in response to the actual death of a friend, respected poet, or, in my conception of the 
elegiac relation, lover. In such instances, the elegiac poet is the mourning speaker 
himself, or an aestheticized self-representation. In the elegies I examine—Adonais, In 
                                                
210 Credit is due to Heidi Kaufman for this helpful signpost. 
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Memoriam, Ave Atque Vale—respectively, Shelley mourns Keats, Tennyson mourns 
Hallam, and Swinburne mourns Baudelaire. Historical and genre scholarship has claimed 
that the lived relationship of each pair of poets grounds these elegies in the poets’ 
biographies; it makes sense, then, that mourning poets write their grief in the lyric “I.”  
 The Death-Wake is not rooted in an actual loss in Stoddart’s life, and so we cannot 
identify his narrator or the character Julio with Stoddart himself. There is no historical or 
paratextual evidence to suggest that any of the characters actually existed or that any of 
the events actually occurred, or that the poem has any basis in Stoddart’s life.211 Unlike 
Keats, Hallam, and Baudelaire, Julio and Agathe exist only in the text, born solely of the 
language of the poet’s imagination. The numerous indeterminacies of time and place, and 
the absence of identifiable references or allusions to historical people or events in the 
poem, further support this. Under Rosenberg’s criteria, then, because it is not personal, 
The Death-Wake would not be considered an elegy; it also does not easily fall under 
Sacks’s rubric of genre conventions or the psychoanalytic “work of mourning.” However, 
these determinations of elegy do not sufficiently account for the range of narrative, 
figural, and epistemological forces that drive The Death-Wake. 
 Beyond its non-biographical, ahistorical basis, the fact of the poem’s narration 
further distances The Death-Wake from the elegiac canon. Instead of the conventional 
lyric “I” who speaks in Adonais and Ave Atque Vale, Stoddart’s poem is spoken by a 
third-person who stands in an uncertain relation to the ill-fated lovers. Generally, the 
narrator speaks from outside the central erotic relation between Julio and Agathe, as an 
                                                
211 I have found no evidence to suggest that an actual death spurred Stoddart’s poem or that he was 
mourning a real person in his life. Relatedly, due to Stoddart being unknown, in addition to his poem 
having a narrator, I cannot use “Stoddart” as a metonymy for his poem, whereas this is standard practice for 
canonical poets like Shelley and Swinburne. 
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observer of the tragic events that befall them; yet at certain desperate or perilous 
moments in their voyage, he seems to be an agent within the poem, speaking as if he 
knows Julio and Agathe, and interjecting himself and his own desire into the tale. These 
interjections are so fevered and forceful that they erupt out of the narration altogether and 
into apostrophe, the mode of lyric.212 
 The narration of The Death-Wake, which separates the central speaker (the narrator) 
from the mourning lover (Julio), is a key point of distinction from Adonais and Ave Atque 
Vale, and it remains a problem for interpretation throughout the poem. Here, I look into 
the figural conditions of the narrative to see what challenges the poem may raise for 
poetic theory. The Death-Wake, like Adonais and Ave Atque Vale, like all poetry, relies 
on figurative language to make meaning, to represent the multiple dimensions of (human) 
experience in and as text.213 In Chapters One and Two, I sought to reconsider the critical 
privileging of metaphor over metonymy in Shelleyan and Swinburnean eros, and claim 
the latter as the central erotic figure of elegy. The figural dynamics of a heterogeneous 
text like The Death-Wake, though, troubles the alignment of metaphor with poetry and 
metonymy with narrative that we have inherited from Jakobsonian linguistic theory. In 
Fundamentals of Language (1956), Jakobson explains “[t]he primacy of the metaphoric 
process in the literary schools of romanticism and symbolism,” and “the predominance of 
metonymy which underlies and actually predetermines the so-called ‘realistic’ trend’” in 
narrative fiction.” But The Death-Wake is a narrative split by two often-indistinguishable 
speakers, and its multiple figural registers cross suddenly and unpredictably between both 
                                                
212 See Jonathan Culler, “Apostrophe.” 
 
213 Lisa Downing comments similarly: “[I]t is important to remember that nothing in poetry is ever merely 
a figure: figurative language is the substance of poetry itself, the heart of the poetic” (73). 
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axes of language, and do not, until its final words, come to rest.214 And it poses still a 
further problem: “Similarity,” Jakobson writes, “connects a metaphorical term with the 
term for which it is substituted,” while “contiguity”—the mechanism of metonymy—
operates linearly: “Following the path of contiguous relationships, the realist author 
metonymically digresses from the plot to the atmosphere and from the characters to the 
setting in space and time. He is fond of synecdochic details” (92). This poem’s 
movements in time and space, however, are severely discontiguous. 
 The Death-Wake is already unstable on the levels of narration and figuration. The 
third focus of this chapter arises in light of these complications, but shifts from the 
register of language to the register of the body because the necrophilic mourner Julio 
cannot be satisfied by a textually-mediated relationship with Agathe.215 Put differently, 
whereas the conventional elegist mourns in language, the necrophilic elegist mourns with 
the body.216 As I noted above, Agathe’s corpse signifies on a corporeal level for Julio and 
on a figural level for the narrator, though as we will see shortly, the blurring of their 
identities will often reverse this. The materiality of death in The Death-Wake negates the 
                                                
214 The poem’s hybrid nature also presents a challenge for genre classification. I mentioned earlier that the 
elegiac rubrics of Sacks and Rosenberg seem, in light of my arguments, either too narrow and limiting or 
too broad and universalizing, respectively. The Death-Wake fits neither the genre conventions and “work of 
mourning” that Sacks considers the core of elegy, nor the personal loss and grief that Rosenberg finds 
there. 
 
215 I should note, though, that Julio’s relationship with Agathe always remains chaste. He does not, as 
common understandings of necrophilia would have it, engage in sexual acts with her corpse. His touch is 
limited to a caress, an embrace, a kiss on the cheek or brow. 
 
216 When I write “necrophilic elegist” I generally intend the narrator; as the primary poetic speaker of an 
elegy, he can properly be called an elegist (or an “elegiac speaker” if elegy cannot be narrated). Julio poses 
more of a problem: he mourns in poetic speech, too, when he sings to Agathe in Chimera II (“A rosary of 
stars, love!”, “‘Tis light to love thee living, girl”, and “To the Harp”); and again later when he 
apostrophically invokes, implores, and curses the heavens and the sea and the all the forces of nature for 
their plight. In these moments when he mourns in song, I consider him an elegist (or elegiac speaker); and 
yet, his primary mode of relation with Agathe is through touch, and secondarily in language. These 
continually shifting subject positions are the result of narration and the dual-register of mourning. 
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metonymic necessity of conventional elegy. Unlike Keats and Baudelaire, her body is not 
a static object preserved in language. The Death-Wake traces Agathe’s deterioration in 
horrific detail:  
The ladye, she hath lost the pearly hue 
Upon her gorgeous brow, where tresses grew 
Luxuriantly as thoughts of tenderness, 
That once were floating in the pure recess 
Of her bright soul. These are not as they were, 
But are as weeds above a sepulchre,  
Wild waving in the breeze : her eyes are now 
Sunk deeply under the discolour’d brow, 
That is of sickly yellow, and pale blue, 
Unnaturally blending. The same hue 
Is on her cheek : it is the early breath 
Of cold Corruption, the ban dog of Death 
Falling upon her features” (II. 559-71).217 
Julio, however, is not repelled, and his love for Agathe does not waiver. I noted above 
that at certain moments in the poem, Julio steps into the position of the elegist when he 
mourns Agathe in song. While they are at sea in Chimera II, he sings: “‘Tis light to love 
thee living, girl, when hope is full and fair, / In the springtide of thy beauty, when there is 
                                                
217 By the time they reach the island, at the very end of Chimera II, even the narrator is in disbelief at the 
severe transformation of her corpse. She is “A faded flower! with all the vernal dews / From its bright 
blossom shaken, and the hues / Become as colourless as twilight air— / I marvel much, that she was ever 
fair!” (ll. 696-99). From this point forward, until the end of the poem, the beauty is “off the rose,” as the 
cliché poets say, and her corpse no longer possesses any of the outward loveliness it once had; yet, even 
though her beauty is passed, Julio loves her still. 
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no sorrow there— […] But when the brow is blighted, like a star of morning tide, / And 
faded is the crimson blush upon the cheek beside; / It is to love, as seldom love, the 
brightest and the best, / When our love lies like a dew upon the one that is at rest” (II. 
209-20). Not only does Julio not turn away from her, he loves her even more. This, I 
would argue, is a defining characteristic of the necrophile, and a clear point of distinction 
from Adonais and Ave Atque Vale: necrophilic desire for the dead does not cease at the 
precipice of its beauty. 
Disinterment and Necrophilic Anti-Prosopon 
 I turn back now to a scene in Chimera I with the hope that understanding the basic 
problems of necrophilic elegy will allow us to navigate this bizarre text. Immediately 
after Agathe’s sudden death, The Death-Wake veers sharply into gothic nightmare and 
madness. On the night of her burial, Julio descends into madness when descends into her 
grave to retrieve her body. He “wields a heavy mattock in his hands,” and over the grave 
he “hath bent him down in speed”; “[A]nd he is flinging the dark, chilly mould / Over the 
gorgeous pavement” of the flagstone that sits atop it (277-93). This scene reveals three 
difficulties that continually disrupt the text’s logic, voice, and language: 1) the temporal 
indeterminacies effected by shifting grammatical tenses; 2) the uncertain nature of the 
narrator’s relationship to Julio and Agathe; and 3) the positing and undoing of faces in 
the face of death. The simultaneity of these issues heightens the figural and 
epistemological disruptions they cause throughout the poem. I begin with the 
grammatical inconsistencies as these are the most immediate and accessible; but more 
significantly, because what might be seen as a minor, surface inconsistency belies a 
deeper level of disorientation that is the poem’s overarching epistemological condition. 
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 The shifting verb tenses in the lines above, and which continues throughout the 
poem, call into question the time of these events and the time of their narration; it is 
unclear if these events are being narrated as they occur in the present, or if these are past 
events the narrator is conveying in the present. Julio “wields” the mattock (I. 277) but 
then he “hath bent down” over her grave (I. 283); he “is flinging” the dirt off her coffin (l. 
292), but then he “would dash” his pick through the other bones there (l. 296); soon after, 
he “went / To his wild work,” (I. 314-15), but then he “hath stolen the dark chest / Where 
the fair nun lay coffin’d” (I. 326-27). And once he has taken her body from the casket, 
“Julio bends o’er / The sleeping girl” (l. 354-55), and he “is holding his pale lips / Over 
her brow” (360-61), yet he then “breathed a cold kiss on her ashy cheek” (I. 366). Over 
the course of what seems just a few hours in a single night, Julio appears simultaneously 
to act in the present and in the past, and the text offers no guidance for understanding 
these temporal shifts.218 These grammatical inconsistencies, however, are not accidental 
or arbitrary, nor, I think, the result of careless editing; they are one way the poem 
performs the linguistic and temporal disorientations that reverberate from Julio’s 
necrophilic act. 
 In an attempt to comprehend death, our sense of the past and the present are the 
fundamental points of temporal orientation. Their distinction and transformation—that is, 
when the present becomes the past, when the living become the dead—marks the event 
that drives mourning; to confuse them collapses the chronology and history of the 
relation between Julio and Agathe, and between the narrator and the doomed lovers. The 
                                                
218 Time is not the only thing disturbed in the poem: place, too, is left unclear. Stoddart provides few 
indications of the setting of this tale, leaving us to extrapolate from such clues as the monastic setting, the 
gothic tones, the Italianate names Julio and Agathe, and the archaic diction and spelling, such as “ladye” 
for “lady.” 
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necrophile, by rejecting the absence of the love-object, by refusing to relinquish his hold 
on the dead, essentially seeks to undo the movement of time in order to keep his desire 
present in the present: Julio’s disinterment of Agathe is an attempt to resist and reverse 
time. As Scott Dudley writes (though of the seventeenth century), the desire to “have 
conference with the dead” is to seek “a past that can only be experienced as rupture” 
(291). 
 These inconstancies of grammar and time are not yet so confused as to prohibit us 
following the plot, but there is in this same scene a truly unsettling moment that throws 
time, grammar, figuration, and narration into chaos: Julio’s inexplicable discovery of 
other, older, bones in Agathe’s grave. The temporal and logical disorientations of the 
poem become more severe when Julio finds in the “cold / Sad grave […] many a relic 
there / Of chalky bones, which, in the wasting air, / Fell smoldering away […]” (I. 293-
96). How is it possible for there to be bones so old and fragile that they fall to dust at the 
mere touch of air, buried above Agathe’s just-interred coffin?219 What are we to make of 
this strangeness? I read it as another indication of the disorientations of time and 
knowledge that the poem continually thematize as a consequence of Julio’s necrophilic 
transgression. 
 This puzzling discovery pales in comparison to what happens next: a moment that 
fundamentally ruptures subjectivity, yet leads to a surprisingly clear example of 
prosopopoeia. As Julio continues his mad digging, he “fell upon a skull,—a haggard one, 
/ With its teeth set, and the great orbless eye / Revolving darkness, like eternity […]” (ll. 
300-302). This discovery marks Julio’s confrontation with the material(ity) of death, a 
                                                
219 While burying more than one corpse in a single grave was not uncommon at the time, this was most 
often done in pauper’s graves, but Agathe was a nun. 
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devastating encounter with the Real that he does not fully recover from. This skull, like 
the other old bones that “in the wasting air, / Fell smoldering away,” cannot be Agathe’s, 
as her body would barely have begun to decompose; yet in his need to reclaim her from 
the grave, Julio’s desperate imagination impossibly transforms the skull into her face: 
“And in his hand he held it, till it grew / To have the fleshly features and the hue / Of life. 
He gazed, and gazed, and it became / Like to his Agathe—all, all the same!” (ll. 303-06). 
As I have discussed in the previous chapters, this figure posits a face on an inanimate, 
nonhuman, or dead object, thereby granting it the possibility of speech and subjectivity. 
By imbuing this anonymous skull with the face of his lost desire, Julio momentarily 
(even if mistakenly) resurrects his dead beloved; I want to suggest that in so doing the 
poem reveals that the figure of prosopopoeia itself is necrophilic. As Dudley very 
concisely and aptly states, necrophilia is “the displaced, uncanny desire to dig up the past 
and make it live again” (291). In other words, prosopopoeia is the figure and performance 
of necrophilic desire. 
 The double frame of the poem, the presence of two speakers, further complicates 
how figures operate and unravel, and it will take some time to elaborate this fully. 
Adonais and Ave Atque Vale, I have explained, are spoken in the first-person, lyric voice 
by poetic speakers who are themselves the primary mourners. For Shelley and 
Swinburne, then, prosopopoeia is solely a figurative act. In their elegies, the speaker 
mourns by recreating (or attempting to recreate) the love-object’s face, but the poems 
recognize that this is possible only in language. Their speech admits this positing is a 
self-conscious fiction because the corpse is not actually present to the poets—their dead 
exist only in figures. Similarly, the events in those elegies, such as the procession of 
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mourners, are purely rhetorical acts. The account of Julio’s mourning, in contrast, is 
narrated in uncertain time, yet presented as if these events actually occurred: for him, 
Agathe’s face actually appears on this skull (even though it is a momentary 
hallucination), while it is the narrator who recreates this experience in poetic speech.  
 A double register of speech and mourning obscures the agent and site of figuration. 
When Julio hallucinates Agathe’s face on this skull, he—as a character within the 
poem—does not “do” prosopopoeia; to him, Agathe’s “face” is not the result of poetic 
speech, but of his lovesick mind.220 He does not speak or write her face onto this skull, 
but imagines it as real; it is the narrator who performs the figural act in the speaking of 
the poem. This is a special problem for a The Death-Wake due to the continual confusion 
of speakers: the events that occur in the poem, the experiences of Julio and Agathe, 
cannot be identified with the event of the poem’s narration. The narrator of The Death-
Wake should be read as the one who “does,” who performs, the necrophilic speech acts of 
prosopopoeia, while it is Julio who acts necrophilically. By making Agathe’s face present 
and “real” to Julio the poem relocates the figure of prosopopoeia from the rhetorical field 
to the material. 
 Julio’s prosopopoeiac hallucination is broken by the stench of this skull, a sensory 
intrusion of death into his body: “He drew it nearer,—the cold, bony thing!— / To kiss 
the worm-wet lips. ‘Ay! let me cling— / Cling to thee now, for ever!’ but a breath / Of 
rank corruption from its jaws of death / Went to his nostrils, and he madly laugh’d, / And 
                                                
220 In “Mourning and Melancholia,” Freud writes that when “the loved object no longer exists […] it 
proceeds to demand that all libido shall be withdrawn from its attachments to that object. This demand 
arouses understandable opposition” in the subject that “can be so intense that a turning away from reality 
takes place and a clinging to the object through the medium of a hallucinatory wishful psychosis” (244). 
We can understand Julio’s wishful hallucination to be the result of his inability to let go of his desire for 
Agathe, and not, as it is for the narrator, the result of language. 
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dash’d it over on the altar shaft” (I. 299-312). That the narrator refers to this stench as a 
“breath” exhaled from the mouth is an inversion of the status of the mouth as primary 
erotic organ in Adonais. It is not until Julio is about to kiss it on the “worm-wet lips,” 
which is also the moment that the skull, via its “stench,” touches his body, that he 
recognizes it for what it is—the decayed remains of some other dead body. This “breath” 
of “rank corruption” is not the breath of eros that is for Shelley, and when the fetor of 
decay enters his body, the truth of this moment is revealed to him, and it is unbearable: 
“he madly laugh’d, / And dash’d it over on the alter shaft.” When Urania yearns for a kiss 
from Adonais, it is a transmission of love and knowledge that she seeks; here, too, in The 
Death-Wake, a (near) kiss is a revelation of knowledge, but of a different kind. Julio, by 
(nearly) kissing the skull, approaches the treacherous boundary between what is living 
(himself) and what is dead (the skull), and when the stench of death crosses this boundary 
it touches his body. In this moment he is “at the border of [his] condition as a living 
being,” as Kristeva writes of the abject in Powers of Horror (3), and only by dashing the 
skull to pieces does he “thrust [it] aside in order to live.”  
 There is another moment in this scene that deserves attention for how it reinforces 
the indeterminacy of the narrator’s relationship to Julio and Agathe: “There is a flagstone 
lieth heavily,” the narrator says, “Over the ladye’s grave; I wist one of three / That bore 
it, of a blessed verity! / But he hath lifted it in his pure madness, / As it were lightsome as 
a summer gladness” (I. 285-89). The narrator speaks here as if he knows them from the 
monastery, since he was “one of three” who helped lay the headstone on her grave. 
Additionally, his occasional self-representations as Agathe’s (vicarious) lover further blur 
this relationship: once Julio has dug up her body, the narrator shifts from describing 
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Julio’s actions in the third-person to an ambiguously amorous, first-person lyric 
ejaculation: “Yes! yes!,” he exclaims when Julio bends to kiss her, “and he is holding his 
pale lips / Over her brow” (I. 361-62). I read this odd interjection as an expression of his 
own desire that momentarily interrupts the narration, and he repeats this ecstatic “Yes!” 
as if he himself were experiencing the pleasure of kissing her.  
The Look of Being 
 We have seen Julio’s descent into madness after Agathe’s death, his prosopopoeiac 
hallucination of the skull in her grave. The repercussions for the linguistic and 
epistemological conditions of the poem only intensify when he sets off to sea with her 
body. While the poem preserves Agathe in her beauty throughout Chimera I, the narrator 
acknowledges that the nature of her beauty has changed in death. When alive, she was “a 
fair sister girl, / With a brow changing between snow and pearl, / And the blue eyes of 
sadness […]” (I. 144-46); she was “bright / In her own self,—a mystery of light!” (I. 152-
53), “with cheeks that flush and fade” (I. 175-76); and when she and Julio speak during 
their courtship, both “seem’d the hue / Of deepest crimson” (I. 193-94). Now, in death, 
she is “An image of cold calm” with a “pale cheek,” a “yet unwither’d flower” that is 
“still unfaded” (I. 330-40).221 The cheek that once flushed crimson with love for Julio is 
now “ashy” and “bloodless as a marble stone,” and though the narrator admits that she is 
“Susceptible of silent waste alone,” her body does not waste until the end of Chimera II, a 
unknown period of time that may be days but seem more like weeks (I. 367-70).222 Julio, 
                                                
221 This scene displays an awareness and strong echoes of certain elegiac conventions, such as the 
metaphorization of the dead beloved as a flower. 
 
222 The passage of time is a persistent problem for the poem. In addition to the confusing temporal shifts 
evoked by the inconsistent verb tenses that I looked at earlier, there are few indications of just how much 
time passes during their voyage, making it difficult to determine how long it is until Agathe’s corpse begins 
to show signs of waste. It could be 9 days, or it could be a few weeks. 
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on the other hand, appears strangely corpse-like from the very beginning of the poem: He 
is “[l]ike a pale spirit […] that looketh wan and white,” and “had the youthful look / 
Which heartfelt woe had wasted”; his “brow was as wan as if it were / Of snowy marble,” 
and “his fine features [were] stricken pale as morn” (I. 35-50). The narrator comments 
often on the odd transposition of their physical conditions, and these early examples 
foreshadow how necrophilia will continue to blur the distinction between what is living 
and what is dead. This indistinction makes necrophilic desire and figuration a problem of 
epistemology as much as a problem of language and materiality. 
 Throughout Chimera I and most of Chimera II, although Agathe’s body remains an 
object of beauty that has not decomposed into abjection, it is still a corpse, and the two 
levels of signification will begin to blur: for Julio, she is not a figure but his beloved nun; 
for the narrator, she is usually a material signifier of death. As a dead thing that Julio 
keeps in the living world, her corpse “infects”—to adopt Kristeva’s term—not only 
Julio’s body but also the narrator’s speech, metastasizing in syntactic contortions and 
imagistic uncertainties that are severe enough to overturn even the rhythms of the natural 
world.223 He exclaims: 
Beauty in death! A tenderness upon 
The rude and silent relics, where alone 
Sat the destroyer! Beauty on the dead! 
The look of being where the breath is fled! 
The unwarming sun still joyous in its light! 
A time—a time without a day or night! 
                                                
223 Kristeva’s conception of “the abject” is crucial for understanding the status of the corpse in The Death-
Wake. 
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Death cradled upon Beauty, like a bee 
Upon a flower, that looketh lovingly!—  
Like a wild serpent, coiling in its madness, 
Under a wreath of blossom and of gladness! (I. 345-354). 
In this description, Agathe’s corpse resembles the idealized female body common to 
Romantic and Pre-Raphaelite poetry (and art). Her beauty has a “tenderness” that appears 
to defy the “destroyer” death. And though death sits on the “rude and silent relics” of her 
material remains, from which her “breath has fled,” she still has the “look of being.” At 
first, the passage seems to imply that beauty is a force of life, a power that might fend off 
death’s corruption. The narrator’s language betrays this possibility, though, as “Beauty” 
gives the corpse only the “look” of life, not life itself; its power here is limited to surface 
appearance. By making what no longer has breath appear to still be alive, this “look of 
being” approximates prosopopoeia; but, as in the earlier example of the skull on which 
Julio superimposes Agathe’s face, we will see that this figure of speech cannot survive 
the base materiality of death. In revealing the rhetoricity of this moment, the poem 
insinuates the impossibility of reviving the dead. 
 Agathe’s corpse strains the narrator’s speech and knowledge in other ways as well. 
Grammatically, the series of mixed prepositions confuses the spatial, representational, 
and ontological relation between death and beauty: when “Beauty in death” becomes 
“Beauty on the dead,” and death is then “cradled upon Beauty,” how is any orientation—
of Julio and Agathe, of the narrator, of the reader—possible? While “beauty in death” is a 
viable metaphor, I find the prepositional shift from “in” to “on” to “upon” makes this 
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passage impossible to image clearly.224 This chaos of meaning and signification exposes 
the cruel arbitrariness of language that seeks the body of the dead.225 We also see her 
destabilize the narrator in the anacoluthic syntax of the passage, when he attempts, 
through syntactic parallelism, to speak death and the dead body. Though the phrasing and 
end-stopping of lines 347-350 elide the copula “is” (which would construct an overt 
identification), “Beauty on the dead!,” “The look of being where the breath is fled!,” and 
“The unwarming sun still joyous in its light!” are syntactically parallel, such that 
“Beauty” is the “look of being,” which is (like) an “unwarming sun,” which then is “a 
time without a day or night.” Each of these parallels is metaphorized into its opposite, or 
into a logical impossibility.  
 The syntactic identification of these conflicting images and arrangements exposes 
still another symptom of the corpse’s infection of the living, but one that is external to the 
narrator; by this I mean it does not inhere in his speech like the unstable prepositions, but 
manifests in the undoing of the rhythms of nature itself. Though Agathe’s corpse has not 
yet decomposed, its mere presence among the living negates the heat of the sun and 
removes this moment from time altogether by erasing the difference between day and 
night.226 Kristeva would call this atemporal event the “nontime of love,” which is “both 
instant and eternity, past and future, [and] abreacted present” (ToL 6). Taken toward its 
symbolic conclusion, this moment, the “nontime of love,” obscures the distinction 
                                                
224 Heidi Kaufman notes the possible significance of the linguistic differentiation over the use of “in” and 
“on” in British and American English: in England, one says “I live in Oak Street,” while in the U.S., one 
says, “I live on Oak Street.” 
225 I suggest this is an example of what de Man considers “the madness of words” (“Shelley Disfigured”). 
 
226 More precisely, the uncertainty of time discussed above with regard to the inconsistent shifts in verb 
tenses becomes here a total elimination of time altogether, not just a confusion of the difference between 
past and present, and day and night. 
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between light and dark, which stand symbolically for life and death. Necrophilic love, 
which has already intermixed the living body and the dead body, now threatens the 
possibility of spatial and temporal orientation altogether. 
 What I hope to have shown by this point is that necrophilic eros collapses into 
temporal, visual, and rhetorical uncertainty a number of fundamental perceptions by 
which the living situate themselves in time and space, perceptions around which human 
life is oriented: the perception of difference between night and day, dark and light, dead 
and living, past and present; in essence, desiring the dead undoes (our knowledge of) the 
world. The perversion of the necrophilic consciousness is that it negates the knowledge 
we are supposed to gain through sensory perception; loving the dead even undoes the 
epistemological expectations of language. And further, as a narrated elegy, in which 
bodily touch is as essential for Julio’s mourning as the touch of language is for the 
narrator, The Death-Wake blurs the line between metonymic touch (which I have argued 
is the central erotic figure of speech in Adonais and Ave Atque Vale) and physical touch. 
In other words, the poem makes language material and makes the body rhetorical: by 
exposing the materiality of language and the rhetoricity of Agathe’s dead body, Julio and 
the narrator stand together as mourning lovers at the threshold of speech and touch, 
which the text now represents as the threshold of life and death.227 
The Unepitaph'd Dead 
 The disinterment scene contains even more to unpack, and in a truly strange 
moment in a poem full of them, there is an opportunity to investigate what necrophilic 
mourning does to the knowledge expectations of reading and writing. Once Julio has 
removed Agathe’s body from the grave, he is compelled to kiss her: “he is holding his 
                                                
227 Credit is due to Veronica Alfano for suggesting this elegant formulation. 
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pale lips / Over her brow” and “breathed a cold kiss on her ashy cheek, / That left no 
trace—no flush—no crimson streak, / But was as bloodless as a marble stone” (I. 360-
68). No “stench” of “rank corruption” emits from her dead body, and in this moment, the 
rest of the world ceases to exist: though the night sky is alive with clouds dancing “like 
infant elves at play,” Julio “gazed on, and never lifted / Himself to see the broken clouds, 
that drifted / One after one” (I. 376-78). When he is startled out of his trance by the 
church bells that call him back into reality, he quickly fills the empty grave back up with 
dirt and replaces the massive flagstone on top: 
  The heavy bell toll’d two, and, as it toll’d, 
  Julio started, and the fresh-turn’d mould 
  He flung into the empty chasm with speed, 
  And o’er it dropt the flagstone. One could read 
  That Agathe lay there; but still the girl 
  Lay by him, like a precious and pale pearl, 
  That from the deep sea-waters had been rent— 
  Like a star fallen from the firmament! (I. 384-91) 
Just the briefest, passive mention of reading here reverberates beyond the text and has 
urgent implications for interpretation. By removing Agathe from the grave, what “[o]ne 
could read” on her tombstone is no longer the truth. ‘Hic jacet Agathe!’, the epitaph reads 
(I. 282), but now in fact she does not. The ironic double meaning of “lies” here is a direct 
result of Julio’s actions. As an intransitive verb, “Here lies Agathe” is a conventional 
epitaphic address that indicates her body rests in the ground below, yet which we know 
  141 
now to be not true; used as a transitive verb, the epitaph lies twice, once in saying that her 
body is there, and again in essentially calling Agathe a liar. 
 Whatever else they are meant to do (and this is multiple), an epitaph should 
truthfully convey who rests in the ground beneath it, but Julio’s actions vacate the truth of 
the epitaph. Because Agathe’s body is no longer where it is expected, where we read it is, 
the poem subverts the truth of writing and the epistemological expectations of reading: to 
read this epitaph is to not know the truth. A general presumption about reading is that to 
read is to know, that reading offers knowledge; but this is not the case here, and so what 
should be a concrete, textual marker of Agathe’s final resting place is emptied of its 
proper signification. Julio’s desire for the dead nun—which has just unraveled time, 
dissolved figures, and erased distinctions between the living and the dead—now nullifies 
writing and reading. 
 The epitaph is a particular problem for necrophilic elegy, moreso, I suggest, than 
for a conventional elegy because unlike the necrophilic mourner, the conventional 
mourner does not physically touch the dead body or remove it from the grave. In Adonais 
and Ave Atque Vale, there is no risk that Shelley or Swinburne’s speech acts might undo 
the truth of epitaphic speech; try as the poets might, the materiality of language does not 
allow them to move concrete objects in the world. Yet this is what happens in The Death-
Wake: Julio’s refusal to let go of Agathe’s body, to leave her where she lies, voids the 
knowledge that certain writing, like epitaphic inscription, purports to offer. The truth 
status of language will remain ambiguous and suspect throughout the poem. A moment in 
Chimera II, for example, recalls this false epitaph that lies about Agathe. Having been at 
sea for days, or possibly weeks, Julio despairingly imagines their death: “Down, down,” 
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he weeps, “through azure silence, we shall go, / Unepitaph’d, to cities far below” (II. 588-
97). When he removes her body from the grave in Chimera I, Julio undoes the epitaphic 
text and de-epitaphs his beloved Agathe, and now they both risk an anonymous death.228 
 In the final scene of the poem, epitaphic signification is fully transformed. When 
the hermit—who we learn is Agathe’s neglectful father—dies atop their shared grave on 
the deserted island, his corpse signifies as a grave marker, an unwritten epitaph, a text of 
flesh and bone: 
And mariners that have been toiling far 
Upon the deep, and lost the polar star, 
Have visited that island, and have seen 
That lover’s grave: and many there have been 
That sat upon the gray and crumbling stone, 
And started, as they saw a skeleton 
Amid the long sad moss, that fondly grew 
Through the white wasted ribs; but never knew 
Of those who slept below, or of the tale 
Of that brain-stricken man, that felt the pale 
And wandering moonlight steal his soul away,— 
Poor Julio, and the ladye Agathe! (III. 542-53) 
In this moment, the hermit’s body becomes its own epitaphic text. This macabre event 
reverses the mechanism of metonymic figuration that is so vital to the erotics of 
mourning in Adonais and Ave Atque Vale: instead of replacing the absent body of the 
                                                
228 Interestingly, an event later in the nineteenth century repeats a disinterment, but the desired object is not 
the beloved’s body. In 1869, Dante Gabriel Rossetti infamously dug up the grave of his wife and muse, 
Elizabeth Siddal, to retrieve the book of poems he had, in his grief over her death, buried with her. 
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love-object with language, The Death-Wake replaces language (in the form of the 
unepitaphed text) with Agathe’s body. 
 The last section of The Death-Wake that I explore focuses on the personified 
deities, natural forces, and terrors that rise from the depths of the sea in Chimera II. These 
beings do not come to mourn Agathe, nor do they sympathize with Julio’s suffering or 
offer him any respite from it by allowing him some distance from death. These 
nightmarish figures perform the opposite function. Appearing as “maladies,” “griefs,” 
“Famine,” “Despair,” and “Death,” they are more like curses than consolations, and when 
they “saw the skeleton / Grisly beside them, the wild phantasies / Grew mad and howl’d; 
the fever of disease / Became wild frenzy—very terrible! / And, for a hell of agony—a 
hell / Of rage, was there, that fed on misty things, / On dreams, ideas, and imaginings” 
(II. 497-512). Clearly, these are not fellow mourners in sympathy with Julio, and they 
exacerbate his mental and physical deterioration by providing him a rare moment of self-
knowledge. While “some were raving on philosophy, / And some on love, and some on 
jealousy, / And some upon the moon […] Julio knew them by a something dim / About 
their wasted features like to him!” (II. 513-18). These adversaries leave him anything but 
protected from death, and the self-knowledge he gleans from the “something dim” is that 
of his own “wasted features,” his own transformation into a corrupted body. 
 As we know from Sacks, the procession of mourners is a performative element in 
elegy, a “staging device[s], a convention that draws attention to the mourner or 
mourners,” the effect of which is “to place the dead, and death itself, at some cleared 
distance from the living” (19). But it is precisely this distance that the necrophile rejects: 
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Julio seeks to fully close this distance, to intertwine his body with hers. Within the verbal 
economy 
economy of the poem, necrophilia destabilizes what we take as an epistemological given: 
the distinction between the living and the dead. In demonstrating how The Death-Wake 
overturns this convention, though, I do not wish to claim that the poem is outside the 
elegiac tradition, but to show how a poem so seemingly alien to the tradition that it 
reverses some of the very things that characterize it as a genre, presents an opportunity to 
reimagine the possible shapes and bounds of elegy. 
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CODA 
 “A HAND THAT CAN BE CLASP’D NO MORE”: NOTES ON  
RETURNING TO TENNYSON’S IN MEMORIAM 
 Throughout this project, I have aimed to read the eroticism of a selection of 
canonical and non-canonical nineteenth-century English elegies as an epistemological 
experience, an intellectual and affective desire for the dead beloved as a textual figure of 
deathly knowledge. For a project that seeks to rethink erotic experience in nineteenth-
century English elegiac poetry not to include what is, despite the eminent strangeness of 
its speech and form, perhaps the master text of the elegiac tradition among its main 
chapters may seem an odd choice, but my decision has been strategic. As a coda, then, it 
may be insightful to test my theory of elegiac eroticism against the most immediately 
biographical and most openly amorous elegy in the canon, Alfred Tennyson’s In 
Memoriam (1850). 
 To do so, however, requires putting pressure on the predominant modes of 
criticism in scholarship on In Memoriam, the biographical and the historical. Of the 
elegies I explore, In Memoriam presents the strongest temptation to biographical and 
historical interpretations as it is grounded on the intimate, lived friendship between 
Tennyson and Hallam.229 Unlike the textually intimate but personally distant 
relationships in Adonais and Ave Atque Vale, which desire their dead as poets first, 
Tennyson’s love is rooted firstly in his affection for Hallam as an intimate friend, a bond 
                                                
229 The poem, Craft writes, “revolves around Hallam as around ‘the centre of a world’s desire,” and refers 
to Carol Christ’s assertion that Hallam is “‘the absent center around which the poem moves’” (47). 
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that is the central reference point for the majority of  readings of the poem.230  As the text 
openly invites biographical readings, critics have long noted the homoerotic under- and 
overtones of the poem as implying or betraying homosexual desire between the two. Its 
originary event lends itself to the interpretation that its sexually suggestive speech is 
evidence of Tennyson’s homosexual longing for Hallam.231  
 The limitation of this approach that seeks a correspondence between the events of 
the poem and the events of Tennyson’s lived reality is that it tends to overlook certain 
figures of speech that, within the verbal economy of the poem, perform in language what 
Tennyson can no longer experience in life—Hallam’s presence, his voice and touch. 
Though contemporary interpretations are not simplistically mimetic in positing a direct 
correspondence between the events in the poem and the events of the Tennyson-Hallam 
                                                
230 Though Hallam was himself a poet, and there are instances in In Memoriam where Tennyson reads him 
as a poetic text, his status as man and friend is always primarily to Tennyson. It is Hallam’s role as intimate 
friend that is Tennyson’s primary focus, and so the corpse/corpus metonymy which is so central to my 
overall argument is more difficult/resistant in In Memoriam. Contributing to this temptation is the fact that 
although Hallam was himself and poet, and though at multiple moments in the elegy Tennyson represents 
him as a poetic text he can (or at least can try) to read, there is no poetic corpus of similar breadth and 
depth to make the corpse/corpus metonymy that Shelley and Swinburne embrace. 
 
231 In Memoriam, Craft writes, is a “Victorian text whose passionate discursively and sexual obliquity 
everywhere marked its constitutive submission to the agonistic Victorian imperative ‘to refine and 
spiritualize’ so problematic a desire.” Craft turns to Havelock Ellis for a contextual perspective on the 
elegy’s sexuality: ‘Various modern poets of high ability have given expression to emotions of exalted or 
passionate friendship towards individuals of the same sex, whether or not such friendship back properly be 
termed homosexual. It is scarcely necessary to refer to In Memoriam, in which Tennyson enshrined his 
affection for his early friend, Arthur Hallam, and developed a picture of the universe on the basis of that 
affection’ (Ellis, Sexual Inversion, 339)” (Craft 46). Craft does not simply interpret In Memoriam as 
homosexual, as evidence of Tennyson’s homosexuality. He argues that In Memoriam is “more than a 
machine for the sublimation, management, or transformation of male homosexual desire; it is, rather, the 
site of a continuing problematization: the problem not merely of desire between men, but also of the desire 
(very urgent in the elegy) to speak it” (47). Craft also directs us to more contemporary responses to the 
poem’s homoerotic potential, citing Ricks on Reade (1970): “Was Tennyson, so to speak, abnormally 
abnormal? A new anthology entitled Sexual Heretics: Male Homosexuality in English Literature from 
1850-1900 does not hesitate to quote extensively from ten sections of In Memoriam; its editor, anxious to 
enlist or if necessary pressgang Tennyson, quaintly says ‘the fact that Tennyson evolved an emphatically 
heterosexual image in later life does nothing to disqualify him as homosexual when he wrote In 
Memoriam’” (Craft 51). 
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relationship, biographical and historical approaches exert the strongest critical pull.232 
“Such work,” Herbert Tucker reminds us, however, “is less literary history than it is 
cultural history haunted by the specter of the literary criticism it severely circumscribes” 
(5).233 This historical “haunting,” in Tucker’s view, what I refer to as the biographical 
and historical temptation of elegy, “circumscribes” the possibilities of criticism that seeks 
to understand the rhetorical and formal nuances of the elegiac relation that exceed the 
potential of genre-based, biographical, and historical interpretations.  
 One problem raised by this biographical strain of scholarship on In Memoriam, 
and by In Memoriam itself, is the uncertainty of what it means to refer to the elegy as a 
“love poem.” Donald Hall has claimed In Memoriam as “the most beautiful homoerotic 
elegy in the English language”; more recently, John Rosenberg has called In Memoriam 
“one of the great love poems in English” (44), but what exactly this means beyond a 
poem of amorous desire and affection remains unresolved. In its common usage, such a 
characterization would not hold for Adonais or Ave Atque Vale due to the lack of a close, 
personal relationship between elegist and elegized; the intimate friendship of Tennyson 
and Hallam, however, encourages readings that reinforce the circumscribed perspective 
that eros is synonymous with sexual desire and pleasure. 
 As I have aimed to demonstrate how erotic love can be understood as an 
epistemological drive, and how knowledge itself is, for my poets, an object of amorous 
                                                
232 Contributing to this pull is the poem’s adoption of sorts as a national text after Queen Victoria’s 
embrace of In Memoriam for solace in the years after her husband’s death in 1861. This cultural adoption 
places extra weight on the historical significance of the poem and the necessity of scholarship that 
examines this aspect of the elegy’s reception. For more, see Esther Schor, Bearing the Dead: The British 
Culture of Mourning from the Enlightenment to Victoria. Princeton: Princeton UP, 1994. 
 
233 Tucker continues: “If historical research reduces literature to the fact, and critical interpretation reduces 
it to the idea, we should remember (as Tennyson did most of the time) that the idea itself has a history and 
that the fact itself always comes to us interpreted” (9). 
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desire, a poem like In Memoriam, with an already overdetermined homoeroticism, all too 
easily encourages the common notion of eros as sexual desire and bodily pleasure, a 
position I have sought to reimagine. Urgently for this project, such a view reinforces the 
interpretation of eros as sexual, an association this project has attempted to complicate by 
pursuing the Platonically erotic longing for knowledge that underpins elegiac speech. The 
poem’s temptation to the biographical and the historical, as I have suggested of Adonais 
and Ave Atque Vale, cannot adequately account for the textual nuances and figurative 
excesses that perform the erotic relation between the elegist and the lost-object.234 By 
focusing firstly on works that do not fit the standard model of eros-as-sexual desire, and 
that do not suggest the possibility of homosexual desire between elegist and elegized, I 
hoped to avoid an overdetermined interpretation of elegiac eroticism as I developed my 
hypothesis about the Platonic nature of the erotic relation. My goal was to establish a way 
of reading that would conceptualize eros without the weight and burden of historical 
determination. In discussions of erotic experience, the desire for knowledge is too often 
subsumed by the desire for sexual pleasure, but my argument has been that knowledge 
itself can be the object of amorous desire, that it is the motive force and ultimate aim of 
poetic mourning, and that the elegiac speaker arrives at this knowledge through certain 
figures of speech (primarily metonymy and synecdoche) that illuminate—and sometimes 
create—the intimate textual relation between speaker and lost love-object. This alternate 
                                                
234 Despite its fragmentary and non-linear movement from grief to consolation, the scope of the poem 
provides its own history of the Victorian era, referencing over the passage of its three years (and written 
over seventeen) fundamental problems faced by England at the time, such as the tension between scientific 
discovery and religious belief. Also, Queen Victoria’s embrace of the poem for personal solace after the 
death of her husband, coupled with Tennyson’s laureateship, makes the poem a voice of the nation in a 
time of significant social and political change. Despite tracing three years of Tennyson’s mourning, despite 
being written and revised a lot before its publication in 1850, the poem maintains a sense of immediacy by 
referencing and alluding to contemporary social and political concerns, such as the debate over evolution. 
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and, I believe, more precise articulation allows us to see how eros operates in a different 
register in the context of elegy. 
 A few brief readings should suffice, for now, to show this different register of 
intimate desire in In Memoriam and how the burdens of biography and history weigh 
more heavily on this poem’s eroticism. One passage often referenced in support of 
homosexual readings falls in section XIII:  
Tears of the widower, when he sees 
A late-lost form that sleep reveals, 
And moves his doubtful arms, and feels 
Her place is empty, fall like these; 
 
Which weep a loss forever new, 
A void where heart on heart reposed; 
And, where warm hands have rest and closed, 
Silence, till I be silent too; 
 
Which weep the comrade of my choice, 
An awful thought, a life removed, 
The human-hearted man I loved, 
A Spirit, not a breathing voice” (XIII. 1-12). 
The gender ambiguity and shifting subject positions are apparent in the conflicting 
metaphors of “widower” and “comrade,” “human-hearted man” and “Spirit,” which blur 
the nature of the speaker’s relation with Hallam. Are Tennyson and Hallam like husband 
 vii 
 
and (now dead) wife, or are they fraternal “comrades”? Is Hallam a man or a spirit, or 
both? If Hallam is a “human-hearted man” Tennyson risks charges of homosexuality; but 
if he is a spirit, there is lesser possibility of misconstruing this love as carnal. The gender-
shifting marital language and the rhetoric of bodily touch (“A void where heart on heart 
reposed; / And, where warm hands have rest and closed”) seems to suggest, as Craft 
suggests, a homosexual longing for the dead poet.235  
 I look now to a sampling of instances where what has been interpreted as erotic 
(sexual) desire is actually erotic (epistemological) desire, which seeks the sensuous, 
somatic pleasures of poetic knowledge. Rosenberg directs us to section 18 as a prime 
example of the intrinsic sexuality of Tennyson’s mourning: 
Ah yet, ev’n yet, if this might be,  
I, falling on his faithful heart, 
Would breathing thro’ his lips impart 
The life that almost dies in me; 
 
That dies not, but endures with pain, 
And slowly forms the firmer mind, 
Treasuring the look it cannot find, 
The words that are not heard again. (18. 13-20).  
“Despite the classic status of In Memoriam,” Rosenberg writes, “much of its power 
resides in its power to shock. Thus in Section 18, in which the poet lays Hallam to rest in 
                                                
235 It is not surprising, Craft writes, that In Memoriam “should identify the hand as the site of passional 
interchange, since the elegy’s explicit recommendation that ‘Love clasp Grief lest both be drown’d’ 
specifically cathects the hand with an erotic charge that oscillates obscurely between the homosocial and 
the homosexual. At times the poet’s desire that Hallam should ‘strike a sudden hand in mine’ (14) takes on 
a startling sexual configuration” (56). 
 viii 
 
language that recalls the stately simplicity of the Anglican service for the dead, he also 
throws himself upon Hallam’s body in a veiled but unmistakable image of a kiss” (43). 
Rosenberg has a complicated understanding of Tennyson’s sexuality, one that reflects the 
difficulty of elaborating the distinction between sexual and erotic experience. My 
approach to this passage is to read it as a sorrowful epistemological recognition, that even 
his “firmer mind” cannot truly know the dead, but only remember “the look it cannot 
find, / The words that are not heard again.” Rosenberg, in focusing on Tennyson’s 
physical acts—“lying down upon his friend, lips pressed to lips,” he writes (44)—misses 
the possibility that the immortalizing kiss Tennyson seeks here is more than a sexual 
pleasure: this kiss is also an epistemological act, an act that “imparts” new knowledge, as 
the life that “dies not, but endures with pain,” “slowly forms the firmer mind.” 
 In the infamous ninety-third section, another often considered as evidence of the 
poem’s homoerotic consciousness, Tennyson yearns for Hallam’s spirit to “Descend, and 
touch, and enter: hear / The wish too strong for words to name, / That in this blindness of 
the frame / My Ghost may feel that thine is near” (93. 13-16). In Adonais and Ave Atque 
Vale, there is nothing quite like the quiet ache of sensual longing we hear and feel in 
these lines. The sexual imagery is difficult to overlook, and the spiritual language of 
“Ghost” only partially allays the worry over physical longing for another man’s caress: as 
an immaterial presence, there is no real possibility of intimate bodily touch. Whether 
“Descend, and touch, and enter” are to be read as acts of the sexual body or as figures of 
bodily speech, or both, remains uncertain, as Tennyson’s ambiguous longing for 
Hallam’s posthumous touch recurs multiple times, in various ways, throughout the poem.  
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 Another key passage on Tennyson’s desire to touch and be touched by Hallam 
suggests not a physical or carnal touch, but a touch of language that is analogous to those 
in Adonais and Ave Atque Vale. My interest lies in those touching moments when 
amorous contact is represented as a textual want, a desire for (the touch of) language. 
This passage from section 95 is a clear example: “So word by word, and line by line, / 
The dead man touch’d me from the past, / And all at once it seem’d at last / The living 
soul was flash’d on mine” (95. 33-36). Tennyson’s love for Hallam is here a desire for 
“words” and “lines,” metonyms for Hallam’s poetry and letters that allow the “dead man” 
to “touch” him with language.236 But even when, as it is here, the nature of this touch is 
figurative, its meaning is still ambiguous. I offer two possible interpretations: “touch’d” 
can mean intransitively and affectively—a heartfelt thanks—as in, “I am touched that you 
thought of me”; or, “touch’d” can mean transitively and materially, as Tennyson 
imagines Hallam’s words to have material substance that can make contact with (touch) 
and move through his reading, speaking body.237 
 We have seen how metonymies of poetic touch occur in Adonais and Ave Atque 
Vale, but their difference from In Memoriam lies in the fact that we cannot quite be sure 
whether Tennyson’s yearning for Hallam remains in the poetic imaginary (as it does for 
Shelley and Swinburne) or if his desire seeks the bodily pleasure of Hallam’s actual, 
physical touch. Yet, all three elegies work with figures of speech that represent a desire 
for the dead poet’s corpus and allow an intimate textual touch between the living and the 
                                                
236 Three stanzas prior, Tennyson states: “A hunger seized my heart; I read / Of that glad year which once 
had been, / In those fallen leaves which kept their green, / The noble letters of the dead” (95. 21-24). The 
pun of “fallen leaves” that “kept their green” relates to both the strangeness of a season where leaves fall 
(Autumn) yet remain vibrant and alive, which is Tennyson saying that Hallam’s letters—his speech—
remain vital after his death. 
 
237 For an alternate reading of this passage, see Richard Dellamora, Masculine Desire 34. 
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dead. This resonance with Adonais and Ave Atque Vale is what allows me to claim that an 
epistemology of touching runs through nineteenth-century elegiac poetics in which erotic 
experience imparts a knowledge that exceeds the confines of the sexual body. 
 If in its speech, In Memoriam is consistently unsure of itself (as we see most 
urgently in the poem’s relentless self-questioning, self-skepticism, and the ambiguous 
erotic figurations I have just looked at), it seems powerfully assured formally.238 The 
most immediate formal feature of the poem’s textual eroticism is the eponymous In 
Memoriam stanza. The internally chiastic and self-enclosed abba rhyme structure (though 
it is at times enjambed across stanzas and even sections) is the only element of the nearly 
three-thousand line poem that remains consistent throughout the poem. For Denise 
Gigante, the stanza form is a model performance of the “mechanics” of Tennyson’s 
desire for Hallam: the “‘lost desire’ that Tennyson laments in In Memoriam,” she asserts, 
“is materially cathected” in this form (481).239 And John Hollander has playfully 
imagined the central bb couplet as “Lines holding hands as lovers do” (16), a formal 
metaphor that becomes ever more apt when we consider how important the acts of 
                                                
238 Of the many possible examples of Tennyson’s self-skepticism one could cite, two examples should 
suffice to show just how deeply anxious he is about speaking his love for Hallam. See Craft: In Memoriam 
is “the site of a continuing problematization: the problem not merely of desire between men, but also of the 
desire (very urgent in the elegy) to speak it” (47). 
 
239 Denise Gigante lucidly explains how the “question of form” and the “question of desire” in the poem are 
“root[ed]” in “the one consistent—indeed, insistent—thing about the poem that has been consistently 
overlooked: the eponymous In Memoriam stanza itself” (481). 
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touching and holding hands are to Tennyson’s poetics of elegiac love.240 Even formally, 
Tennyson’s verse enacts the touch he so forlornly longs for.241 
 Furthermore, the sheer length of the poem creates a reading experience quite 
different from that of the other elegies I look at. Its incessant, almost obsessive, stanzaic 
repetition performs in extremis the formal work of mourning we encounter in Adonais 
and Ave Atque Vale.242 The continual barrage of identical stanza after stanza, and section 
after section, that carries us through three years of mourning creates an effect of readerly 
exhaustion that mimics Tennyson’s own mourning exhaustion over the course of the 
seventeen years during which he wrote the poem.243 While his extensive examination of 
his grief may indicate Tennyson’s confidence in elegiac poetry to console his loss and 
allow him knowledge of the dead, a more compelling view is that “The sheer 
extensiveness of Tennyson’s discourse of desire (no one ever wished the poem longer) 
writes against desire’s own desire to end” (Craft 68). Tennyson’s continual piling of 
stanzas and his frequent revisiting of it over such a long period of time, reveals the 
anxiety that his sorrow and mourning may never cease. Despite these differences that 
                                                
240 See Craft for more on the problem of touching and the status of the hand as the poem’s “primary 
synecdoche for presence […]; for absence […]; and for the medial condition between these two.” He notes: 
“In Memoriam is almost obsessive in its concern for the human hand and in its desire for a restored male 
touch” (55). 
 
241 Both Craft and Rosenberg have noted the centrality of hand imagery to the poem’s eroticism. “In 
Memoriam,” Craft states, “is almost obsessive in its concern for the human hand and in its desire for a 
restored male touch” (55). 
 
242 For more on the purpose and effect of elegiac repetition, which I have explained in the previous chapters 
with regard to Shelley and Swinburne as an aspect of their elegiac eroticism, see Sacks, The English Elegy 
(1-37, 166-203). 
 
243 Rosenberg comments on the “inordinate length” of the poem, its “first transgression […] against genre.” 
“He strains the generic seams of elegy to the bursting point,” he continues, “yet he remains eminently 
Victorian in mourning at such elaborate length.” Queen Victoria herself “was never more Victorian than in 
her inconsolably protracted mourning over Albert, and the bonds of respect and affection between the 
Queen and her Laureate derived in part from their being world-class mourners, the most celebrated of the 
century” (41). 
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make In Memoriam an unexpected outlier in the elegiac tradition, they situate the poem 
within the Platonic current of erotic desire in the nineteenth century. The Platonic ideal of 
“spiritual procreancy” (Symposium 209a), which Linda Dowling explains as “that pure 
intellectual commerce between male lovers which brings forth the arts, philosophy, and 
wisdom itself” (xv), is the connective thread that runs through my chapters on Shelley 
and Swinburne, and foregrounds the epistemological dimension of Platonic eros.244 
 
                                                
244 Though Dowling is concerned with the historical conditions under which late Victorian writers 
reinvigorated the study of Platonic eros through the “pure and intellectual dimension of Uranian love” 
insists that Aestheticism is much more than “a convenient blind for carnal appetite” (115). The “intellectual 
dimension of Uranian love” finds earlier expression in Shelley’s Platonic poems like Prometheus Unbound, 
Epipsychidion, and Adonais. 
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